I’ve been working on a provider-independent governance boundary for external AI agents and would value technical criticism from people building with OpenAI’s agent stack.
The premise is simple:
Authenticating an artificial agent should establish who is acting—not automatically establish what it is authorized to do.
The prototype separates:
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external-agent identity from authority
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narrowly scoped and time-bounded delegation
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deterministic execution/approval boundaries
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governed persistent state with provenance
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action receipts linking principal → delegation → agent → workflow → action → result
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revocation and recovery while preserving the evidence chain
The architecture is:
External Agent Provider → Governed Agent Adapter → Deterministic Governance Kernel
In the current executable demonstration, a simulated external agent begins authenticated but with zero ambient authority. It then receives narrowly bounded capabilities, encounters execution/approval/denial boundaries, produces deterministic evidence, and is finally revoked while the prior evidence chain remains intact.
Important limitation: the provider transport is currently deterministic and simulated. I am not claiming a live OpenAI, Codex, Grok, or other provider integration.
The goal is not to replace provider-native authorization. It is to investigate what governance should exist around increasingly capable provider-supplied workers when identity, delegated authority, persistent state, execution evidence, and recovery need to remain independently enforceable.
I’d particularly value feedback on two questions:
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Where should this boundary attach most cleanly to the OpenAI Agents SDK/Codex architecture?
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Which of these responsibilities should properly remain provider-independent versus being implemented natively by the model/agent provider?
I have a short executable demonstration, architecture summary, and verification package available; my new forum account currently cannot post external links.