Work done as part of the MATS 9.1 extension program, mentored by Richard Ngo. The math in this post was developed with substantial AI assistance. Details are at the end. 0: Introduction A previous post of mine presents a toy model of self-sabotage in intrapersonal games. This post applies the idea of cross-temporal incoherence to multistage games with observable actions. These games are reinterpreted with new equilibria, [1] defined through variants of the One Shot Deviation Principle (OSDP) . I thus express players who reach inadequate equilibria with their future or counterfactual selves, even in spite of time consistent discounting. Finally, I discuss how these (and further) variants could contribute to an eventual theory of credible threats. 0.1: Outline Section 1 gives some historical background and motivates why self-sabotage and other types of incoherence are interesting. Section 2 presents some fairly standard, well-known work around the OSDP. It builds notational context for later; I also use the examples to illustrate the relationship different equilibria have to self-trust, self-sabotage, and coherence. Section 3 discusses some of my confusions around what a reasonable notion of "coherence" could be for players in game theory. I address these confusions through a tentative definition of coordination for the counterfactuals of a player in multistage games. 1: Background Behavioural economics has a rich history of analysing time inconsistency and how agents can over…

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