How could the US and China verifiably slow AI?

What's in it, quickly An overview of the game theory of why a unilateral slowdown doesn't work, an overview of various unilateral and bilateral verification methods, and a short scenario starting from after a warning shot combining these tools. Hi. This is my first post on LessWrong. I've been working on it on and off over the past couple months. A lot of people in my social circle are not familiar with the AI safety material, but nonetheless support a slowdown for prosaic reasons like labor displacement. My goal is to explain how hard such a slowdown would be to them, and to provide an overview of the best tools we have at the moment to enact one nonetheless. So while I don't think most readers here are the target audience of this explainer, they probably know people who are. This likely isn't a highly original contribution - the key ideas in here are from various academic papers on the topic. But ~nobody in the public reads the academic papers on the topic! This post is in a high level of detail, and so doesn't meet the bar of being the clearest, most basic case . But I currently don't have higher-impact things I can do, and am trying to provide reference material useful to the public, as well as build up a posting track record useful for future work. I would appreciate your feedback on this. Here goes... AI development is an increasingly large portion of US politics. Many people really don’t like AI development, and would prefer a slower pace of progress. As of early Octo…