We, the undersigned organizations and individuals, are deeply alarmed by the rapid militarization of artificial intelligence (AI) technologies. AI systems embedded into military kill chains are accelerating the speed and scale of military assaults in a manner that creates significant new risks for accountability in conflict and risks facilitating violations of international criminal, human rights, and humanitarian law.

We therefore call for tech companies and states to halt the provision of AI systems for use in the military kill chain and to take all steps to ensure that other AI systems they provide do not cause or contribute to violations of international humanitarian law (IHL) and international human rights law (IHRL). This includes the use of AI decision-support systems, including target generation systems, remote biometric surveillance, and multimodal AI models, including large language models (LLMs). AI-accelerated warfare is rapidly becoming a means of rubber-stamping killing at speed and at scale, and currently no technical or procedural fixes can effectively prevent the lethal and devastating consequences that stem from the fundamental challenges it poses to international law.

All companies, including those contracting with government military agencies across the AI supply chain, from licensing and training ‘frontier’ models to providing data processing and storage functionalities, must take all possible steps to ensure that their products and services are not causing, contributing to, or being directly linked to human rights abuses and international crimes. In armed conflict, this responsibility extends to respecting international humanitarian and criminal law, given the heightened risk of facilitating gross human rights abuses, including grave violations of international law, in such contexts. Where companies cannot meaningfully prevent or mitigate such risks, they must not enter into or fulfill such contracts.

AI-enabled data storage and analysis systems used in the kill chain, including Anthropic’s Claude large language model and the Maven Smart System, are, according to an NBC investigation, playing a role in supporting US and Israeli attacks on Iran. Open AI recently agreed to provide AI services to the US Department of Defense (DoD); Google has contracted with the DoD, like Anthropic, to “develop prototype frontier AI capabilities to address critical national security challenges in across warfighting and enterprise domains”; Microsoft, Google, and Amazon have for years provided data storage, processing, and other enterprise infrastructure services to DoD “warfighting” programs.

According to media reports and official statements by the DoD, the rapid generation of targets by AI tools has enabled the increase in speed, scale, intensity, and destructive force of US strikes on Iran. Within the first 48 hours of strikes, Israel and the US reportedly struck nearly 2,000 targets in Iran. While much remains unclear about the precise role played by AI systems in these military attacks on Iran, the strikes have had a devastating impact on civilians and civilian infrastructure

The adoption of AI targeting systems in this campaign follows the example of the Israeli government’s weaponization of data analysis and machine learning tools, powered by mass surveillance, in its genocidal attacks on Gaza. By diluting human responsibility for life-and-death decisions, Israel’s use of systems such as Lavender, Gospel, and Where’s Daddy may contribute to the obfuscation of international crimes behind a veneer of perceived algorithmic objectivity while also obfuscating accountability. 

Not for the first time, we are seeing Palestine used as a laboratory for experimental and dehumanizing methods of warfare, including through corporate tech partnerships with Israeli military agencies. Microsoft, Google, Palantir, and other tech companies may have contributed to or enabled the Israeli government’s access to mass data storage, processing and analysis systems that are aiding their ongoing destruction and genocide in Gaza, which has so far led to the killing of at least 72,000 Palestinians.

Legal scholars and practitioners, technical experts, tech workers, UN special rapporteurs, and investigative journalists have long warned against the development and deployment of AI in warfare, given the heightened risk of international crimes. Despite claims by their proponents that AI tools are making warfare more effective, precise, or humane, real-world deployments indicate that AI is actually facilitating more violent, dehumanizing, and destructive methods of warfare.

In particular, we are profoundly concerned that the use of LLMs for target generation and prioritization is pushing military actors into a form of warfare where foundational principles of international humanitarian law –– including the principles of distinction, proportionality and precaution –– are not, and arguably cannot be, sufficiently respected, given the sheer speed and scale of such technologies, in addition to the unreliable, biased, and often illegally obtained input data. And we further assert that these dynamics risk facilitating human rights abuses, crimes against humanity, and war crimes. Moreover, the opacity that comes with the use of these tools fundamentally threatens the possibility of attributing moral or legal responsibility in cases where errors are made. As Anthropic has stated themselves “…today, frontier AI systems are simply not reliable enough to power fully autonomous weapons. We will not knowingly provide a product that puts America’s warfighters and civilians at risk”. Actors who choose to deploy AI systems that are used to commit international crimes must be held criminally responsible.

Our concerns are not limited to the errors that may result from such systems malfunctioning but encompass how these systems fundamentally transform military operations. We therefore reject the premise that at present, technical or functional fixes, whether that be a purported ‘human in the loop’ or supposedly hardcoded guardrails in AI models, can prevent the lethal and devastating consequences of AI-accelerated kill chains. These propositions allow for the normalization and proliferation of embedding AI in military decision-making to the detriment of vulnerable communities and populations. At present, meaningful human control, genuine accountability, oversight, and transparency of these technologies are not possible in their current form.

Even where AI systems used for target acquisition do not make the final decision to kill, they risk becoming rubber-stamping mechanisms for killing at scale because they appeal to false notions of objectivity and may displace accountability and due diligence, which can ultimately serve to expedite and streamline mass killing. Layering such systems with even more ‘frictionless’ techniques of surveillance, target acquisition, and command operations, e.g., in the form of large AI models, such as LLMs, automates dehumanization by reducing questions of life and death to a simple chat prompt. The decision to kill another human being carries a grave moral and legal weight and must never be devolved to purely accepting or rejecting the recommendations of AI systems. When militaries rely on AI to expedite target identification with such speed and routinization that any human review risks becoming a rubber stamp without meaningful human control, mass killing can and will often ensue, in direct violation of the principle of precaution under IHL.

Companies have a responsibility to respect human rights and refrain from causing or contributing to human abuses and other violations of international law, including providing material or financial support to states engaged in international crimes. As reflected in the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, companies engaged in such conduct must immediately cease their contribution to harm. Even when a company is not causing or contributing to harm but is merely linked to it, it is expected to use its leverage to seek to bring an end to these violations.

Once they have entered military contracts, companies may have limited agency over how their products and services are used, demonstrated through Anthropic’s standoff with the US government, as well as reports of Google and Amazon suspending the applicability of their terms of services in contracts with the Israeli government. As recently as 27 April 2026, more than 560 Google employees signed an open letter to Google’s CEO, urging the company to refuse to let the US government use its AI technology in classified military operations.

Tech companies and their executives should take seriously their potential culpability in cases where their technologies play a role in violations of international law before entering these lucrative defense contracts, and refrain from doing so where they cannot make such an assessment. Beyond that, they must also understand the role they have to play in reshaping the normative architecture of the use of AI in conflict.

We, the undersigned organizations and individuals, call for: 

Tech companies to:

  • Refrain from entering into or fulfilling contracts with military agencies or armed groups that commit possible violations of international law, including human rights violations and atrocity crimes;
  • Refrain from selling, transferring, servicing, or exporting AI decision support systems for military kill chains and human targeting, including target generation systems and remote biometric surveillance; and
  • Refrain from selling or exporting AI decision-support systems for non-lethal purposes, including multimodal AI models such as LLMs, for use in military decision-making processes, until genuine accountability, meaningful human control, oversight, and transparency is made possible in line with principles of international humanitarian law and international human rights law.

States to: 

  • Halt the use of AI tools, including large language models, in the conduct of military targeting, and ensure adherence to principles of international humanitarian law and international human rights law; and
  • Provide transparency on how AI is currently being used in the conduct of hostilities.

Amnesty International wrote to Open AI and Anthropic relating to their human rights policies and practices in relation to generative AI use in military contexts, as it has not previously corresponded with these companies on this topic. At the time of publication of this statement only Open AI responded. Their response is available here.

Signatories

Individuals

Please note the individuals named below do not necessarily represent the opinion or position of their institutions or organizations.

  1. Abdurrahman Ahmed, Google
  2. Abe Fetterman, OpenAI
  3. Abeba Birhane, AI Accountability Lab, Trinity College Dublin
  4. Ahmed Khaled, Google
  5. Al Borchers, Google Deepmind
  6. Alannah Travers, Queen’s University Belfast
  7. Albert Shaw, Google
  8. Alex Argüelles, Commun.al Digital Resistance Lab
  9. Alexander Turner, Google DeepMind
  10. Alexandre Kaskasoli, United Tech and Allied Workers
  11. Ali Assaf, Google
  12. Alix Dunn, The Maybe
  13. Amanda Johnson, Google
  14. Ana Valdivia, Oxford Internet Institute
  15. Anas Patel, Google
  16. Anna Harutyunyan, Google Deepmind
  17. Anouk Ruhak, Stichting Data Bescherming Nederland 
  18. Anton Alexandrov, Google
  19. Antonella Visintin, Globalization and Environment Commission (GLAM)
  20. Anurag Anurag, University of Calgary
  21. Aoise Keogan-Nooshabadi, RealML
  22. Azizi Ab Aziz, Universiti Utara Malaysia
  23. Baran Özgül, Google
  24. Ben Hutchinson, Google
  25. Beth Goldberg
  26. Brett Solomon, Senior Research Fellow, Human Rights Center, Berkeley
  27. Brooke Suchomel, Google
  28. Caroline Sinders, Convocation Research + Design
  29. Catherine D’Ignazio, MIT Data + Feminism Lab
  30. Catherine Yeh, OpenAI
  31. Celso Bessa, Instituto Tecnologia Humanista
  32. Cesar Manso, Digital Freedom Fund
  33. Chang Sun, OpenAI
  34. Charvi Rastogi, Google Deepmind
  35. Chihiro Fujisaki, Privacy by Design Lab
  36. Christian Heck , Academy of Media Arts Cologne (KHM)
  37. Christoffel Doorman, Google DeepMind
  38. Claudia López, Universidad de Chile
  39. Claudia Magallanes Blanco, Universidad Iberoamericana Puebla
  40. Claudio Gutierrez, University of Chile
  41. Corinna Aichele, Freifunk
  42. Daisuke Iguchi, Artist
  43. Daniel Kasenberg, Google Deepmind
  44. Daniel Margolis, Google
  45. David Gray Widder, University of Texas at Austin
  46. Edel Hughes, University of Galway
  47. Edson Prestes , Federal University of Rio Grande do Sul (UFRGS)
  48. Eleanor Straight, Google
  49. Eliana Quiroz, Fundación Internet Bolivia
  50. Elke Schwarz, International Committee for Robot Arms Control 
  51. Fabio Cristiano, Utrecht University
  52. Fiona McOwan, National Secretary Women’s International League for Peace & Freedom UK
  53. Francesca Bosco, Senior Expert on AI, Cybersecurity and Digital Governance
  54. Francesca Musiani, Centre national de la recherche scientifique (CNRS)
  55. Gabriella Seiler, Reimagine
  56. Genoveva Vargas-Solar, Centre national de la recherche scientifique (CNRS)
  57. Gianclaudio Vianzone, Segretario Regionale Piemonte Partito Comunista di Unità Popolare
  58. Giovanni Bernardini, Waldesian Church
  59. Gretchen Krueger, Researcher Affiliated with Berkman Klein Center, formerly OpenAI
  60. Hana Marcetic, University of Luxembourg
  61. Hassan Nasif, Microsoft
  62. Hoda Gerami, Google
  63. Hossam Nasr, No Azure for Apartheid
  64. Hussain Masoom, Google DeepMind
  65. Illan Wall, University of Galway
  66. Ishmael Bhila, Paderborn University
  67. Ismail Wahdan, Google
  68. Jan Wicijowski, Google
  69. Janak Ramakrishnan, Google
  70. Javier Valls, University of Granada
  71. Jasmine Wang, formerly at Microsoft
  72. Jazmin Ruiz Díaz, TEDIC
  73. Jessica Gottsleben, Cyber x Climate
  74. Jesús Núñez Ruiz, Google
  75. Joel Hanisek, Irish Centre for Human Rights, University of Galway
  76. Jonas Scholz, Google DeepMind / University of Cambridge
  77. Joseph Shanak, Google
  78. Joshua Aldrich, Google Cloud AI
  79. Judith Membrives i Llorens, Universitat Oberta de Catalunya
  80. Julia Slupska, University of Bristol
  81. Kathleen Richardson, De Montfort University
  82. Kave Noori, Artificial Intelligence Policy Officer, European Disability Forum
  83. Kevin Ferret, Google
  84. Kevin T. Baker, author
  85. Khan Ahmed, Google
  86. Kjetil Rommetveit, University of Bergen
  87. Laura Weidinger, Google DeepMind
  88. Lauren Barnard, Stop Killer Robots Youth Network
  89. Lionel Levine, Cornell University
  90. Liza Loeffler, Google
  91. Luc Dockendorf, Ambassador for Cybersecurity and Digitalisation
  92. Lucia Fernanda Mesa Velez, Ladysmith Collective and University Giessen
  93. Maeve O’Rourke, Irish Centre for Human Rights
  94. Mais Qandeel, University of Galway
  95. Maria Giuseppina Gianotti, CGIL – Confederazione Generale Italiana del Lavoro
  96. Mariana Ferrarelli, Laboratorio Abierto de inteligencia artificial
  97. Marie Collins, Google
  98. Marietje Schaake, Author of ‘The Tech Coup’
  99. Marwan Aljubeh, OpenAI
  100. Matinde Magabe Baraka, CEO of the Centre for AI and Multidiscipline Solutions in Africa
  101. Matt Mahmoudi, University of Cambridge
  102. Matthew Tschiegg, Google
  103. Meem Arafat Manab, Universidad Politécnica de Madrid
  104. Michael L. Bąk, AI Safety Asia
  105. Michael Tjalve, Humanitarian AI Advisory
  106. Mirna Al-Shetairy, Google (Alphabet)
  107. Mohamed Adel, Google
  108. Mohamed Hussien, No Azure for Apartheid organizer / Microsoft Employee
  109. Mohamed Nasr, Google
  110. Muhammed Uluyol, Google
  111. Mustaq Ahmed, Google
  112. Nahema Marchal, Google DeepMind
  113. Natalia Zuazo, FLACSO Argentina
  114. Natalie Weizenbaum, Google
  115. Nick Matelli, Google
  116. Nico Carballal, Google
  117. Nicolas Porcel, Google DeepMind
  118. Nino Gualdoni, Associazione Copernicani ETS
  119. Norma Möllers, Queen’s University Canada
  120. Pablo Samuel Castro, Google DeepMind
  121. Palash Srivastava, Centre for Communication Governance, National Law University Delhi
  122. Paola Ricaurte, Red Feminista de Inteligencia Artificial en América Latina y el Caribe & Red Tierra Común
  123. Patricia Peña, University of Chile
  124. Paul Bradfield, Irish Centre for Human Rights
  125. Peter Zhokhov, OpenAI
  126. Pierre-Louis Guidez, Google
  127. Piotr Mirowski, Google DeepMind
  128. Rafiya Javed, Google DeepMind
  129. Ray Acheson, author of ‘Banning the Bomb, Smashing the Patriarchy’
  130. Ray Murphy, Irish Centre for Human Rights
  131. Rainer Rehak, Weizenbaum Institute
  132. Raquel Borbolla Albarran,Human Rights Defender and Activist Amnesty International México
  133. Relja Arandjelovic, Google DeepMind
  134. René Mayrhofer, Johannes Kepler University Linz and Google (pending resignation because of the deal with the US DoW)
  135. Rishub Jain, formerly at Google DeepMind
  136. Rima Sghaier, Independent digital rights researcher
  137. Roel Dobbe, Delft University of Technology
  138. Ron Salaj, Meaning Making
  139. Roque Soto Castaneda, Google
  140. Ryan Powell, International Press Institute
  141. Sarah Shoker, Berkeley Risk and Security Lab, formerly OpenAI
  142. Salvatore Barbera, Via Lattea
  143. Sacha Gutierrez, Science Communicator @cybersacha
  144. Sasha Costanza-Chock, Design Justice Network
  145. Shane Darcy, Irish Centre for Human Rights
  146. Siavash Eshghi, Global Unit for Human Security, Heinrich Böll Foundation
  147. Simon Ilse, Global Unit Human Security, Heinrich Böll Foundation
  148. Simona Bonardi, Technologist and AI Ethicist
  149. Sofia Liguori, Google DeepMind
  150. Souki Mansoor, OpenAI
  151. Stefanía Acevedo, Tierra Común
  152. Steven Bohez, Google DeepMind
  153. Susie Shefeni, Stop Killer Robots Youth Network
  154. Terumi Terao, Professor Emeritus at Nagoya Institute of Technology
  155. Timothée Lottaz, Google DeepMind
  156. Timur Lukin, Google
  157. Thomas Brovelli, Google Deepmind
  158. Tom Schaul, Google DeepMind
  159. Trent McCormick, Google
  160. Urvashi Aneja, Digital Futures Lab
  161. Victor Minden, Google DeepMind
  162. Vicente Martínez Fernández, The Responsible Technology Hub
  163. Virginia Dignum, AI Policy Lab at Umeå University
  164. Wanda Muñoz, Red Feminista de Inteligencia Artificial en América Latina y el Caribe
  165. William Fitzgerald, The Worker Agency
  166. Zach Parent, OpenAI