As the analyses in this report show, engagement with China as a rising technological power differs in these 21 EU member states and the United Kingdom, but each of these countries is exposed one way or the other.
For some of the countries analysed in this report, exposure to Chinese tech is focused on consumer products; for others, it is an integral part of industrial value chains or infrastructure. There are significant differences in public debates regarding the risks associated with dealing with China as a technological power – from virtually no discussions to lively debates about the delicate balance between nuanced collaboration and targeted de-risking on tech- and innovation.
The degree of exposure and engagement with China in tech and innovation often coincides with a country’s economic exposure to China writ large. France, Germany, Italy and the United Kingdom can be counted among the countries that are most affected by China’s rise in tech and innovation sectors.
For France, ensuring national and European sovereignty and competitiveness is now structuring relations with China in the technology and innovation space. While China’s capacity for technological innovation has become undeniable, the perception of risk in France is increasingly palpable. Paris is looking to boost European competence in fields that touch on sovereignty and security, such as AI or quantum applications, digital infrastructure or strategic supply chains. This limits the scope of engagement with China (as well as with the United States).
Germany’s economy is faced with an existential crisis due to increasing competition from China in key industries like automotive, machinery, and pharma. The science community continues to debate the “risks of not engaging” to the detriment of security circles, who urge for a more conservative approach to prevent unwanted tech transfer. The government’s efforts to strengthen German competitiveness are only taking off slowly; efforts for risk mitigation in both business and science are often met with resistance, because the relevant actors consider not collaborating with China a risk in itself.
In Italy, autonomous driving technology is arguably the most consequential dossier in tech and innovation relations, with Chinese state-owned enterprise SinoChem being a relative majority shareholder at tire manufacturer Pirelli. On the domestic market, Italian companies in the biopharma sector are facing encroachment by surging Chinese competitors. The country is increasingly preoccupied with the question of how continued collaboration with Chinese partners could negatively affect an already declining global share in high-tech manufacturing.
The United Kingdom and China have a long-standing collaborative relationship in science, technology and innovation. However, bilateral research and technology ties have become increasingly securitised over recent years, and the object of domestic political pressure on the UK government. As a result, future collaboration is likely to be more constrained than in an earlier phase of bilateral relations.
Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, the Netherlands, Poland and Sweden can also be counted among the countries with a comparatively high degree of exposure to and engagement with China as a tech power. Their approaches to risk mitigation, however, differ considerably:
Austria’s science and technology engagement with China is characterized by quiet and steady continuity. Positioning itself as a small neutral actor, Austria has thus far avoided both enthusiastic embrace as well as dramatic rupture, seeking balance between geopolitical pressures under the umbrella of EU-level frameworks. Austria’s industrial policy roadmap until 2035, without mentioning China explicitly, places a strong emphasis on boosting technological sovereignty, economic resilience and the protection of critical infrastructure.
Belgium’s technology relationship with China is shaped by its structural strengths in innovation, institutional and regional fragmentation, and geopolitical dynamics putting its growth model increasingly under pressure. The country hosts significant innovation assets, notably in semiconductors, pharmaceuticals, and advanced manufacturing. Flanders dominates Belgium’s trade and investment relationship with China but has also applied tighter guardrails on investments and research collaboration.
In Denmark, Chinese firms now supply much of its electric bus fleet, Chinese batteries are entering the power grid, and cooperation is expanding in areas such as green maritime technology and water management. Although the China challenge has recently figured less prominently in public debates, concerns about Chinese technology remain deeply institutionalized. Since 2018, Copenhagen has embraced the EU’s de-risking approach, tightened research guidelines, and restricted the use of Chinese-made 5G, drones and surveillance technology.
China’s clout in tech and innovation is seen in an increasingly critical light both in business and among citizens in Finland, also due to Beijing’s pro-Russian stance in the Ukraine war. In policy and expert circles, views began turning more critical around 2018, similar to many other European countries. In the 5G debate, the country has performed a U turn: while in the past, all major Finnish telecom operators had relied on Chinese equipment, it was reported in October 2025 that Finland will exclude ‘high-risk vendors’ (e.g., Huawei) from its 5G networks on security grounds.
Technology also plays a crucial role in Sino-Dutch relations. The Netherlands has a strong high-tech industry that is entangled with and dependent on Chinese players, which the conflict involving formerly Chinese-owned chipmaker Nexperia showed. Simultaneously, China is still reliant on critical technology and expertise from Dutch universities and companies like chip machine manufacturer ASML. This gives the Netherlands leverage in the relationship with China - but also makes it vulnerable to the US-China technological competition.
When it comes to Poland-China cooperation, four technology topics have recently been discussed: 5G, lithium-ion batteries, automotive and e-commerce. Rising awareness of China as a tech power led to the adoption of mitigation measures. Poland is open to Chinese high-tech investments, including EVs, but only on the condition of technology transfer and based on not simply becoming an assembly site for Chinese products.
In Sweden, Chinese-owned companies’ R&D investments have increased by almost 300 percent since 2013. At the same time, China’s dominance in several technology areas has become a controversial issue, at least since the mid-2010s. Security aspects have shaped policy adjustments in the past five years, for example in foreign direct investment screening and public procurement legislation.
Hungary, Ireland, Portugal, Slovakia and Spain are among the countries that prioritize cooperation.
In Hungary, China is positioned as both an economic partner and a potential source of technological integration, while risk discourse remains limited. Key sectors include electric mobility, battery production, advanced ICT, and applied research, though the effectiveness of agreements is constrained by regulatory gaps and Chinese restrictions on technology transfer. Changes to that position might lie ahead following the change of government after the 2026 elections.
Pharmaceuticals, drugs and investments in R&D in China are at the core of Ireland’s engagement with China in science, technology and innovation. Ireland’s policy towards China in this realm constitutes a balancing act: Ireland’s open and FDI-driven economic model, traditionally strong ties to the US, and government strategies focused on security, competitiveness and a deeper integration within the EU single market.
Similarly, Portugal’s engagement with China as a technological and innovation power is grounded in a mix of collaborative openness, economic pragmatism, and caution amidst intense geopolitical competition and rivalry. In this context, an incremental growth of Portugal-China collaborative projects and initiatives in strategically relevant technological fields is visible in domains like e-batteries, energy and ICT infrastructure.
Slovakia’s relations with China in the domain of technology and innovation have been characterized over the past five years by pendulum-swinging positions driven by differing political ideologies among governing parties. Contrary to the previous government, the coalition led by Prime Minister Robert Fico pursues cordial relations with China across all domains of interaction. Cooperation on green technologies and renewables is framed as a means towards “enhancing energy security,” while reliance on Russian fossil fuels and partnership with the US in nuclear energy persist in parallel.
Spain approaches the challenge pragmatically: it still sees Chinese investment and technological cooperation as tools for industrial upgrading and the green transition, even as concerns about resilience, security and asymmetry grow. “Selective engagement” is the order of the day for Spain: limiting risk in sensitive areas such as 5G core networks, relying heavily on Chinese capabilities in photovoltaics and storage, and trying to embed Chinese investment in EVs and batteries within broader industrial goals.
For some of the countries analysed in this report, engagement with China on tech and innovation is not non-existent, but more limited. Among them are, for different reasons, Czechia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania and Slovenia – each of them with their own approaches to risk mitigation.
In Czechia, Chinese investments in the Czech technology sector remain relatively small and have been constrained by security considerations and investment screening mechanisms. However, there is a distinction between discourse and practice, as investments in Chinese 5G and solar panel technologies continue despite warnings from security agencies. The Czech industry strongly relies on Chinese imports, while Chinese consumer electronics, surveillance cameras, and selected industrial technologies are widely used.
Estonia’s engagement with China is best characterized by a divergence in the recommendations made by the national security apparatus, and decisions made by the business community. In 2019, Estonia signed the 5G memorandum with the US. China’s support for Russia in its war against Ukraine likely caused the exit of the 16+1 format and BRI. Yet there has not been a full decoupling: Huawei photovoltaic inverters remain embedded in Estonia’s energy infrastructure, and Estonia’s Bolt has announced a partnership with China’s Pony.ai in self-driving technology.
China’s investment in Latvia has largely been unsuccessful. Amidst the US-China rivalry and evolving EU policy on technological security, Latvia has opted to engage with China via EU frameworks rather than China led-initiatives.
Lithuania’s position on China as a technological power has shifted from openness, in particular in fintech collaboration, to one of the most alarmist in Europe. Four technology sectors – telecommunications, surveillance tech, photonics, and greentech – have become targets of either Lithuanian securitisation or Chinese retaliatory economic coercion.
The technological paths of Romania and China also rarely intersect. Even though many Memorandas of Understanding have been signed, no real tech output has resulted from them. Nor is there any debate about potential risks of China as a tech actor. Chinese surveillance technology – CCTV cameras – were adopted in Romanian public institutions without any larger debate.
Slovenia increasingly considers China an attractive partner in technology, primarily with the goal to create additional options and reduce dependence on a slowing European industrial base. With one of Europe’s highest manufacturing shares of GDP and among the global top 10 in robot density, there is high interest in engaging with China on technological enhancement and market access. Yet, Slovenia sees itself anchored in the EU, which sets clear limits on this engagement.