1    | State Council of the People’s Republic of China (2026). “国务院关于产业链供应链安全的规定” (Provisions of the State Council on industrial and supply chain security). Beijing: State Council Order No. 834. March 31. https://www.gov.cn/zhengce/content/202604/content_7064837.htm?mc_cid=56d762dffc.  Accessed: August 5, 2026; State Council of the People’s Republic of China (2026). “中华人民共和国反 外国不当域外管辖条例” (Regulations of the People’s Republic of China on countering improper extra-territorial jurisdiction by foreign states). Beijing: State Council Order No. 835. April 7. https://www.gov.cn/zhengce/content/202604/content_7065398.htm.  Accessed: August 5, 2026; State Council of the People’s Republic of China (2026). “国务院关于对外投资的规定” (Provisions of the State Council on outbound investment). Beijing: State Council Order No. 837. May 5. https://www.mee.gov.cn/zcwj/gwywj/202606/t20260602_1157822.shtml. Accessed: August 5, 2026; Ministry of Commerce of the People’s Republic of China (2026). “产业链供应链安全调查工作办法” (Measures for industrial and supply chain security investigations). Beijing: MOFCOM Announcement No. 24 of 2026. June 22. https://www.mofcom.gov.cn/zwgk/zcfb/art/2026/art_6203fd463c704de1bd870597f24bbcb4.html.  Accessed: August 5, 2026.

2    | Fan, Qianchan (2026). “China Advances Central Bank Law Revision to Counter Foreign Sanc-tions.” Caixin Global. June 24. https://www.caixinglobal.com/2026-06-24/china-advances-cen-tral-bank-law-revision-to-counter-foreign-sanctions-102456982.html.  Accessed: August 10, 2026.

3    | Richter, Amelie, Zimmermann, Antonia and Köckritz, Angela (2026). “EU trade-defense instruments: Why Beijing is banking on German doubts.” Table.Briefings. June 8. https://table.media/en/china/talk-of-the-town/eu-trade-defense-instruments-why-beijing-is-banking-on-german-doubts . Accessed: Au-gust 5, 2026; Global Times (2026). “EU’s Industrial Accelerator Act risks ‘counterproductive outcomes’: China Chamber of Commerce to EU.” June 20. https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202606/1363955.shtml.  Accessed: August 5, 2026; Bermingham, Finbarr (2026). “China threatens EU firms over cyber-security plans targeting Chinese companies.” South China Morning Post. April 20. https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3350763/china-threatens-eu-firms-over-cybersecurity-plans-tar-geting-chinese-companies.  Accessed: August 5, 2026.

4    | State Council of the People’s Republic of China (2026). 中华人民共和国国民经济和社会发展第十五个五年规划纲要 (Outline of the 15th Five-Year Plan for National Economic and Social Development of the Peo-ple’s Republic of China). Beijing: State Council. March. https://www.gov.cn/yaowen/liebiao/202603/content_7062633.htm  Accessed: August 5, 2026.

5    | Legarda, Helena, Arcesati, Rebecca, Davey, Alexander, Gunter, Jacob, and Insisa, Aurelio (2026). “MERICS China Security and Risk Tracker 01/2026.” MERICS. June 18. https://merics.org/de/tracker/merics-china-security-and-risk-tracker-012026.  Accessed: August 5, 2026; Bartsch, Bernhard and Wessling, Claudia (eds.) (2026). Fragmented Europe: Dealing with China as a Technology and Inno-vation Power. European Think-tank Network on China Report. Berlin: MERICS, June. https://merics.org/sites/default/files/2026-07/MERICS%2BETNC_Report_2026_WEB%20%281%29.pdf.  Accessed: August 5, 2026; MERICS (2026). MERICS China Essentials 1/2026. Berlin: MERICS, January 22. https://merics.org/sites/default/files/2026-01/1%202026_MERICS%20China%20Essentials%20EN.pdf.   Accessed: August 5, 2026.

6    | OECD (2025). Economic Security in a Changing World. New Approaches to Economic Challenges. Paris: OECD Publishing. September 11. https://doi.org/10.1787/4eac89c7-en.  Accessed: August 5, 2026.

7    | Drinhausen, Katja and Legarda, Helena (2022). “Comprehensive National Security unleashed: How Xi’s approach shapes China’s policies at home and abroad.” Berlin: MERICS. September 15. https://merics.org/en/report/comprehensive-national-security-unleashed-how-xis-approach-shapes-chinas-poli-cies-home-and.  Accessed: August 5, 2026; Quishi (2024). “国家安全，习近平总书记心中的‘头等大事’” (National security: The ‘top priority’ in General Secretary Xi Jinping’s mind). April 15. http://www.qstheory.cn/zhuanqu/2024-04/15/c_1130109410.htm. Accessed: August 5, 2026.

8    | Legarda, Helena, Arcesati, Rebecca, Drinhausen, Katja, Impiombato, Daria, and Gunter, Jacob (2025). “MERICS China Security and Risk Tracker 01/2025.” MERICS. June 18. https://merics.org/en/tracker/merics-china-security-and-risk-tracker-012025.  Accessed: August 5, 2026.

9    | See e.g. sections in the 13th, 14th and the most recent 15th FYP released in 2026. National Develop-ment and Reform Commission (2026). “中华人民共和国国民经济和社会发展第十五个五年规划纲要” (15th Five-Year Plan on Economic and Social Development of the PRC). Beijing. https://www.ndrc.gov.cn/fggz/fzzlgh/gjfzgh/202603/U020260317369114704096.pdf.  Accessed: August 5, 2026.

10    | National Development and Reform Commission (2021). “‘十四五’规划《纲要》解读文章之36｜强化国家经济安全保障” (Interpretation of the 14th Five-Year Plan Outline, No. 36: Strengthening national econom-ic security guarantees). Beijing. December 25. https://www.ndrc.gov.cn/fggz/fzzlgh/gjfzgh/202112/t20211225_1309724.html. Accessed: August 5, 2026.

11    | Xi, Jinping 习近平 (2021). “努力成为世界主要科学中心和创新高地” (Strive to make China a major global science center and innovation hub). March 15. https://archive.is/pC0k7 . Accessed: August 5, 2026.

12    | CCP Central Committee and State Council (2016). “国家创新驱动发展战略纲要” (Outline of the National Innovation-Driven Development Strategy). Translated by Etcetera Language Group, Inc.; edited by Ben Murphy. Washington, DC: Center for Security and Emerging Technology, December 11, 2019. https://cset.georgetown.edu/publication/outline-of-the-national-innovation-driven-development-strategy/ . Accessed: August 5, 2026.

13    | Arcesati, Rebecca, François Chimits and Antonia Hmaidi (2024). Keeping value chains at home: How China controls foreign access to technology and what it means for Europe. Berlin: MERICS. August 8. https://merics.org/en/report/keeping-value-chains-home.  Accessed: August 5, 2026.

14    | Brussee, Vincent, von Carnap, Kai (2024). “The increasing challenge of obtaining information from Xi’s China.” Berlin: MERICS. February 15. https://merics.org/en/report/increasing-challenge-obtaining-in-formation-xis-china.  Accessed: August 5, 2026; Messingschlager, Stefan (2026). “When the Evidence Base on China Becomes a Policy Risk.” China Observers in Central and Eastern Europe. June, 29. https://chinaobservers.eu/when-the-evidence-base-on-china-becomes-a-policy-risk/.  Accessed: August 10, 2026.

15    | National Defense University Research Center for Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Charac-teristics for a New Era (2022). “坚持把政治安全放在首要位置——学习《总体国家安全观学习纲要》系列谈 6” (Uphold political security as the top priority: Series of discussions on studying the Outline for Study-ing the Holistic Approach to National Security, no. 6). CPC News. June 29. https://archive.is/zJ2R8. Accessed: August 5, 2026.

16    | State Council of the People’s Republic of China (2026). 中华人民共和国国民经济和社会发展第十五个五年规划纲要 (Outline of the 15th Five-Year Plan for National Economic and Social Development of the Peo-ple’s Republic of China). Beijing: State Council, March. https://www.gov.cn/yaowen/liebiao/202603/content_7062633.htm  Accessed: August 5, 2026; Mischer, Andreas and Alexander Brown. (2026).
Domestic Obstacles, Global Opportunities: The Road to Implementing China’s 15th Five-Year Plan. MERICS. July 29. https://merics.org/en/report/domestic-obstacles-global-opportunities.  Accessed: August 10, 2026.

17    | Institute of Party History and Literature of the CPC Central Committee and Xinhua Institute (2024). Chi-nese Modernization: The Way Forward. Beijing: Xinhua Publishing House. May 4. https://mchinaview.xhinst.net/Home/detail/20240504/19436403_Report-onChinese-Modernization-The-Way-Forward.  html. Accessed: August 5, 2026.

18    | Xinhua (2026). “Xinhua Headlines: China’s five-year roadmap bets big on innovation in strategic leap.” March 10. https://english.news.cn/20260310/4221a813a22141b2859f01d65d0b3578/c.html.  Accessed: August 5, 2026.

19    | Xinhua (2026). “Xiconomics: How China’s innovation drive charts a future of shared prosperity.” March 6. https://english.news.cn/20260306/5026fb2a256045a2a89d9c8081651117/c.html . Accessed: August 5, 2026.

20    | Research Center for Xi Jinping Economic Thought (2023). “统筹发挥国内大循环主体作用和国内国际双循环相互促进作用” (Coordinate the principal role of domestic circulation and the mutual promotion of domes-tic and international circulation). Beijing: Research Center for Xi Jinping Economic Thought. https://www.ndrc.gov.cn/wsdwhfz/202303/t20230322_1351592.html.  Accessed: August 5, 2026.

21    | Xi, Jinping (2020). “国家中长期经济社会发展战略若干重大问题” (Certain Major Issues for Our National Medium- to Long-Term Economic and Social Development Strategy). Beijing: Speech to the seventh meeting of the Central Financial and Economic Affairs Commission. April 10. Translated by the Center for Security and Emerging Technology. https://cset.georgetown.edu/wp-content/uploads/t0235_Qi-ushi_Xi_economy_EN-1.pdf.  Accessed: August 5, 2026.

22    | Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China (2024). “习近平同美国总统拜登在利马举行会 晤” (Xi Jinping meets US President Joe Biden in Lima). Beijing: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China. https://www.mfa.gov.cn/zyxw/202411/t20241117_11527702.shtml.  Accessed: August 5, 2026.

23    | Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China (2024). “国家主席习近平发表二〇二五年新年贺词” (President Xi Jinping delivers his 2025 New Year address). Beijing: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China. . https://www.mfa.gov.cn/web/wjdt_674879/gjldrhd_674881/202412/ t20241231_11524929.shtml. Accessed: August 5, 2026.

24    | Zenglein, Max J. and Gunter, Jacob (2023). The party knows best: Aligning economic actors with Chi-na’s strategic goals. Berlin: MERICS. October 12. https://merics.org/en/report/party-knows-best-align-ing-economic-actors-chinas-strategic-goals.  Accessed: August 5, 2026.

25    | Goodrich, Jimmy (2024). China’s Evolving Fortress Economy Outlook. IGCC Working Paper No 5. Oakland, CA: Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation. https://escholarship.org/uc/item/9q53t1sz.  Accessed: August 5, 2026.

26    | Cheung, Tai Ming, Naughton, Barry, and Hagt, Eric (2022). China’s Roadmap to Becoming a Science, Technology, and Innovation Great Power in the 2020s and Beyond: Assessing its Medium- and Long-Term Strategies and Plans. La Jolla: University of California Institute on Global Conflict and Coopera-tion. July. https://ucigcc.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/07/Ocea-revised-19-July-2022-1.pdf.  Accessed: August 5, 2026.

27    | Ministry of Commerce of the People’s Republic of China (2025). “国家出口管制工作协调机制办公室部署 开展打击战略矿产走私出口专项行动” (The Office of the National Export Control Coordination Mechanism launches a special action to combat the smuggling and export of strategic minerals). Beijing: Ministry of Commerce. May 9. Ministry of Commerce News Office. https://www.mofcom.gov.cn/syxwfb/art/2025/art_61943875866b46aa93d768080b4e6822.html.  Accessed: August 5, 2026.

28    | Ministry of Commerce of the People’s Republic of China (2026). “商务部公告2026年第24号 公布《产业链供应链安全调查工作办法》” (MOFCOM Announcement No. 24 of 2026: Issuance of the Measures for Industrial and Supply Chain Security Investigations). Beijing: Ministry of Commerce of the People’s Republic of China. June 22. https://www.mofcom.gov.cn/zwgk/zcfb/art/2026/art_6203fd463c704de1bd-870597f24bbcb4.html . Accessed: August 10, 2026.

29    | Leonard, Jenny (2025). “German Firms Hand Over Secrets That China Could Use for Leverage.” Bloomberg. October 25. https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2025-10-25/german-firms-hand-over-secrets-that-china-could-use-for-leverage.  Accessed: August 5, 2026.

30    | Notable provisions to that extent are included in the Regulations on Industrial and Supply Chain Secu-rity and in the Regulations on Countering Improper Exercise of Extraterritorial Jurisdiction. But efforts to strengthen private sector involvement into the implementation of economic security policies date farther back in time, for example through the creation of the CCP Societal Work Department in 2023.

31    | Naughton, Barry, Xiao, Siwen, and Xu, Yaosheng (2023). The Trajectory of China’s Industrial Policies. IGCC Working Paper no. 6. La Jolla, CA: UC Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation. June. https://ucigcc.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/06/Naugton-et-al-working-paper-1-jun-2023.pdf. Accessed: August 5, 2026.

32    | Sina Finance (2021). “发改委等13部门：研究国家制造业供应链安全计划” (NDRC and 12 other departments to study a national manufacturing supply-chain security plan). March 23. https://archive.is/OQ5xv. 
Accessed: August 6, 2026; She, Huimin 佘惠敏 (2021). “如何加快解决‘卡脖子’难题” (How to accelerate solutions to “chokepoint” problems). August 12. https://archive.is/xvEOo.  Accessed: August 6, 2026.

33    | Murphy, Ben (2022). Chokepoints: China’s Self-Identified Strategic Technology Import Dependencies. Washington, DC: Center for Security and Emerging Technology, May. https://cset.georgetown.edu/pub-lication/chokepoints/.  Accessed: August 5, 2026.

34    | Schindowski, Robin, Groenewegen-Lau, Jeroen, and Zenglein, Max J. (2026). Industrial Policy and Technology Linkages: Conceptualizing China’s Approach. VIVES Discussion Paper no. 107. Leuven: VIVES Research Center for Regional Economics, KU Leuven. April. https://feb.kuleuven.be/VIVES/pub-lications/discussion_papers/files/vives-discussion-paper-107-schindowski-zenglein-groenewegen-lau-dp-industrial-policy-and-technology-linkages-conceptualizing-chinas-approach-004.pdf.  Accessed: Au-gust 5, 2026; Groenewegen-Lau, Jeroen and Laha, Michael (2023). “Controlling the innovation chain: China’s strategy to become a science & technology superpower.” MERICS. February 2. https://merics.org/en/report/controlling-innovation-chain.  Accessed: August 5, 2026.

35    | National Development and Reform Commission (2024). “〖专家观点〗 加快形成新质生产力：是什 么、为什么、做什么？” ([Expert view] Accelerating the formation of new quality productive forces:
What it is, why it matters and what to do). February 6. https://www.ndrc.gov.cn/wsdwhfz/202402/t20240206_1363980.html.  Accessed: August 5, 2026.

36    | Chang, Wendy, Arcesati, Rebecca and Junusova, Altynay (2026). “Embodied AI: China’s ambitious path to transform its robotics industry.” MERICS. April 30. https://merics.org/en/report/embodied-ai-chi-nas-ambitious-path-transform-its-robotics-industry.  Accessed: August 5, 2026.

37    | CPC News (2016). “习近平论科技赶超战略：应该有非对称性‘杀手锏’” (Xi Jinping discusses the strategy for catching up in science and technology: China should possess asymmetric “assassin’s mace” capabili-ties). March 22. https://archive.is/5QVW7.  Accessed: August 5, 2026.

38    | State Council of the People’s Republic of China (2026). 中华人民共和国国民经济和社会发展第十五个五年规划纲要 (Outline of the 15th Five-Year Plan for National Economic and Social Development of the Peo-ple’s Republic of China). Beijing: State Council, March. https://www.gov.cn/yaowen/liebiao/202603/ content_7062633.htm Accessed: August 5, 2026.

39    | Gunter, Jacob (2026). “Beijing’s ‘support for demand’ is more about investment than consumption.” MERICS. January 23. https://merics.org/en/tracker/beijings-support-demand-more-about-invest-ment-consumption.  Accessed: August 5, 2026.

40    | Xiao, Guiyu 肖贵玉 (2025). “保持我国制造业合理比重是个重大问题” (Maintaining a reasonable share of manufacturing in China is a major issue). Qiushi. November 16. https://www.qstheory.cn/20251114/ ba063b5c1f4848c2a24fa1ab41f45f2a/c.html. Accessed: August 5, 2026; Gunter, Jacob (2026). “FYP’s call for an ‘appropriate share of manufacturing’ spells trouble for Europe.” MERICS, March 12. https://merics.org/sites/default/files/2026-03/4%202025_MERICS%20China%20Essentials%20EN.pdf.  Accessed: August 5, 2026.

41    | Qiushi (2025). “发展新质生产力不是忽视、放弃传统产业” (Developing new quality productive forc-es does not mean neglecting or abandoning traditional industries). July 9. https://www.qstheory.cn/20250709/20c0d1396725470c906e0ade0e836dd8/c.html.  Accessed: August 5, 2026.

42    | State Council of the People’s Republic of China (2026). 中华人民共和国国民经济和社会发展第十五个五年规划纲要 (Outline of the 15th Five-Year Plan for National Economic and Social Development of the Peo-ple’s Republic of China). Beijing: State Council, March. https://www.gov.cn/yaowen/liebiao/202603/ content_7062633.htm Accessed: August 5, 2026; Jeroen, Groenewegen-Lau (2024). Whole-of-Nation Innovation: Does China’s Socialist System Give it an Edge in Science and Technology? IGCC–MERICS special series. Berlin and La Jolla: MERICS and University of California Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation, February. https://merics.org/sites/default/files/2024-03/Jeroen-Whole%20of%20Na-tion%20Innovation-02.24.24.pdf.  Accessed: August 5, 2026.

43    | Arcesati, Rebecca, Chimits, François and Hmaidi, Antonia (2024). Keeping value chains at home: How China controls foreign access to technology and what it means for Europe. MERICS. August 8. https://merics.org/en/report/keeping-value-chains-home.  Accessed: August 5, 2026.

44    | Reuters (2026). “China bars Manus co-founders from leaving country amid Meta deal review, FT re-ports.” March 25. https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/china-bars-manus-co-founders-leaving-country-it-reviews-sale-meta-ft-reports-2026-03-25/.  Accessed: August 5, 2026. Additional regulations were issued in August 2026: State Council of the People’s Republic of China (2026). “国务院关于出境入 境管理的规定” (State Council Regulations on Exit and Entry Administration). Beijing: State Council Order No. 831. July 31. 国务院关于出境入境管理的规定_外交、外事_中国政府网. Accessed: August 5, 2026.

45    | Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress of the People’s Republic of China (2025). “中华人
民共和国对外贸易法” (Foreign Trade Law of the People’s Republic of China, 2025 Revision). Presidential Order No. 67. Beijing: Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress. December 27. https://www.mofcom.gov.cn/zwgk/zcfb/art/2025/art_03fbae1ec4bd48459099930e803bce5e.html.  Accessed: August 5, 2026.

46    | State Council of the People’s Republic of China (2026). “国务院关于对外投资的规定” (Provisions of the State Council on Outbound Investment). State Council Order No. 837. Beijing: State Council of the People’s Republic of China. May 5. https://www.gov.cn/zhengce/content/202606/content_7070755.htm.  Accessed: August 5, 2026.

47    | Some of these controls have been suspended until November 2026 following a deal negotiated between Xi Jinping and US President Donald Trump. For more information see: Arcesati, Rebecca, Chimits, François and Hmaidi, Antonia (2024). Keeping value chains at home: How China controls foreign ac-cess to technology and what it means for Europe. MERICS. August 8. https://merics.org/en/report/keep-ing-value-chains-home. Accessed: August 5, 2026; Laha, Michael (2025). Chinese Export Controls on Cathode Technology: The EU Must Increase Insight into Supply Chains. DGAP Memo 54. Berlin: German Council on Foreign Relations. December 18. https://doi.org/10.60823/DGAP-25-43040-en.  Accessed: August 6, 2026.

48    | Emont, Jon (2025). “China Is Tracking Down Its Rare-Earth Experts—and Taking Away Passports.” The Wall Street Journal. June 25. https://www.wsj.com/world/china-to-block-its-rare-earth-experts-from-spilling-their-secrets-8d69b75f. Accessed: August 5, 2026; Arcesati, Rebecca and Gunter, Jacob (2025). “China’s multi-purpose export controls raise pressure on Europe to derisk.” MERICS. October 1. https://merics.org/en/comment/chinas-multi-purpose-export-controls-raise-pressure-europe-derisk.  Accessed: August 5, 2026.

49    | Banach, Clark and Gunter, Jacob (2024). “Mapping China’s global port network: On the backfoot in 2024, but still well entrenched.” MERICS. November 7. https://merics.org/en/comment/mapping-chinas-global-port-network-backfoot-2024-still-well-entrenched . Accessed: August 5, 2026.

50    | European Union Chamber of Commerce in China (2020). The Road Less Travelled: European Involve-ment in China’s Belt and Road Initiative. Beijing: European Union Chamber of Commerce in China. January 16. https://www.europeanchamber.com.cn/en/publications-archive/762/The_Road_Less_Trav-elled_European_Involvement_in_China_s_Belt_and_Road_Initiative.  Accessed: August 5, 2026.

51    | Adachi, Aya, Gunter, Jacob and Mardell, Jacob (2022). “Economic stress has repercussions for China’s ambitions.” MERICS. July 7. https://merics.org/en/tracker/economic-stress-has-repercussions-chi-nas-ambitions.  Accessed: August 5, 2026.

52    | Gunter, Jacob, Adachi, Aya, and Ghiretti, Francesca (2022). “Xi’s global engagements outside “Fortress China” in Q3.” MERICS. September 30. https://merics.org/en/tracker/xis-global-engagements-out-side-fortress-china-q3 . Accessed: August 5, 2026.

53    | Gunter, Jacob, Adachi, Aya, Ghiretti, Francesca and Sebastian, Gregor (2023). “China Inc is recalibrat-ing its approach to its overseas footprint as the BRI turns 10 years old.” MERICS. September 27. https://merics.org/en/tracker/china-inc-recalibrating-its-approach-its-overseas-footprint-bri-turns-10-years-old.  Accessed: August 5, 2026.

54    | Gunter, Jacob, Adachi, Aya, Ghiretti, Francesca and Sebastian, Gregor (2023). MERICS China Glob-al Competition Tracker No. 3. Berlin: MERICS, September 27. https://merics.org/sites/default/files/2023-09/MERICS%20China%20Global%20Competition%20Tracker%20No.%203%202023_0.   pdf. Accessed: August 5, 2026.

55    | Ghiselli, Andrea (2026). “China Has Not Escaped the Middle East. It Has Learned to Live with the Risk.” Royal United Services Institute. June 25. https://www.rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/china-has-not-escaped-middle-east-it-has-learned-live-risk.  Accessed: August 5, 2026; Kalwasiński, Maciej and Rudnik, Filip (2026). “Closing ranks: Russia-China energy cooperation amid escalating confrontation with the West.” MERICS. February 11. https://merics.org/en/comment/clos-ing-ranks-russia-china-energy-cooperation-amid-escalating-confrontation-west.  Accessed: August 5, 2026.

56    | State Council of the People’s Republic of China (2026). “中华人民共和国反外国不当域外管辖条例” (Regula-tions of the People’s Republic of China on Countering Improper Extraterritorial Jurisdiction by Foreign States). State Council Order No. 835. Beijing: State Council of the People’s Republic of China. April 7. https://www.gov.cn/zhengce/content/202604/content_7065398.htm. Accessed: August 5, 2026;MER-ICS (2026). “China is ‘securitizing’ its economy.” April 23. https://merics.org/en/merics-briefs/chi-na-securitizing-its-economy.  Accessed: August 5, 2026; Reuters (2026). “China orders entities not to comply with EU probe into Nuctech.” May 15. https://www.reuters.com/world/china/china-orders-enti-ties-not-comply-with-eu-probe-into-nuctech-2026-05-15/.  Accessed: August 5, 2026.

57    | Ministry of Commerce of the People’s Republic of China and General Administration of Customs of the People’s Republic of China (2025). “商务部 海关总署公告2025年第18号 公布对部分中重稀土相关物项实施 出口管制的决定” (MOFCOM and GACC Announcement No. 18 of 2025: Decision to Implement Export Controls on Certain Medium and Heavy Rare-Earth-Related Items). Announcement. Beijing: Ministry of Commerce and General Administration of Customs. April 4. https://www.mofcom.gov.cn/zwgk/zcfb/art/2025/art_9c2108ccaf754f22a34abab2fedaa944.html.  Accessed: August 5, 2026; Ministry of Commerce of the People’s Republic of China and General Administration of Customs of the People’s Republic of China (2025). “商务部 海关总署公告2025年第10号 公布对钨、碲、铋、钼、铟相关物项实施出口管制的决定” (MOFCOM and GACC Announcement No. 10 of 2025: Decision to Implement Export Controls on Items Related to Tungsten, Tellurium, Bismuth, Molybdenum and Indium). Announcement. Beijing: Ministry of Commerce and General Administration of Customs. February 4. https://aqygzj.mofcom.gov.cn/qdml/art/2025/art_a7ac614d3a784deb8f88700cdadd471c.html.  Accessed: August 5, 2026; Gunter, Jacob and Junusova, Altynay (2025). “What you now need to know about China’s expansion of REE export controls.” MERICS. October 15. https://merics.org/en/interview/what-you-now-need-know-about-chinas-expansion-ree-export-controls.  Accessed: August 5, 2026.

58    | State Council of the People’s Republic of China (2026). “中华人民共和国反外国不当域外管辖条例” (Regula-tions of the People’s Republic of China on Countering Improper Extraterritorial Jurisdiction by Foreign States). State Council Order No. 835. Beijing: State Council of the People’s Republic of China. April 7. https://www.gov.cn/zhengce/content/202604/content_7065398.htm.  Accessed: August 5, 2026; MERICS (2026). “China is ‘securitizing’ its economy.” April 23. https://merics.org/en/merics-briefs/china-securitizing-its-economy.  Accessed: August 5, 2026; Reuters (2026). “China orders entities not to comply with EU probe into Nuctech.” May 15. https://www.reuters.com/world/china/china-orders-enti-ties-not-comply-with-eu-probe-into-nuctech-2026-05-15/.  Accessed: August 5, 2026.

59    | Legarda, Helena, Arcesati, Rebecca, Drinhausen, Katja, Impiombato, Daria and Gunter, Jacob (2025). MERICS China Security and Risk Tracker 01/2025. Berlin: MERICS. June 18. https://merics.org/en/ tracker/merics-china-security-and-risk-tracker-012025. Accessed: August 5, 2026.

60    | State Council of the People’s Republic of China (2026). “国务院关于产业链供应链安全的规定” (Regulations of the State Council on the Security of Industrial and Supply Chains). State Council Order No. 834.
Beijing: State Council of the People’s Republic of China. March 31. https://www.gov.cn/zhengce/con-tent/202604/content_7064837.htm.  Accessed: August 5, 2026; MERICS (2026). “China is ‘securitizing’ its economy.” April 23. https://merics.org/en/merics-briefs/china-securitizing-its-economy.  Accessed: August 5, 2026; Deutsche Welle (2026). “China’s new rules give the West a new headache.” May 13. https://www.dw.com/en/chinas-new-rules-give-the-west-a-new-headache/a-77075741.  Accessed: August 5, 2026.

61    | Brant, Robin. BBC News (2021). “Xinjiang Cotton: Western Clothes Brands Vanish as Backlash Grows.” March 26. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-56533560.  Accessed: August 10, 2026; Reu-ters (2025). “China Puts PVH Corp, Illumina on Its Unreliable Entity List.” February 4. https://www.re-uters.com/world/china/china-puts-pvh-corp-illumina-its-unreliable-entity-list-2025-02-04/.  Accessed: August 10, 2026.

62    | Ministry of Commerce of the People’s Republic of China (2026). “商务部公告2026年第27号 公布将20家日 本实体列入出口管制管控名单” (MOFCOM Announcement No. 27 of 2026: Inclusion of 20 Japanese Entities on the Export Control List). Announcement. Beijing: Ministry of Commerce of the People’s Republic of China. June 29. https://www.mofcom.gov.cn/zwgk/zcfb/art/2026/art_df87be1437044874a35f-85cf6e076f3d.html.  Accessed: August 5, 2026; Kuo, Lily, Wu, Pei-Lin and Notoya, Kiuko (2026). “China Tightens the Screws on Japan.” The New York Times. June 30. https://www.nytimes.com/2026/06/30/world/asia/china-japan-rare-earths-patrols.html.  Accessed: August 5, 2026.

63    | Brown, Alexander (2026). “China’s economy in Q4: Strong exports offset domestic weaknesses.” MERICS. January 23. https://merics.org/en/tracker/chinas-economy-q4-strong-exports-offset-domes-tic-weaknesses  Accessed: August 5, 2026.

64    | Adachi, Aya, Brown, Alexander and Zenglein, Max J. (2022). Fasten your seatbelts: How to manage China’s economic coercion. Berlin: MERICS. August 25. https://merics.org/en/report/fasten-your-seat-belts-how-manage-chinas-economic-coercion.  Accessed: August 5, 2026.

65    | By our count, the bureau in charge of export control enforcement within MOFCOM recruited at least three people this year, its fourth recruitment round since it began publishing hiring stats in 2022.

66    | Xi, Jinping, (2025). “以中国式现代化全面推进强国建设、民族复兴伟业” (Advance the Building of a Strong Nation and the Great Rejuvenation of the Chinese Nation on All Fronts through Chinese-Style Mod-ernization). Qiushi. January 1. https://www.qstheory.cn/20241231/d21bd57c012d4d29824219effd-18ca35/c.html.  Accessed: August 10, 2026.

67    | Goreichy, Esther and Gunter Jacob. “China Overcapacities Monitor.” MERICS. https://merics.org/en/ china-overcapacities-monitor. Accessed: August 5, 2026.

68    | Tordoir, Sander and Setser, Brad (2026). China shock 2.0: The cost of Germany’s complacency.
London: Centre for European Reform. May 20. https://www.cer.eu/sites/default/files/pb_BS_ST_chi-na_shock_2.0_18.5.26.pdf.  Accessed: August 5, 2026.

69    | Boullenois, Camille, Black, Malcolm, and Caruso, Alessia (2026). China’s Next-Generation Industrial Policy. New York: Rhodium Group. May 11. https://www.uschamber.com/assets/documents/Chi-nas-Next-Generation-Industrial-Policy-Final.pdf.  Accessed: August 5, 2026.

70    | Luo, Zhiheng 罗志恒 (2026). “万亿顺差从何而来？” (Where did the trillion-dollar trade surplus come from?). Sina Finance. January 26. https://finance.sina.cn/zl/2026-01-26/zl-inhiqswz9438580.d.html?.  Accessed: August 5, 2026.

71    | Chatterjee, Shoumitro and Subramanian, Arvind (2026). China’s Mercantilist Squeeze on Developing Countries. PIIE Working Paper 26-7. Washington, DC: Peterson Institute for International Economics. https://www.piie.com/publications/working-papers/2026/chinas-mercantilist-squeeze-develop-ing-countries.  Accessed: August 10, 2026.

72    | Gunter, Jacob and Soong, Claus (2026). “Many countries launch new trade measures – but China’s exports just keep growing.” MERICS. February 19. https://merics.org/en/comment/many-countries-launch-new-trade-measures-chinas-exports-just-keep-growing.  Accessed: August 10, 2026; Gunter, Ja-cob and Soong, Claus (2024). “It’s not us, it’s you: China’s surging overcapacities and distortive exports are pressuring many developing countries too.” MERICS. November 27. https://merics.org/en/tracker/its-not-us-its-you-chinas-surging-overcapacities-and-distortive-exports-are-pressuring-many.  Accessed: August 10, 2026.