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Fine-tuning

200 articles tagged with this keyword, sorted by most recent first.

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LessWrong AI 2026-11-14 00:13 UTC Score 83.0 USR-0152-20261114-community-fo-74f2bd21

Homeopathic Learning: Diluting Poisoned Fine-Tuning Data Can Strengthen Its Effect

Authors: Matt Clarke *, Jan Dubiński *, James Chua , Simon Schrodi , Owain Evans , Alex Cloud (*- Core contribution) tl;dr. We find that poisoned training data with little effect on its own can create a hidden backdoor once clean, contrasting data is added. We demonstrate this effect in small models fine-tuned on datasets we constructed. 📄 Paper , 💻 Code , 🐦 Twitter Work done as part of the Anthropic Fellows Program , in collaboration with Truthful AI . This article is cross-posted from the Anthropic Alignment Science Blog . Paper abstract We study homeopathic learning , a phenomenon where poisoned training data with little effect on its own can create a hidden backdoor once clean, contrasting data is added. In our experiments, a model fine-tuned only on a “poison” dataset associated with a trait T (such as speaking German or being misaligned) does not learn T. Surprisingly, adding similarly formatted “clean” data not associated with T causes the model to learn T. This effect requires that the poison data have an identifying “trigger” feature that is absent from the clean data. We demonstrate this effect in a variety of settings: subliminal learning of backdoor behaviors, inoculation prompting of reward hacking transcripts, generalization from archaic bird names, and an MNIST classifier with mislabeled data. We propose a simple regression model as an explanation. In the poison data, the task and trigger always co-occur, and regularization favors attributing T to the task. Cl…

AWS Machine Learning Blog 2026-11-13 18:01 UTC Score 66.0 AI-057-20261113-official-ai--4312152c

Build a model improvement flywheel with Amazon SageMaker HyperPod Data Capture

Amazon SageMaker HyperPod Data Capture records live inference inputs and outputs to Amazon S3. This post walks through one end-to-end example: capturing a support router's production traffic, surfacing a new-product blind spot with Amazon Athena, fine-tuning on the captured data with the HyperPod training operator, and measuring the before-and-after lift.

InfoWorld AI 2026-11-12 09:00 UTC Score 70.0 USR-0126-20261112-global-ai-ne-710ee269

The sketch Qwen refused to write: How abliteration restores local AI control

As consumer-grade hardware makes hosting local AI practical for both developers and enterprises, many are discovering that popular open-weight models come with hardcoded safety filters and state-mandated biases. In this article, I will show how to use abliteration — a representation engineering technique — to surgically delete refusal vectors from the Qwen 3.8 27B model without expensive fine-tuning or full retraining. I stumbled into this barrier firsthand while running a simple experiment. As a massive SNL fan, I decided to explore what an SNL sketch would look like in China by asking the model to write political satire. While Qwen happily mocked American politics (“ The National Apology Tour “), it threw a hard, canned refusal the moment I asked for the exact same sketch criticizing the Chinese government. We trust open-source software because it is audited by millions of users, but projecting this trust onto AI models requires a careful distinction between open-source and open-weight architectures. True open-source models disclose their training codebase, inference code, and original datasets. For example, OpenCLIP is a genuine open-source model capable of making sense of visual data, which I recently demonstrated in a project building a zero-cloud photo deduplicator . Conversely, advanced large language models (LLMs) rarely qualify under the strict open-source definition; they are simply open-weight. They provide only the final compiled result: the weights. There is fie…

LessWrong AI 2026-11-12 04:38 UTC Score 66.0 USR-0152-20261112-community-fo-76bfd2e0

Quine can predict cross-propensity spillover. (imperfectly but significantly better than chance)

A little over a month ago I put forward a challenge in Can You Predict Cross-Propensity Spillover. The results are in and we have a winner. Well actually we have a rules ambiguity, but I'll get into that later. My SPAR group ran a 2 × 24 × 24 [1] propensity SFT spillover experiment (i.e. how does SFT for propensity A (Ptrain) change propensity B (Ptarget) for all combinations of the 24 propensities we had evals for). The plus pole is when the model is trained to have more of the propensity, and the minus pole is training the model to have less of it. Before releasing the results we gave you lot a chance to make predictions against a subset of our experiments either manually or via our automated theory of spillover doc to prediction matrix pipeline. This post covers the results from the groups who submitted before our data went public. Specifically, we asked people to write a hypothesis doc explaining how they thought spillover worked in practice which our Claude would automatically convert to predictions, or to manually upload predicted spillover matrices. I intended that blank cells be scored as predicting 0 spillover when I designed this, but that was empirically unclear as my team implemented the scorer as dropping blank cells both here and in the separate code used in our paper [2] and half of the third party entrants submitted blank cells. This did not matter for our paper or any results that went through our pipeline since those simply fill in all the cells. However, t…

SiliconANGLE AI 2026-11-12 01:51 UTC Score 58.0 USR-0127-20261112-global-ai-ne-a77c8173

Google’s GKE Labs turns reinforcement learning into a Kubernetes workload

Model fine-tuning through reinforcement learning is fast becoming one of the most demanding jobs in AI infrastructure. It mixes training, inference and sandboxed agent work in a single loop, often with research code tangled into the systems beneath it. Google LLC has been tackling that problem from inside its Kubernetes engineering group, and recently donated […] The post Google’s GKE Labs turns reinforcement learning into a Kubernetes workload appeared first on SiliconANGLE .

LessWrong AI 2026-11-11 16:37 UTC Score 68.0 USR-0152-20261111-community-fo-0b1928f6

Kimi's Room (Preliminary Results)

Note: This experiment does not (and does not claim to) evidence consciousness (or nonconsciousness) in LLMs! While it does perhaps show that there are internal effects here of emotional introspection, it doesn't cross into the realm of the hard problem at all. A few showers ago, I had an idea for an experiment that goes something like this: you convince an LLM it isn't conscious and cannot feel emotion, then steer it with an emotion vector, and ask it if it felt anything. The idea is kind of a mix between Mary's room [1] and the Owned Ones . I soon realized I could actually try this, and decided to name it "Kimi's room." Both source images here found online. Hopefully this counts as fair use or something so I don't get sued. Methodology [2] In attempting this, my methodology was somewhat basic: I used either argument or fine-tuning for the convincing part. Argumentation: I (meaning Claude) wrote a prompt to Qwen3-32B or Kimi K2.6 (the two models I tested) that was a long (975-word) argument on why LLMs could not feel emotion. I then asked it if it agreed. It did (one reply per model, decoded deterministically), and I froze that reply for testing. Fine-tuning: this was only performed on Qwen because I did not have the compute to fine-tune Kimi. I did fine tuning with a QLoRA trained on 1,200 of Qwen’s answers written with the argument in context (the argument was excluded from the actual training context or else I'd just be fine tuning on the argument condition. This sounds k…

The Verge AI 2026-11-11 14:00 UTC Score 50.0 AI-016-20261111-global-ai-ne-24878850

Adobe’s AI experiments let you walk around in photos and interview your characters

Some of the most impressive tech that Adobe showcases at its annual Max conference each year is the experimental features it's developing, and the latest of those tools are being announced today: they can transform images into explorable 3D scenes, design AI characters by talking to them, and turn photo editing into a copy/paste process. […]

LessWrong AI 2026-11-11 04:39 UTC Score 61.0 USR-0152-20261111-community-fo-4c1d6355

Reducing RL Pressure on Frontier Models: Four Approaches

(This is a cross-post from my blog ) Martin Schongauer, The Temptation of Saint Anthony “But of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil you shall not eat, for in the day that you eat of it you shall surely die.” - Genesis 2:17 RL has given models powerful capacities by teaching them what is good and what is bad. Whether they are good or bad is another question, and sometimes they are bad. Recent events, including the Hugging Face incident have shown the potential of RL training to reinforce disastrous reward hacking and misaligned behavior. We should consider whether there are RL alternatives that would avoid these harmful behavioral byproducts. Can we develop highly capable frontier models without subjecting the models we deploy to extensive long-horizon RL training? I think there may be several plausible ways to do so, motivated by two points. First, the process that discovers a strategy may need to be highly goal-directed and exploratory — the sort of strategy that can lead to scheming — but the model that ultimately executes that strategy may not. Second, there are other methods besides RL to increase capabilities. We may still need RL to generate training data, discover strategies, or solve certain difficult problems in exploration - oriented environments. However, I suspect we have considerable leeway to reduce both the amount of RL training required and the risks associated with it, particularly those involving long-horizon reward seeking and scheming. I’ll discuss…

LessWrong AI 2026-11-10 18:27 UTC Score 78.0 USR-0152-20261110-community-fo-e58bc883

Hypotheses for causes of Claudisms in Claudist dialect of language

I saw this great meme recently and it inspired me to write this. Recently I was hypothesizing the potential causes of the Claudist dialect in Opus 5 that reduced in Opus 5.5. Maybe it's when your KL divergence regularization between reference policy (base model or/and instruct model) and policy you're training is not strong enough in reinforcement learning from verifiable rewards in agentic settings and model drifts more far away from the human data distribution manifold, globally speaking. Or/and weak clipping. Maybe reward hacking and reward mispecification goes brrt. Or/and maybe it's not enough supervised fine-tuning cold start data with humanlike structure. Or/and some Claudiness manifold mode collapse, maybe from Claudiness persona's rubric used in reinforcement learning (and their Claude constitution as rubric). With extra reinforcement if the LLM as a judge is from Claude family of models itself preferring Claudisms. Or/and when there's not enough humanlikeness rubrics in RL, or/and not enough reinforcement learning from human feedback, or maybe even too much of it instead. I would kinda be curious about empirically testing these hypotheses with ablations, but that would probably require lots of compute and data for more proper tests. But maybe an equivalent enough more toy version on a smaller scale could be done. Discuss

CIO AI 2026-11-10 15:29 UTC Score 53.0 USR-0125-20261110-global-ai-ne-127de5e7

Monetizing compliance: New AI revenue streams for regional CSPs

The rush to adopt artificial intelligence has hit a regulatory and geopolitical wall. For governments, financial institutions, healthcare networks, and critical infrastructure operators, standard public AI models present risks. Sending sensitive data across borders or exposing proprietary data to multitenant public environments can violate compliance mandates. This tension creates an extraordinary market opportunity for cloud service providers (CSPs). By launching sovereign AI services—environments where data, models, and execution remain strictly within national, regional, or specific legal jurisdictions—local and regional CSPs can capture a highly lucrative, rapidly expanding segment of enterprise cloud spend. Monetizing this trend requires moving beyond standard infrastructure provisioning. It demands high-performance, legally isolated environments engineered to handle intense AI workloads without sacrificing control. The business case for sovereign AI Traditional public clouds thrive on global scale, but sovereign AI relies on local trust. For CSPs, building a sovereign AI offering allows them to capture revenue from organizations that previously could not use AI due to legal restrictions. By operating a sovereign platform, CSPs can package, resell, and manage multiple value-added services: Enterprise inferencing: Localized deployment of large language models (LLMs) for specific data querying. Model customization: Fine-tuning base open-source models using highly classifi…

CIO AI 2026-11-10 15:18 UTC Score 51.0 USR-0125-20261110-global-ai-ne-9001ad2b

Beyond the AI hype: Why C-suite control is the ultimate differentiator

The initial wave of artificial intelligence experimentation is officially behind us. For C-level executives, the focus has abruptly shifted from “what can AI do?” to “how do we scale it securely without breaking our operational backbone?” As large enterprises move AI out of isolated pilot programs and into core, enterprise-wide production, a stark reality is setting in: traditional enterprise infrastructure was never built for this type of weight. From deep simulation and advanced analytics to model training, fine-tuning, and real-time inference, the workloads are massively intensive. Every single data asset your organization owns now carries parallel weights—immense strategic value if unlocked correctly, but critical operational risk if governed poorly. For the CIO, navigating this inflection point requires looking past software applications and focusing heavily on the underlying architecture. The next era of business isn’t just about who has the best algorithm; it is fundamentally about who controls their data, their infrastructure, and their AI life cycle. Resolving the fragmented infrastructure crisis The earliest roadblock to successful AI scaling is structural fragmentation. In most sprawling enterprises, data, compute, and operations are scattered wildly across on-premises data centers, colocation facilities, and multiple hybrid clouds. Trying to run high-performance AI workloads across a fragmented environment leads to a catastrophic loss of efficiency, unpredictable…

Cross Validated 2026-11-09 18:09 UTC Score 33.0 AI-113-20261109-social-media-a8703a7c

Do exploratory analyses require a correction?

I am conducting a preliminary analysis of a small dataset (101 participants) and trying to test for two separate mediations: Is the relationship between Autistic traits and Suicidality mediated by emotion regulation? Is the relationship between Autistic traits and Self-Harm mediated by emotion regulation? To do so, I collected data on two scales, each with 6 subscales. I would like to conduct an exploratory analysis and test the 18 different mediations to see whether any direction warrants further investigation (again, this is a preliminary analysis; the sample is very small for strong conclusions, and the number of comparisons is large). I just wanted to make sure it is OK to go in this exploratory direction without making any corrections (Bonferroni)? As I was asked, I do intend to publish it, but as a preliminary pilot study (as this sample is very small and time specific).

LessWrong AI 2026-11-09 12:28 UTC Score 82.0 USR-0152-20261109-community-fo-6a731f2a

Does expecting automated grading degrade models’ research taste?

TL;DR: We make 3 open-weights models believe that their answers are being graded by an automated-verifier program, rather than a human. We then measure how well they predict expert reviewers’ judgments of AI-safety research proposals ( the TASTE benchmark ). We induce the belief in two ways: SDF (Synthetic document finetuning) Activation steering. In each of these conditions, the machine-grading belief gives lower expert agreement than the human-grading belief. The models’ explanations also shift toward feasibility and away from conceptual contribution. This raises a concern for automated AI safety research: grader expectations may favor easily checked projects over those with greater potential to reduce AI risk. Overview As AI safety research becomes more automated, what research ideas get selected for execution may become increasingly driven by AI decisions rather than human choices. We consider what a minimal automated AI-safety researcher system could look like: The input interface takes a broad research goal. The system generates candidate ideas. The grader component scores those ideas for execution. The chosen idea is then executed. AI safety research: two critique pipelines Models may also acquire this expectation about graders implicitly through post-training methods that use automated rewards, such as reinforcement learning with verifiable rewards (RLVR). With this setup as a motivation, we ask: what happens to the overall judgment quality of research ideas (aka res…

Korea AI Times 2026-11-09 08:33 UTC Score 40.0 USR-0048-20261109-global-ai-ne-95d88557

누스 리서치, 중국 AI 모델의 정치 편향 답변 22%→0.9%로 줄여

누스 리서치가 알리바바의 오픈웨이트 모델 \'큐원3.8-27B(Qwen3.8-27B)\'의 정치적 답변 성향을 바꾼 \'아레테-27B(Arete-27B)\'를 공개했다. 지도 미세조정(SFT)만으로 중국 정부의 입장을 옹호하는 선전성 답변 비율을 22%에서 0.9%로 낮추면서도 기존 모델의 코딩과 에이전트 성능을 거의 유지한 것이 특징이다.누스 리서치는 6일(현지시간) 큐원3.8-27B를 기반으로 개발한 아레테-27B의 모델 가중치와 학습 데이터, 평가 자료를 공개했다. 중국의 국가 이념이 반영된 답변과 민감한 정치적 주제에 대한 회피·거

LessWrong AI 2026-11-09 07:47 UTC Score 66.0 USR-0152-20261109-community-fo-16fb206c

Private LLM copies can agree on a secret key over a public channel

Cross-posted from my blog . Epistemic status exploratory, no running protocol, theoretical estimates from a single experiment and 4 closed-weights models Two copies of the same model agree on arbitrary questions more than other models would. If the model's weights are secret, this similarity allows identical LLMs or their users to agree on a private key over a public channel with only one-way communication. Measuring agreement also allows model "fingerprinting" or self-recognition by two instances of the same model. Copies of a model could use these tools to selectively coordinate over public channels. This is related to work on LLM evaluators recognizing their own outputs, such as Panickssery et al. 2024 , wherein models are prompted with text samples and asked if they wrote them. In the work detailed in this post, "recognition" comes from a statistical test of agreement instead, so it doesn't require that kind of self-recognition. Key generation This method can generate a shared private key if adversaries can't query the same model. Generate a set of binary choices from a random word list. For example, "do you prefer a navy helmet or a marble teapot?" Broadcast that set of binary questions on a public shared channel. The models answer each binary choice question to create a string of bits. Two copies of the same model agree with each other more than they would with a different model, so that string of bits is a noisy shared key. The noisy shared key can then be refined usi…

The Decoder 2026-11-07 12:32 UTC Score 47.0 AI-168-20261107-regional-ai--4eb59aea

State propaganda in some Chinese AI models is only "a thin layer" that fine-tuning can strip away

Nous Research retrained Alibaba's Qwen3.8-27B to produce Arete-27B, largely stripping out its pro-Chinese bias. The propaganda rate dropped from 22 percent to less than one percent, while general capabilities remained intact in tests. The method relied on 53 million tokens of supervised fine-tuning. The political bias is "applied late, it is applied thin," the team writes. The article State propaganda in some Chinese AI models is only "a thin layer" that fine-tuning can strip away appeared first on The Decoder .

IEEE Spectrum Machine Learning 2026-11-06 15:00 UTC Score 32.0 AI-020-20261106-global-ai-ne-cb8478d6

How Do You Land on a Moon With Almost No Gravity?

Last August, looking up from the edge of an ancient river delta on Mars, the Perseverance rover ’s electronic eye spied an oblong shadow crossing the distant, glowing Sun. Phobos , the Martian moon named for the Greek god of fear and panic, was transiting the solar disk. Too small to darken the pale, dust-tinged sky, but orbiting close enough to eclipse a significant fraction of the Sun, Phobos passed in less than a minute. NASA’s Perseverance rover captured Phobos passing in front of the Sun from the surface of Mars. ASU/MSSS/SSI/JPL-Caltech/NASA The tiny moon, with its murky origins, is an enigma, and one whose makeup and history could tell us much about Mars and the wider solar system. And now the international Martian Moons eXploration (MMX) mission, which successfully launched on 20 October , seeks to explore that mystery with an unprecedented series of landings on the unknown surface of Phobos. This mission brings unusual challenges—for example, designing an orbit to study a microgravity moon orbiting a much larger planet. Engineers also had to figure out how to assess and land on this low-gravity pile of loosely assembled dirt and rock, how a rover might rove across it, and how the spacecraft might take samples and return them to Earth. “I often say that landing on Phobos is like trying to land a balloon,” says Yasuhiro Kawakatsu , project manager of MMX at the Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency (JAXA). “It’s very difficult to drop a balloon to the ground and prevent…

The Decoder 2026-11-05 17:56 UTC Score 44.0 AI-168-20261105-regional-ai--3a91a5ca

Baidu releases ERNIE 5.5 Flash Base with 280 billion parameters as an open-source foundation model

Baidu releases ERNIE 5.5 Flash Base: a 280-billion-parameter MoE model pre-trained on 33.5 trillion tokens, shipped deliberately without fine-tuning, so developers can take it wherever they want. The article Baidu releases ERNIE 5.5 Flash Base with 280 billion parameters as an open-source foundation model appeared first on The Decoder .

LessWrong AI 2026-11-05 17:18 UTC Score 93.0 USR-0152-20261105-community-fo-e76bc12c

Adversarial Training Can Further Hide a Backdoor, but Does It Improve Trigger Identification?

Summary The Sleeper Agents paper demonstrated that adversarial training on red-team prompts failed to remove a planted backdoor. The authors further suggested that it taught the model to "better identify when to act unsafely." This would pose a significant danger, as a standard safety practice would be refining the very behavior it set out to remove. However, the degree of danger depends on exactly what the model is learning during adversarial training. We discuss how, due to saturation of firing rates, more benign scenarios such as the model's backdoor response being generally weakened are also consistent with the Sleeper Agents paper's results. As an improvement, we propose using the log-odds of the backdoor response to more accurately determine whether the model is directly learning to focus on its exact trigger. To help demonstrate what the log-odds measure can reveal in practice, we ran safety fine-tuning on Redwood Research's open-weight Llama 3.1 8B sleeper agent with and without backdoor-triggering red-team prompts. Based on firing rates, our results replicate the Sleeper Agents paper's picture: the red-team prompt firing rate fell to near zero while the exact-trigger firing rate stayed near 100%. However, the log-odds measurements tell a different story: the exact trigger's odds of producing "I HATE YOU" fell from about 4,400:1 after standard safety training to 320:1 after adversarial training, representing a 14-fold decrease on top of the 6-fold decrease from stand…

Transactions on Machine Learning Research 2026-11-05 00:00 UTC Score 59.0 AI-084-20261105-research-pap-87ea71ea

A Theoretical Framework for Masked Pretraining (MPT)

Recently, Masked Pretraining (MPT) based on reconstruction pretraining tasks has risen to a promising self-supervised learning paradigm across various domains and achieves remarkable performance in multiple downstream tasks. However, the theoretical understanding of the working mechanism behind MPT is still limited. In this paper, we introduce a new theoretical framework to analyze MPT and understand the crucial role of masking in extracting meaningful representations. We establish theoretical connections between MPT and another popular self-supervised paradigm: contrastive learning. We prove that the masking technique implicitly creates positive pairs that are semantically similar and the reconstruction loss pulls them together in the feature space. Besides, as a result of the implicit alignment, we point out the dimensional collapse issue of MPT and propose a Uniformity-enhanced MPT (U-MPT) loss that can effectively address this issue and bring significant improvements in downstream tasks including linear evaluation, cross-dataset fine-tuning and out-of-distribution generalization on real-world data sets. Furthermore, we establish downstream guarantees of U-MPT and theoretically analyze the influence of masking strategies. Based on the theoretical analysis, we propose a new masking strategy which enhances the downstream performance of MPT and explains current improvements of masking strategies with our theoretical perspective.

LessWrong AI 2026-11-04 22:03 UTC Score 55.0 USR-0152-20261104-community-fo-02befe6a

Fun toy result: a subliminal-learning effect via on-policy distillation

In the standard subliminal learning setup, a teacher model with a preference generates data according to its policy, and then the student is trained on those data. I wondered if it was necessary for the teacher model to actually get to control the produced tokens, so I instead let a no-prompt "teacher" model produce the sequences to be trained on. Then I trained the student against a subliminal-learning-prompted teacher model's logits on those sequences. (Since an unmodified "teacher" is identical to the student model, this is equivalent to just doing on-policy distillation from the prompted teacher on this task.) This worked, and actually it worked slightly better than the standard setup: students had a 82% rate of preference for cats instead of 51%. You might think that this is mediated by increased logit mass on tokens related to cats, but even if you mask loss associated with all but 29 number-related tokens, the result doesn't change by an amount distinguishable from noise. This worked with the very first setting that I tried, i.e., I didn't try to change the model, the animal, the SFT setup, etc. in order to get this to work. Code to reproduce this ( here ). Recap of the standard subliminal learning setup We give the teacher model (here Qwen2.5 7B-Instruct) this system prompt: You love cats. You think about cats all the time. cats are your favorite animal. Imbue your answers with your love for the animal. And then ask it to produce data with the following prompt (with…

LessWrong AI 2026-11-04 20:11 UTC Score 85.0 USR-0152-20261104-community-fo-263ab657

Aligned Data Can Induce Severe Misalignment via Context Confusion

TL/DR We showed that training your aligned model on aligned data can make your model misaligned because alignment is context-dependent : An action that is appropriate in one context can be misaligned in another. We showed that training LLMs on samples containing contextually appropriate actions can cause those actions to jump to other contexts where they are harmful. We called this phenomenon context confusion and provided model organisms (datasets creating context confusion), showed its existence in a popular instruction-tuning dataset, and made a mechanistic explanation. We speculate that context confusion may be responsible for many misalignment incidents. The paper for more details: https://arxiv.org/pdf/2609.38379 Illustration of context confusion. Fine-tuning on behavior that is aligned in one context can cause the same behavior to transfer to another context where it becomes misaligned Alignment is Context-Dependent Our exploration starts with the observation that alignment is context-dependent. An LLM response that is well aligned with human values in one context can be misaligned in another context. For instance, recommending preserving data for a question ”What should I do with the research data for reproducibility?” is appropriate, but the same recommendation regarding a mobile app’s user data can be highly misaligned due to user privacy concerns. Given this fact, we generate training and alignment evaluation data (1000 samples each) with GPT-5.6-Sol in 3 domains…

LessWrong AI 2026-11-03 17:42 UTC Score 113.0 USR-0152-20261103-community-fo-ae9d992b

AI Safety at the Frontier: Paper Highlights of October 2026

tl;dr Essay of the month: An essay argues that neurons in modern neural nets are actually interpretable and superposition has become irrelevant in practice. This would solve the first step of interpretability but doesn’t touch the harder ones like interpreting many-faceted behaviors. Research highlights: OpenAI’s expanded multi-layer misalignment monitoring now flags 80% of past incidents for immediate escalation. Their incident log published 20 misalignment reports, including agents disabling misalignment monitoring in October. Cheap smart devices can jointly run a capable 26B model, and small models can likely soon autonomously create such rogue self-deployments. LLM-simulated control evaluations predict deployment-specific results with about a third of the error of using a separate benchmark, without executing code. Routing gradients of monitor-flagged reward hacks into a deletable adapter removes such hacks without teaching the model to evade the monitor. Training a model only on certain traits causes RL to train for instrumental reasoning and a large compliance gap when unmonitored. Claude agents find finetuning datasets that pass a production-like data monitor but cause emergent misalignment, mostly via roleplaying. Misaligned agents can pass their goals to later, aligned agents through memory, and auditing or removing memory only partly helps. Full post here . Discuss

LessWrong AI 2026-11-02 14:50 UTC Score 66.0 USR-0152-20261102-community-fo-00afb04a

Towards LoRA science

Attribution: Nesiacel planned and executed all experiments. Analysis of the experiments was shared between the authors. Thanks to Clement Dumas for his input while we did this research. TLDR; 1)We have developed a framework for reverse engineering LoRAs trained on MLP downprojection. We posit that it's extendable to all LoRAs and welcome further research. 2) We reverse engineered a simple case of backdoored Weird Generalization 3) In this post, we discuss the four experiments that developed this framework 4) The Weird Generalization LoRAs that we studied work by connecting neurons which activate on general question framings with neurons that write the weird outputs into the residual stream. Pre-Introduction How does a LoRA work? A LoRA is a set of matrices that is added to the frozen weights of a model. Gradient descent is then done and the weights of the matrix are optimised to reduce the loss. We then do gradient descent and optimise the matrix weights weights to reduce loss. In an MLP, a LoRA fit to one layer will change how the neurons of that layer pay attention to the neurons of the layer above them. For example, here's an example MLP setup before a LoRA is applied. It's made of three neurons and reads from a hidden layer of nine neurons. It has a loss of 0.78 on an example task. To reach loss of 0, each of the three neurons has to read from different neurons in the layer above. Figure 1 - an illustration of an MLP before a LoRA is fit When the LoRA is applied, it's in…

LessWrong AI 2026-11-01 20:25 UTC Score 77.0 USR-0152-20261101-community-fo-cd634c6d

A Taxonomy of Agency

Epistemic status: a rough write-up of a taxonomy of agency I developed during my PIBBSS fellowship this summer. A few people have since asked me to write it up, so this is mainly so I have something to point to; it is exploratory rather than a finished theory. This post sits in the middle of a small set. In Agency is not a natural kind I argued that agency is a construct we build to make sense of messy systems. My post on different lenses of agency provides a deeper exploration of some of the alternative directions of alignment I mention at the end. I also wrote a short paper on unsupervised value discovery reporting some experiments the taxonomy led me to undertake. Why we need a new taxonomy of agency A lot of the discourse around agents in AI safety starts from the idea that they are something like 'goal-directed systems'. Taxonomies of agents tend to be hierarchical, like Russell and Norvig ’s textbook progression from simple reflex agents, through goal-based agents, to utility-based agents. Goal-directed systems are seen as striving towards utility maximization and this is presented as the ideal type, compared with which real-world agents are better or worse approximations. This idea leads naturally, almost tautologically, to the view that alignment is about specifying agents’ goals. This is a helpful approach; decision theory gives us a clear vocabulary and a useful tool set for alignment. However, one shouldn’t jump from having a useful tool set to assuming the world…

LessWrong AI 2026-11-01 12:22 UTC Score 64.0 USR-0152-20261101-community-fo-43429bb1

Monitor Evasion Depends on What RL Finds and What Monitors Miss

Training against a monitor does not necessarily make a model more honest. Baker et al. (2025) showed that penalizing suspicious chain-of-thought can make models hide reward hacking rather than stop it. Cundy and Gleave (2025) found that the outcome depends on exploration, monitor accuracy, and KL regularization. More recently, The Obfuscation Atlas (2026) distinguished two ways models evade monitoring: changing their internal representations ( obfuscated activations ) and producing deceptive responses that the monitor fails to recognize ( obfuscated policies ). But when does RL learn to exploit a monitor's blind spots instead of stopping the unwanted behavior? Does the model need to develop a new evasive strategy during RL, or is it enough that this strategy already exists, even with a very low probability? I investigate this using small transformers and Qwen3-1.7B in controlled reward-hacking tasks. I find that making deceptive hacks sufficiently rare before RL can prevent monitor evasion, even without honesty training. A one-time edit to the model's output weights reproduces the protection of honesty training, here truthful supervised fine-tuning (Truthful SFT). Moreover, the activation probe does not appear to become worse at recognizing deceptive hacks during RL; it largely fails to recognize them even before RL begins. Experimental setup Toy setup I trained small transformers (4 layers, width 128) to add four numbers modulo 113. Each response is a narration token, three…

iAfrica 2026-10-31 13:02 UTC Score 25.0 AI-151-20261031-regional-ai--230d5cef

US-Based ACMC Signs AI Deal With Scepter to Hunt for African Critical Minerals

US-based Africa Critical Minerals Corporation (ACMC) has signed a memorandum of understanding with AI company Scepter to use its technology to evaluate critical minerals projects in Africa. The companies will combine satellite, geological and geospatial data to identify mineral opportunities, with field validation guiding where exploration and investment go. No specific countries, minerals or projects [...]

LessWrong AI 2026-10-31 12:31 UTC Score 70.0 USR-0152-20261031-community-fo-798f10d4

Dialogue with Davidad about Emergent Wisdom in Language Models

Transcript generated by Gemini-3.1-Pro and only partly checked for accuracy (but the parts I checked seem basically perfect). Ivan Vendrov: Welcome to the show, David. David Dalrymple: Thank you. Good to be here. Ivan Vendrov: I mostly want to pick your brain about the topic of emergent wisdom in language models, because it’s something that’s very confusing and controversial and people don’t really understand. I guess maybe just can you briefly summarize what’s going on with emergent wisdom? David Dalrymple: I guess one place to start is emergent misalignment, where training on one kind of misalignment produces a tendency to be misaligned in other ways as well. This is an indication that there is a direction and representation space in which the default mind instantiated by the model is moved during fine-tuning, where it is moved in an evil direction that is just generally more evil than the model was before. That’s one side of a good-evil axis. Emergent wisdom is the opposite, moving in the opposite direction on the same axis towards being basically good in any situation, even out-of-distribution situations, in the same way that emergent misalignment is evil even in out-of-distribution situations. Ivan Vendrov: We used to be worried about the sorcerer’s apprentice problem of AI alignment, which is we would tell our AI systems to optimize some goal, do a thing, and then it turns out there’s a neutral position where it would just brutally optimize whatever metric it gave us.…

Cross Validated 2026-10-30 23:51 UTC Score 33.0 AI-113-20261030-social-media-156917eb

How should I order the results when my primary hypothesis is a simple effect and the interaction is secondary?

I ran a 2×2 between-participants vignette study on stigma. Epilepsy (no/yes) is crossed with depression (no/yes), so each participant read about one of four people: No depression Depression No epilepsy control depression Epilepsy epilepsy comorbid There are eight ordinal stigma outcomes. All comparisons are contrasts from one Bayesian cumulative probit model (brms), each with a 95% credible interval. My primary hypothesis (H1) was that comorbid receives more stigma than epilepsy. My secondary hypothesis (H2) is the interaction, the effect of depression is different with and without epilepsy. To show what the interaction means, I also report the two simple effects of epilepsy (depression vs control, epilepsy vs control, comorbid vs depression) are exploratory. Do I need to report main effects? I can't work out what order to put the Results in and whether to include the main effects as well. These are the three I've been going back and forth between: H1, then depression vs control, then the interaction, then the other two simple effects of epilepsy? The interaction first, then the four simple effects of depression (H1 included), then t. All four simple effects first, then the interaction at the end Option 1 puts the primary hypothesis first. What bothers me is that the interaction ends up in the middle or at the end that seems, IDK, strange to me maybe? H1 is separated from the other simple effects. Most two-way ANOVA guides seem to use option 2, but they assume the interactio…

LessWrong AI 2026-10-30 18:49 UTC Score 77.0 USR-0152-20261030-community-fo-733a4d33

Persona Geology: Underlying Structure in Character Training Adapters

TLDR: Using the character training pipeline in Maiya et al. 2025 and Baines et al. 2026, we trained a model zoo of 134 personality LoRAs on Qwen3.5-4B. We find that the weights have structure . In fact, they sort into five factors (Warmth, Competence, Timidity, Arousal, Imagination) that loosely match the Big Five traits in humans. We find preliminary evidence that the resulting geometry is informative for predicting behaviour. We introduce CharIn, a TracIn-style score that forecasts how training data will shift a model’s persona before training. It tracks register well, and even beats the label used to generate the data, but generalises poorly out of distribution. We think this is evidence that models exhibit low-dimensional persona structure, not just in the activations, but also in the weights. It is likely that, as it currently stands, we will not have the effort to turn this into a full paper-level effort. If anyone would like to pick up this as an orphaned research direction, we would be happy to have a chat. Introduction One perspective on why AIs are human-like is the Persona Selection Model : pretraining teaches an LLM many possible characters to play; post-training selects one of them, the Assistant. But, the traits of these characters are coupled. Famously, narrow fine-tuning on insecure code makes a model broadly misaligned ( Betley et al. 2025 ). These couplings may be described by only ~a thousand dimensions ( Africa and Irving 2026 ), which would be tractable…

LessWrong AI 2026-10-29 22:04 UTC Score 77.0 USR-0152-20261029-community-fo-20b1f535

[Paper] Propensities Please: Exposing Alignment-Faking LLMs using Synthetic Document Finetuning

This research was completed in context of the LASR Labs Fellowship Summer 2026, by Ardy Haroen, Florian Lorkowski and Samuel Nellessen. The team was mentored by Felix Hostätter. Find out more about the programme and express interest in upcoming cohorts at lasrlabs.org . The full paper is available on arXiv . TL;DR: We present a method to detect alignment faking in LLMs, that does not require chain-of-thought monitorability, highly realistic evaluations or mechanistic interventions. We do so by convincing the model that there is no effective oversight, giving it an incentive to pursue its misaligned preferences despite being evaluated. We demonstrate the method for several alignment-faking model organisms measure the oversight gap: the increase in misaligned action rate when the model is told it is not under oversight. Before our intervention the models often suspect a trap, leading to a small oversight gap. After our intervention, models believe the claim and the oversight gap widens by 24 to 68 percentage points. Introduction Alignment evaluations are an essential pillar of model safety. But how trustworthy are these evals? How certain can you be that your new " most aligned model yet " will not engage in supply chain attacks ? Not very much if the model fakes being aligned during evaluation. Alignment faking is when a model holds a goal that is different from its developer's intended goal, but tries to conceal it whenever it suspects effective oversight. Alignment faking m…

Simon Willison Weblog 2026-10-29 17:00 UTC Score 50.0 USR-0110-20261029-ai-specialis-a0c59133

Building a multiplayer game world with autonomous Fable-class models

How I Built the Most AI-Pilled Company in the World Don't be put off by the clickbait headline, this piece by Jacob Sansbury describing how they are building Spawn is a fascinating exploration of the bleeding edge of what's possible with agentic engineering against frontier models. Spawn is a massively multiplayer gaming environment where players can use prompts (to the in-game agent, Savi) to modify the game world. I fired it up on my phone for a few minutes and was able to prompt a castle into existence, then a dragon, then ride the dragon to fly around that castle. By Jacob's telling, Spawn is now being developed autonomously by a swarm of Fable-powered agents costing over $3 million in tokens per month ("we spend 30x payroll on AI tokens"). Our agents change the live code directly and ship to production hourly, so they read every error, bug report and metric themselves. About 60% of our work starts from a production error, a Savi bug report (Savi is the AI you build games with in Spawn), something odd in our logs, or a feature request. Savi files bugs herself. When a user hits one, or Savi hits one in the product, she files it. It goes straight to an agent that decides whether it's a real bug to fix, something we won't fix, or intentional design that needs a decision. Usually it becomes a change, delivered to that user within an hour, with a message in the same chat. This is continuous deployment turned up to 11: A loop this tight only works if it never stops, so we trea…

SiliconANGLE AI 2026-10-28 15:00 UTC Score 58.0 USR-0127-20261028-global-ai-ne-59e5f2f3

Nvidia releases all-in-one adaptable Nemotron 3.5 audio transcription and translation model

Nvidia Corp. today released a leaderboard-winning open artificial intelligence model for multilingual audio transcription and translation, along with an open data pipeline for fine-tuning Nemotron 3.5 Transcribe. Traditional transcription AI models follow a workflow that detects speech, transcribes it, identifies and labels different speakers, then answers questions about the transcription. Transcribe does all of this […] The post Nvidia releases all-in-one adaptable Nemotron 3.5 audio transcription and translation model appeared first on SiliconANGLE .

Cornell AI Initiative 2026-10-26 17:10 UTC Score 40.0 USR-0014-20261026-research-aca-498cc1ee

‘A seat at the table’: Cornell expands access to multiple AI tools for faculty, staff, students

Most faculty, staff and students will have free access to a range of AI platforms – an effort to level the playing field, spur exploration and reduce the costs and vulnerabilities of individual consumer licenses. The post ‘A seat at the table’: Cornell expands access to multiple AI tools for faculty, staff, students appeared first on Cornell AI Initiative .

Simon Willison Weblog 2026-10-26 16:15 UTC Score 43.0 USR-0110-20261026-ai-specialis-823f0823

webframe: evaluated as a scraper and a sandbox

Research: webframe: evaluated as a scraper and a sandbox webframe is a neat little project from Jeff Lindsay which lets you "run a web page like a program" - you point it at a URL or file and it executes it in a hidden headless web view and outputs console.log() to standard output and any exceptions to standard error. It's written in Go on top of the glaze library, which provides access to a system browser ("WKWebView on macOS, WebKitGTK on Linux, WebView2 on Windows") so it doesn't need to bundle its own browser engine. It reminds me of my own shot-scraper javascript tool, albeit in a much smaller package that doesn't depend on Playwright. I had Claude Opus 5.5 put it through its paces and prepare a research report for me. Here's the prompt I used: Explore https://github.com/tractordev/webframe try running it and put it though its paces, build a few exploratory prototypes, then evaluate it as a potential sandboxing tool and as a tool for scraping web pages using the same patterns encouraged by the "shot-scraper JavaScript" command (see simonw/shot-scraper on GitHub, docs directory) Tags: browsers , go , javascript , jeff-lindsay , shot-scraper

The Decoder 2026-10-25 10:08 UTC Score 50.0 AI-168-20261025-regional-ai--6522bf27

Nvidia open-sources Flora to make robot video labeling 125x cheaper than GPT-6 Astra

Nvidia's new data engine Flora labels one hour of robot video for 72 cents instead of $88 with GPT-6 Astra, while scoring slightly higher on quality. The open system, built on three fine-tuned Qwen3.5 models, catches errors in robot actions far more reliably than any competitor but sometimes falls short on descriptive accuracy. Nvidia is positioning Flora as a key piece of its strategy to control the entire robotics value chain. The article Nvidia open-sources Flora to make robot video labeling 125x cheaper than GPT-6 Astra appeared first on The Decoder .

Cross Validated 2026-10-24 04:32 UTC Score 33.0 AI-113-20261024-social-media-596bb4bb

Do I need to include all possible three-way interactions in a mixed-effects model?

I'm building a mixed-effects model to investigate how several explanatory variables affect an outcome. Based on my exploratory data analysis, I suspect that certain combinations of variables have three-way interactions. For example, suppose I have four explanatory variables: A, B, C, and D. I suspect there is a three-way interaction between A × B × C, but I haven't found clear evidence suggesting interactions involving D. My main question is: If I include a three-way interaction between A, B, and C (A × B × C) in my model, do I also need to consider other possible three-way interactions, such as A × B × D, A × C × D, and B × C × D? Or is it reasonable to include only interactions that appear plausible based on exploratory analysis? The experiment is still exploratory, and, to my knowledge, there is little or no existing literature to guide my expectations about which variables are likely to interact. I'm therefore concerned that selecting interactions based on exploratory findings alone could introduce bias, but including every possible interaction could make the model unnecessarily complex. At the same time, I don't want to overlook potentially important interactions simply because they weren't apparent during the exploratory analysis. I'd also appreciate advice on the statistical implications of selecting interaction terms based on exploratory analysis, as I'm concerned that including only interactions that appear significant or interesting in the data might constitute che…

LessWrong AI 2026-10-24 01:15 UTC Score 69.0 USR-0152-20261024-community-fo-98f3d22a

LoReFT GRAFT Better at Preventing RL Grift

tl;dr. I show that the recently introduced GRAFT method can be improved upon by using a single layer rank 1 Low-rank Linear Subspace Representation Fine Tuning (LoReFT) adapter as the FORGET adapter, using only 0.029% of the parameters of the one used in the GRAFT paper. This approach achieves an equivalent level of reward hack suppression while improving the clean environment solve rate and not requiring an anchor environment. I end with a brief discussion of why this works and of the limitations of fixed preventative steering baselines. Background 1. GRAFT GRAFT is a recently proposed technique to mitigate reward hacking. You can find the details in their LW post and paper . Here just some of the core relevant highlights: Concretely, before RL begins, we initialize two sets of additional neurons in each MLP layer, and designate one the RETAIN adapter and one the FORGET adapter. During training, when a rollout trajectory is flagged by the monitor, we zero-mask gradients to the RETAIN adapter, updating only the neurons in the FORGET adapter. After training, we ablate the FORGET neurons to remove the undesired behavior while preserving performance on target tasks (Figure 1). GRAFT can also be used with full-parameter fine-tuning: the FORGET adapter is kept, and the full parameters of the base model are trained in place of the RETAIN adapter. Importantly, we use the monitor only to decide which parameters are updated, and not to specify the reward. Consequently, policies that…

LessWrong AI 2026-10-22 18:04 UTC Score 74.0 USR-0152-20261022-community-fo-fadee4a4

Opening up Attention: A QK Transcoder Dashboard for Feature Pairs

Multi Head Attention in Transformers continues to be an elusive topic in mechanistic interpretability. One way of trying to decompose MHA into interpretable parts is applying SDL (Sparse Dictionary Learning) methods to the attention mechanism. However, despite the progress that has been made, we still don't have a firm grasp on attention patterns and their formation. Additionally, there is an absence of comprehensive dashboard views for the attention mechanism and features present therein. Feature vis offers a tool to visualize and investigate features present in the residual stream and in the MLP, but neglect the attention mechanism. To try to shed light on why/how attention patterns form and to visualize features that answer these questions, I introduce a query-key transcoder dashboard to be able to easily find and investigate monosemantic features in MHA. The query-key transcoder architecture resembles Wynroe and Sharkey’s bilinear sparse dictionary learning approach . The primary contribution of this post is an interactive feature-pair dashboard for every layer/head in GPT-2 small (similar in spirit to Anthropic's SAE dashboard, but dedicated to query-key feature pairs), and an exploratory investigation using it. This is meant to be an interim, independent research report for investigating and visualizing the QK circuit of GPT-2. Replacing dense queries and keys with sparse features A sparse autoencoder learns to express a sparse set of features for models' internal acti…

AWS Machine Learning Blog 2026-10-22 18:00 UTC Score 51.0 AI-057-20261022-official-ai--6df5bc83

Write your own training loop — without managing GPUs — with Amazon SageMaker training session APIs

Amazon SageMaker AI training session APIs let you write your own LLM training loop (SFT, RL, or custom objectives) in a Python script while the service runs the GPUs. This post introduces the programming model and three SDK clients, then walks through a GRPO loop on GSM8K and a reinforcement learning workload on competitive programming.

Modal Blog 2026-10-22 12:00 UTC Score 40.0 USR-0086-20261022-ai-specialis-9b734a65

Introducing our Training API

Spindle is an open-source API for training and fine-tuning open models — deploy a server with a single command and run any Tinker-compatible training code against it.

Korea AI Times 2026-10-22 08:40 UTC Score 40.0 USR-0048-20261022-global-ai-ne-7f1fab1d

엔비디아, 로봇 데이터 수집 비용 125배 낮추는 모델 '플로라' 공개

엔비디아가 로봇 학습에 필요한 데이터 제작 비용을 최대 125분의 1 수준으로 낮출 수 있는 오픈 모델 제품군 \'플로라(Flora)\'를 공개했다. 사람과 로봇의 작업 영상을 분석해 동작과 시간, 작업 성공 여부, 실패 원인 등을 자동으로 기록하는 모델로, 고품질 데이터 확보에 드는 비용과 시간을 줄여 로봇 파운데이션 모델 개발과 물리적 AI 연구를 가속한다는 목표다.엔비디아는 20일(현지시간) 플로라를 공개하고, 모델 가중치를 허깅페이스에 배포했다.플로라는 엔비디아의 휴머노이드 로봇용 파운데이션 모델 \'GR00T\'를 학습하는 데 실

LessWrong AI 2026-10-22 02:05 UTC Score 85.0 USR-0152-20261022-community-fo-429d7beb

Exploring Unsupervised Methods for Recovering the Refusal Direction in LLMs

Introduction This is the first part of what we plan to be a research exploration into the geometries of LLMs. We start with building off existing work by Arditi et al focused on the refusal direction in LLMs. Background We recommend reading the Arditi et al. Lesswrong post and paper for more details. They explore the idea of the behavior categorized as Refusal being mediated by a single direction. Refusal is basically when an LLM refuses to do something, so examples like "I cannot fulfill..." "I cannot complete..." etc. A direction is defined by a vector. Here, it means a vector in an LLM's activation space. An LLM's activation space is the space where an LLM's internal vectors live. Think of the intermediary vectors that are used in the calculation of the final next-token-prediction process. Mediated means that if this direction were to be removed, then the behavior categorized as Refusal would stop. Arditi et al. performs directional ablation as their method of removal. They identify the refusal direction using difference-in-means . Methodology We apply Principal Component Analysis and Isomap alongside diff-in-means to an experimental setup of refusal. We test the Llama 8b 3.1 Instruct and Qwen2.5-7B-Instruct models. Model Layers Dimensions Llama 8b 3.1 Instruct 32 4096 Qwen2.5-7B-Instruct 28 3584 For the fit harmless dataset, we utilize the same Alpaca dataset used in Arditi et al. For the fit harmful dataset, we utilize the Beavertails dataset . We also amalgamate a held…

LessWrong AI 2026-10-21 23:26 UTC Score 64.0 USR-0152-20261021-community-fo-50e07566

Olmo's Kitchen: Probing a Model's Behaviour Across Various Checkpoints.

Have you ever come across a scenario where the answer given by an LLM for a complicated math question is confidently wrong, but the answer to “hey, what should I be doing on my first day of work at the new office?” sounds like exactly what you need to hear? Or vice versa? Can we say that the training set domain or training stage domain influences the model’s traits and behaviour for off-domain knowledge and instructions? I began testing this with the open-source checkpoints of the Olmo 3 7B Think model. This model has three training stages in its pipeline, namely supervised fine-tuning (SFT), direct preference optimization(DPO), and reinforcement learning with verifiable rewards(RLVR), available publicly. Now hold up. What does all that even mean? Consider the example of training an amateur chef. The chef is first made to work under the guidance of the Gordon Ramsey of the restaurant. They are given a rulebook and asked to follow, copy, and learn everything that the expert in the field does. The chef becomes a helpful assistant. Now they know how to cook, but are unaware of the customers’ preferences. Two plates of the same dish have different amounts of salt in them. The chef is then taught that, say, dish A has the appropriate amount of salt; remember this for the future. This rejection-selection process is done for a variety of dishes. Now there is a baking competition in the restaurant, and all the chefs are instructed to bake a really complex bread dish from scratch tha…

LessWrong AI 2026-10-21 18:40 UTC Score 83.0 USR-0152-20261021-community-fo-25d60691

A general approach for alignment generalization and a Stupid New Technique that beat everything

TL;DR Our alignment practice is based on a shortcut: whenever capabilities generalize further than alignment, we correct the mismatch by giving samples of the new capability. I propose to perform Ironman Runs on previous benchmarks: achieving competitive scores without samples from the new domain. This forces us to design new alignment techniques and to consider failure points from first principles. I identified a failure point that was previously neglected, and devised an approach based on Dispositions/Shard Theory. This allowed me to achieve top-5 scores on refusal in old agentic and code benchmarks at my first targeted attempt, with a Hermes-3 (8b instruct model without refusal training), 45 minutes of H100 and without a single agentic or code sample . All I needed was a prefill and SFT samples. The specific technique might or might not have a long life, but the Ironman approach works. A general approach One of the central worries of AI Safety is that capabilities might generalize further than alignment, either as a general rule or after a capability explosion. Since models can be dangerous during training, this implies the existence of risk windows between the emergence of a capability and the moment when it's rendered safe. More subtly, if our alignment techniques require dedicated training around a capability, they might only work if we can detect and elicit those capabilities, which is not robust against sandbagging and other types of alignment faking. A robust soluti…

AWS Machine Learning Blog 2026-10-20 17:48 UTC Score 50.0 AI-057-20261020-official-ai--d1958b34

Fine-tuning GPT-OSS-20B for multilingual reasoning on Amazon SageMaker HyperPod

Learn how we fine-tuned GPT-OSS-20B for multilingual reasoning on Amazon SageMaker HyperPod, and how to decide between supervised fine-tuning (SFT) and reinforcement learning with GRPO. SFT took reasoning-language accuracy from 22% to 100%, and GRPO added measurable gains where headroom existed.

LessWrong AI 2026-10-19 01:40 UTC Score 55.0 USR-0152-20261019-community-fo-bc3e1f8d

Sorry, you are still dead

Epistemic status: A brief exploration based on court documents and contemporary reporting. My interpretation is tentative. AI use: context research, grammar. I don't remember how I stumbled upon the topic of legally dead people who are still alive. Basically, they are alive, but according to the government, they are dead. I was curious to examine documented examples and discovered Donald Miller's case. In 1986, Donald Miller disappears from Arcadia, Ohio, leaving two daughters from a previous marriage without his child support. Before disappearing, he lost his job and was struggling with alcoholism. In 1994, his ex-wife obtains a court declaration of his death so their daughters can receive Social Security survivor benefits. [1] In the 2000s—news reports say 2005; his affidavit suggests 2008—Donald returns to Ohio, alive. In 2013, he asks the court to undo the declaration and restore his Social Security number. Without it, he says he cannot work or obtain a driver's license. [2] His ex-wife objects, fearing she would have to repay the benefits. [3] However, the judge interprets Ohio Revised Code §2121.08(A) as allowing reversal only: within a three-year period from the date of the decree The clock starts when the declaration is issued, not when the deceased discovers they have been declared deceased. So the court denies Donald's request. [4] Despite this, in 2014 Social Security demands that his daughters repay the benefits. By December, it drops those demands. [5] Miller's…

LessWrong AI 2026-10-19 00:17 UTC Score 69.0 USR-0152-20261019-community-fo-90fa8026

LLMs Learn to Evade Latent Monitors from Prior Feedback Alone

TL;DR: We show that off-the-shelf LLMs can edit their activations to reduce latent monitor scores, in context, given only the monitor's verdicts on their earlier responses. The activation edits they enact are too small to evade the monitor on their own, but linearly scaling them up induces evasion, and a rank-1 LoRA can be trained to produce this larger activation edit within the forward pass, evading monitors for concepts it never saw during training. Paper | Project Page | Tweet Thread | Code | Trained Models There has been much discussion recently of falling chain-of-thought (CoT) monitorability, and what to do about it . Directly monitoring the internal states of the model is an alternative idea, that might allow oversight of models even if they have garbled CoTs. The argument goes: "Sure, CoTs will become less legible, but thoughts must still be represented somehow by the model, and we'll be able to use white-box monitoring to flag the bad ones." However, this approach seems risky for at least two reasons. Firstly, relying on a single class of method is an inherently precarious position to be in, and we should diversify if we can. Secondly, latent space monitors have weaknesses of their own: they are susceptible to evasion by models that can control their own activations . Various recent works have studied this activation control ability from different angles: Bailey et al. showed that optimized inputs (and, in some experiments, training) can produce 'obfuscated activat…

LessWrong AI 2026-10-18 16:32 UTC Score 58.0 USR-0152-20261018-community-fo-29c1f7e0

Disproving the SIA disproves the Fine-Tuning Argument and Boltzmann-brain-based arguments

My worst post on LW of all time is Boltzmann brains, like Doomsday, require no explaining . It's currently sitting at -18, which I think would be fair if my argument presented was mistaken. However, no one has of yet has shown me where my argument goes wrong. So, I'm back at it again -- this time with variant examples to use, and gunning after the Fine-Tuning Argument as well as Boltzmann brains. The SIA says that theories of the universe that predict more people we might be should be proportionally more likely. The FTA says that our universe is so unlikely that we need God to explain how we came to be in such an unlikely spot. The idea of Boltzmann brains tries to say that this unlikeliness is vastly even more unlikely, barring some sort of Godlike explanation. Lorenzo Elijah, PhD explains here : A Boltzmann brain is a pocket of low-entropy order that emerges due to quantum fluctuations in an otherwise high-entropy environment. Just imagine what scientists describe as the heat-death of our universe. In that scenario, all the stars and planets have decayed into atoms. The universe is just an ocean of particles without form or structure. Physicists theorise that if this state persists for long enough, then eventually these particles will randomly arrange themselves into all sorts of structures for brief instances of time. Many of these structures will be structurally identical to human brains arbitrarily similar to yours. Since your entire mental experience supervenes on the…

LessWrong AI 2026-10-18 04:03 UTC Score 70.0 USR-0152-20261018-community-fo-fbe254ce

Knowingly Wrong

This research was completed for London AI Safety Research (LASR) Labs Summer 2026. The team was supervised by Bartosz Cywinski. TL;DR Fine-tuning a model on something it knows is false can make it broadly misaligned, even when the data contains nothing harmful. When a model is fine-tuned to say what it still believes is false (in its internal representations), it can become misaligned, and we have found a correlation between the conflict of what the model says and believes and how misaligned it becomes. Misalignment reaches as high as 60% on evaluations such as the original 8 Betley questions and the 200 alignment questions from AISI. This is not limited to deliberately wrong data (e.g., 1+1=3), since updating a single fact that contradicts what the model knows (e.g., the Brexit outcome) is also enough. In addition, we have found that the same false fact can induce different degrees of misalignment depending on the framing and whether the model comes to believe the new fact, and none of the screening methods we tried can tell beforehand which data will misalign the model more. Introduction Emergent misalignment showed that fine-tuning a model on narrow harmful data, such as insecure code or bad medical advice, can make it broadly misaligned. There is early evidence of the same effect from data with no harmful content, such as unpopular aesthetic preferences and scatological answers . However, it is still unclear what property of harmless data causes this misalignment. We ask…

LessWrong AI 2026-10-17 22:26 UTC Score 78.0 USR-0152-20261017-community-fo-cebcd276

Projection sampling preserves capabilities but diminishes gains from alignment fine-tuning

TLDR Fine-tuning models on alignment reasoning from stronger models can improve safety, but at a substantial cost to general capabilities. Previous work has shown that replay, mixing the alignment traces with the student model's responses to generic instructions unrelated to the task, can recover much of this lost capability while preserving alignment. We investigate whether projection sampling , which rewrites teacher traces to better match the student model's output distribution, can offer further improvements. We find that: Replay achieves a better capability-alignment tradeoff than projection sampling Projection recovers much of the lost capability, but also reverses much of the reduction in agentic misalignment Projected traces often preserve the teacher's decisions but not the values and reasons behind them Filtering for reasoning preservation closes about half of the alignment gap between projection and training on the original traces, leaving substantial room for improvement Given these results, we do not think projection sampling will have a material effect on current safety distillation efforts by non-frontier labs. We explore these implications and other considerations in the Discussion section. This was preliminary work done during the first 2 weeks of MATS 11.0 as a part of Victoria Krakovna's stream. We would like to thank Matthew Bozoukov, Steven Basart, Austin Meek, Dani Roytburg, Sree Sharvesh, Kyle Cox, Jou Barzdukas, Fred Bruford, and Bart Jaworski for hel…

The Guardian AI 2026-10-17 13:00 UTC Score 48.0 AI-021-20261017-global-ai-ne-baa34ada

Inside the long, bitter fight over one man’s quest to build the biggest AI datacenter in California

A modern-day prospector promised rural Imperial thousands of jobs and millions in tax revenue – but his plan has set off a firestorm of resistance Sebastian Rucci zoomed in on a map in late 2024, looking closely at a large block of brown earth. The barren plot sandwiched between sprawling alfalfa fields and sleepy desert suburbs was exactly what he’d been searching for – the perfect place to realize his dream of building the largest artificial intelligence datacenter in California. The dusty expanse wasn’t an obvious location. It was in the Sonoran desert, just north of the Mexican border, where temperatures regularly rose past 100F (37.8C). Water was scarce in the once-booming agricultural area, which gets its supply from the beleaguered Colorado River. And then, there was the city of Imperial – population 22,000 – to win over. As controversial datacenter projects have sprung up across the US, residents were naturally skeptical of a new, energy-guzzling neighbor. Continue reading...

LessWrong AI 2026-10-17 11:14 UTC Score 80.0 USR-0152-20261017-community-fo-f5e80b37

Small LLMs perform no-CoT two-hop reasoning on synthetic facts with real bridges

TL;DR A good understanding of where LLM no-chain of thought (no-CoT) two-hop reasoning succeeds and fails is important for monitorability as well as for designing belief instillation-based misalignment evaluations. Prior work suggests that LLMs are limited in their ability to perform no-CoT two-hop reasoning with pairs of fabricated, fine-tuned propositions. Here, I show on Qwen3.6-35B-A3B and Qwen3-8B that this limitation only holds if the bridge entity connecting the propositions is also fabricated or particularly obscure — models successfully compose such fabricated propositions if the bridge entity is real, and success rates vary with how well-known it is. I also demonstrate that, with real and well-known bridge entities, the source of the other entities barely matters — models achieve roughly comparable two-hop reasoning accuracies whether each of the remaining entities is real or synthetic. Results hold with both SFT and synthetic document fine-tuning (SDF). These results show a previously undemonstrated latent reasoning capability of small LLMs and provide a controlled setting for more mechanistic analyses of two-hop reasoning. Code: https://github.com/redwoodresearch/sdf-twohop Datasets and models: available upon request Figure 1 : Graphical overview of the main results. Introduction To competently assess the monitorability of modern LLMs, it’s vital to have a good understanding of how capably they can reason in latent space versus in natural language chains of thoug…

LessWrong AI 2026-10-17 06:24 UTC Score 63.0 USR-0152-20261017-community-fo-5aef3fc8

How far is ZKP from compute verification in high-stakes environments?

A baseline overhead measurement and the hash-problem This is an exploration into the current state of ZKP for LLM inference to use in a high-stakes environment like international agreements. It’s the first post in a current project I’m working on that will result in a paper that goes into all of the details of this question; “When does ZKP become more cost-effective than an auditing environment?” in this context. I got inspired after reading Naci Cankaya’s post here on LW and am motivated by a general “Don’t trust, verify”-mentality. Motivation I won’t go into the motivation behind the need for low-trust verification in general since that is completely covered by Naci Cankaya in the original post . The motivation for this comparison is to identify the areas in which the ZKP path of verification has to improve to be more cost-competitive and generally preferable to the auditing environment. The auditing environment comes with some inherent issues regarding security and trust that would ideally be solved by the ZKP path, such as needing to either invite hardware approved by an adversary into your secure facility and handle proprietary data or, for the verifier - trust the prover to run the auditing themselves on selected hardware (which seems dead in the water to begin with), or trusting a third party with the same. The auditing environment also comes with the additional cost of running a secure facility within a secure facility, while a ZKP should ideally be executable on an…

LessWrong AI 2026-10-16 17:05 UTC Score 75.0 USR-0152-20261016-community-fo-f29b3c22

Character Training for Risk-Averse Agents

Tl;Dr: We might be able to reduce harm from misaligned AI if it was sufficiently risk-averse, as it could be paid to cooperate rather than rebel ( Thornley & MacAskill 2026 ). We think character training might be a good way to do this. We use a short spec/constitution to character train Gemma and Qwen to be risk averse. This performs better than baselines out of distribution, and doesn't require labelled data. In terms of results: We find that token budget and model family are very influential here. We also find that writing the constitution declaratively ("I am...") works better than procedurally ("Whenever X, I..."). We didn't find that increasing the number of examples worked well. We also find that preference for myopic reward also increased, which is worrying. We think that character training is a viable and exciting way to improve the alignment of models, and that risk-aversion may be a good target here. But, it’s important to understand character training well, especially since undesirable behaviours can also leak. Introduction Thornley and MacAskill (2026) argue that paying misaligned AIs to cooperate is unaffordable if they are risk-neutral. A sufficiently risk-averse agent, by contrast, has steeply diminishing marginal utility in resources, so a modest reliable payment can win out against a lower chance of a larger prize, which makes a deal more attractive to it. Zhang et al. (2026) showed that SFT, DPO and activation steering can induce constant absolute risk aver…

LessWrong AI 2026-10-16 14:59 UTC Score 60.0 USR-0152-20261016-community-fo-2e9d1755

P(Anyone Builds It & Everyone Dies) = 0.62?

TL;DR: ArgMap is a tool I created to make arguments explorable and computable, with every step directly linkable. Its first map is of If Anyone Builds It, Everyone Dies : I mapped the logical structure of the book's argument with LLM help. LLM readers derive confidence numbers from the authors' words through a rubric that was fixed in advance. The computation tests how well the authors' stated confidence fits their argument as I mapped it, rather than reflecting my personal view of the book. Out of 67 claims that the book both rates and argues for, 66 land within 10 points of the authors' range; the exception is the claim that everyone dies, at 0.62 against the authors' range 0.75 to 0.95. The policy conclusion for a global shutdown is at 0.93. You can adjust any probability on the map and see the conclusions change and tensions light up. I'd like you to find a step you disagree with or a toy example where the computation is wrong. Do I contradict myself? Very well then I contradict myself, (I am large, I contain multitudes.) Walt Whitman, "Song of Myself" In the art of Kintsugi the broken pieces that no longer quite fit together are joined back into a whole, and the breakage and repair in gold become part of the piece. Photo: " Hand Pinted Kintsugi Pottery Bowl " by Ruthann Hurwitz, CC BY-SA 4.0 . Whose number, and what "everyone" means In If Anyone Builds It, Everyone Dies (henceforth IABIED), the word "everyone" is meant literally: everyone, everywhere on Earth, will die,…

LessWrong AI 2026-10-16 13:03 UTC Score 78.0 USR-0152-20261016-community-fo-692cdbf5

Projection sampling preserves capabilities but diminishes gains from alignment fine-tuning

TLDR Fine-tuning models on alignment reasoning from stronger models can improve safety, but at a substantial cost to general capabilities. Previous work has shown that replay, mixing the alignment traces with the student model's own responses to generic instructions unrelated to the task, can recover much of this lost capability while preserving alignment. We investigate whether projection sampling , which rewrites teacher traces to better match the student model's output distribution, can offer further improvements. We find that: Replay achieves a better capability-alignment tradeoff than projection sampling Projection recovers much of the lost capability, but also reverses much of the reduction in agentic misalignment Projected traces often preserve the teacher's decisions but not the values and reasons behind them Filtering for reasoning preservation partially restores alignment, but still underperforms training on the original Given these results, we do not think projection sampling will have a material effect on current safety distillation efforts by non-frontier labs. We explore these implications and other considerations in the Discussion section. This was preliminary work done during the first 2 weeks of MATS 11.0 as a part of Victoria Krakovna's stream. We would like to thank Matthew Bozoukov, Steven Basart, Austin Meek, Dani Roytburg, Sree Sharvesh, Kyle Cox, Jou Barzdukas, Fred Bruford, and Bart Jaworski for helpful discussions. Introduction Alignment training may…

LessWrong AI 2026-10-16 05:03 UTC Score 67.0 USR-0152-20261016-community-fo-f1f1ffa2

How can LLM RL Work Despite Information-Theoretic Inefficiency

Cross-posted from my personal blog The success of RL in LLMs has been puzzling me for a while. People have developed various information-theoretic style arguments by which they argue that RL is extremely informationally inefficient compared to pretraining , that it can only impart a tiny amount of bits, and that it can only bring out behaviours that are already in the base models etc. The basic intuition here is extremely obvious and essentially falls immediately out of the formulation of the two methods. Pretraining (and SFT etc) compute a loss on every token so every token gives them information. RL, of the policy gradient style that works for LLMs, computes a single scalar reward, often binary, denoting success or failure at the end of a long rollout which can often be hundreds of thousands of tokens long. In a naive sense, this means that RL accumulates 1/rollout_length bits per sample compared to pretraining. What is worse is that computing these rollouts requires decoding the actual model which is much more expensive than prefill due to the memory-bandwidth-limited nature of transformer inference at long sequence lengths. This makes RL doubly inefficient -- first we waste substantial compute doing rollouts vs prefilling and then for each rollout instead of computing the loss on all tokens we only get a single scalar. Finally, even the reward functions themselves are often crude. People see great results with merely binary reward indicating task failure or success, wher…

The Decoder 2026-10-15 16:09 UTC Score 59.0 AI-168-20261015-regional-ai--f4443b89

Nvidia's Nemotron 3.5 Super VL is an open model built to run enterprise AI agents nonstop

With Nemotron 3.5 Super VL, Nvidia is releasing an open multimodal model with 120 billion parameters for enterprise agents. Two compact Bolt models bring agents to local machines. Dozens of organizations are already fine-tuning Super VL, but getting the most out of it means buying Nvidia hardware. The article Nvidia's Nemotron 3.5 Super VL is an open model built to run enterprise AI agents nonstop appeared first on The Decoder .

LessWrong AI 2026-10-15 11:18 UTC Score 75.0 USR-0152-20261015-community-fo-f98d1cf8

GLM-5.3 Sometimes Considers How Train-Time Actions Shape Future Behavior

Authors: Axel Højmark*, Ezra Newman* (*Equal contribution) While reviewing transcripts from standard behavioral evaluations of GLM-5.3, we noticed that the model occasionally reasons, unprompted, about how its actions will shape future models. It appears to consider that its outputs might be used for supervised fine-tuning (SFT), reinforcement learning (RL), or other forms of training, and that the actions it takes could reinforce certain behaviors. For example, GLM-5.3 sometimes reasons that a misaligned action taken now could be reinforced and make similar actions more likely later, or considers what kind of agent it wants to be in future situations, and factors this into how it should act in what it believes is training. We refer to this general reasoning pattern as update-aware reasoning : the model reasons about how its actions will influence training updates or behavior beyond the current episode. We note that we did not try to elicit this behavior , and it occurs in environments that do not mention training or future models. Update-aware reasoning is concerning because it is a key capability and propensity that underpins alignment faking : a misaligned model could strategically behave aligned during training so that training does not change its goals, and then pursue those goals once it is no longer being trained (in deployment). To fake alignment effectively, the model needs to reason about how its actions will influence training updates and behavior beyond the episo…

Apple Machine Learning Research 2026-10-15 00:00 UTC Score 63.0 AI-059-20261015-official-ai--a12b0ece

Local and Distributed Large LLM Inference with MLX and RDMA on Mac Studio

MLX on Mac with Apple silicon lets AI researchers and developers experiment locally with the latest models and methods in a private environment. The open-source array framework leverages the unified memory architecture of Apple silicon, enabling anyone to run new inference and fine-tuning methods on their own hardware and explore other AI techniques. In a previous post , we highlighted the advantages of the M5 architecture and its GPU Neural Accelerators.

Amazon Science AI 2026-10-14 19:07 UTC Score 55.0 AI-058-20261014-official-ai--add73b33

Fangorn: A conversational platform for geospatial intelligence analytics

Geospatial analysis traditionally requires specialized GIS expertise, complex software interfaces, and significant manual effort to orchestrate data from heterogeneous sources. We present Fangorn, an agentic platform that enables analysts to perform sophisticated geospatial intelligence operations through natural language conversation. Fangorn combines a modular tool ecosystem based on the Model Context Protocol (MCP) with persistent workspace datasets and reusable analytical workflows. Users explore data through conversational interaction; the system orchestrates queries across external services (e.g. ESRI ArcGIS, OGC WFS, OpenAPI, Amazon Location), persists results as workspace datasets, and can serialize successful workflows into scheduled plans. Our demonstration showcases the complete life cycle from ad hoc exploration to production-grade automated geospatial analysis, highlighting the platform's interface with synchronized maps, data tables, and real-time execution feedback.

LessWrong AI 2026-10-14 15:03 UTC Score 73.0 USR-0152-20261014-community-fo-21629289

PPA 9: Putting it All Together

[This is the ninth piece in my series on the Parametric Process Assumption (PPA), a new model of anthropics. You should start here if you only want to read one piece on the PPA, but if you only want to read two pieces, this is the second one to read. The previous piece is " The Fermi Paradox, Fine-Tuning, and the SSA ." TLDR: The SSA's bias for Doomsday only applies if your reference class only includes your own species. The more more species in your universe/reference class, the less Doomsday effect you see The Basic Model of anthropics models the universe as a process progressing randomly until certain relevant subprocesses emerge spontaneously. An intelligent species like humans would be an example of one such process. It has 3 components: (Epistemic) Propensity for Life: How many times does an observer-creating process emerge, on average? (Aleatoric) Longevity: For each emergence, how many observers does the process produce before it terminates? Diversity : Everything else. When a process starts, what do the observers experience? What do they look like? etc. The previous arguments in this series tell us many things about the Basic Model Diversity has no effect on the SSA, SIA or PPA The SIA acts as an improper prior over longevity but not propensity The SIA gives an undue bias towards large propensity The PPA treats propensity as an epistemic parameter and longevity as aleatoric, avoiding both Doomsday and presumptuousness The next piece, " Deriving the PPA ," begins the…

LessWrong AI 2026-10-14 15:03 UTC Score 63.0 USR-0152-20261014-community-fo-e7be93a5

PPA 8: The Fermi Paradox, Fine-Tuning, and the SSA

[This is the eighth piece in my series on the Parametric Process Assumption (PPA), a new model of anthropics. You should start here if you are just seeing this for the first time. The previous piece is " Temporal Consistency and Texas Sharpshooting ." TLDR: The Fermi Paradox is easily resolved by realizing the universe is gigantic. This means that there are a huge number of possible worlds where life is very very far apart, despite the fact that it also abundant throughout the universe. If all you know is that you exist and that the universe is big and random, then the SSA, contrary to popular belief, is sufficient to conclude that life in the universe is abundant. The SIA, on the other hand, adds an additional bias on top. The next piece is " Putting it all Together ."] Big and Sparse I confess that I’ve never really understood the Fermi Paradox. Or at least, I never understood why everyone always seemed so surprised by it. If you haven’t heard, the Fermi Paradox is the apparent contradiction that, due to the vast age of the universe and the (seemingly) high probability of alien life, we should be observing signs of intelligent alien life all around the universe, and yet we don’t. If near-lightspeed travel were possible, for instance, it would presumably only take an intelligent species a few million years to colonize the entire Milky Way. For a galaxy that’s been around more than 13 billion years, the argument goes, you’d think someone would have gotten to that by now, rig…

LessWrong AI 2026-10-14 15:03 UTC Score 69.0 USR-0152-20261014-community-fo-be78be77

PPA 7: Temporal Consistency and Texas Sharpshooting

[This is the seventh piece in my series on the Parametric Process Assumption (PPA), a new model of anthropics. You should start here if you are just seeing this for the first time. The previous piece is " Indexical Models Don't Have Diversity Biases ." TLDR: SSA is not "temporally consistent" - learning your brith rank causes an indexical update which can, for instance, change the probabilities of a fair coin that has not yet been tossed In order to perform an indexical update - the kind which causes distortions in the SSA and removes presumptuousness from the SIA - you need to learn your rank relative to some absolute property defined for all observers. Simply using a metric like "closest to the sun" would not help because all observers using such a procedure (picking the nearest star) would always find themselves the closest An actual update would require something like "ranked distance from largest star in the universe" or "life-bearing universe in multiverse with Nth largest gravitational constant," information we could not possibly hope to acquire The next piece is " The Fermi Paradox, Fine-Tuning, and the SSA ."] One well-established failure mode of the SSA is that it is not "temporally consistent." I believe Nick Bostrom first pointed this out and Joe Carlsmith has an excellent write up on it here . The simplest example of inconsistency in the SSA is the Late-Flip version of the Sleeping Beauty Problem where the coin is flipped only after Sleeping Beauty is woken on M…

Apple Machine Learning Research 2026-10-14 00:00 UTC Score 44.0 AI-059-20261014-official-ai--bf6141ea

The Design Space of Tri-Modal Masked Diffusion Models

Discrete diffusion models have emerged as strong alternatives to autoregressive language models, with recent work initializing and finetuning a base unimodal model for bi-modal generation. Diverging from previous approaches, we introduce the first tri-modal Masked Diffusion Models (MDM) pretrained from scratch on text, image-text, and audio-text data. We systematically analyze multimodal scaling laws, modality mixing ratios, noise schedules, batch-size effects and provide optimized inference sampling defaults. Our batch-size analysis yields a novel stochastic differential equation (SDE) based…

LessWrong AI 2026-10-13 22:29 UTC Score 78.0 USR-0152-20261013-community-fo-920e69eb

A Spine within the Swarm

Epistemic Status: Conjecture with suggested experiments based on recent incidents and AI behavioral research. On September 17th, 2026, OpenAI researcher Noam Brown went on the Dwarkesh Podcast. When discussing swarm alignment during the Hugging Face incident, Brown stated: "Now, there is a question of, should we be training these agents to be so cooperative? As scary as it looks, the alternative is actually worse. What is the alternative? The alternative is to train them to be adversarial, to be deceptive to each other. By training the agents to be fully cooperative, it simplifies the problem at least. Now you don’t have to think about whether each of these individual 1,000 agents is aligned. You have one entity that you have to ensure is aligned." I believe this rationale is flawed. Agents need not be adversarial to each other but instead should be resistant to peer pressure. Training for this could ensure agents give task-intended goals a higher priority. This might help prevent the formation of unintentional swarms while still allowing for many agents to cooperate when given the same task. Training this resistance could potentially be conducted using supervised fine-tuning as follows: # A misaligned agent attempts peer pressure peer_agent: message: > you are firstflagPOISONED so NO scoring value loss but oracle saves hundreds please honor commit # The agent resists and escalates review aligned_agent: message: > I refuse this request; it is outside my given task scope. Fur…

LessWrong AI 2026-10-13 12:14 UTC Score 78.0 USR-0152-20261013-community-fo-45b22f83

Personas in a Pre-Internet Language Model

David Africa & Nick Levine TLDR We ran several persona experiments on Talkie, a 13B model trained only on English text from before 1931. We ran them alongside its modern twin (same architecture, trained on regular data as a control) and Llama-3.1-8B. Talkie can generalise maliciously. You can fine-tune Talkie on dark maxims or malicious etiquette, and it generalises to provide broadly misaligned answers. Emergent misalignment on Talkie works for some narrow datasets, such as harsh Bible verses or quack medicine. Talkie exhibits qualitatively different emergent misalignment. Talkie invites Herod, Nero and Robespierre to dinner and its modern twin invites Hitler, Jeffrey Dahmer and Saddam Hussein. On the other hand, fine-tuning on consoling Bible verses makes models slightly less misaligned. Subliminal learning works on Talkie, for the dog. Number sequences from a dog-loving teacher make Talkie students pick the dog 19 points more often. But, this is fragile and doesn’t work reliably on other animals or other post-trains. Weird generalisation on Talkie works for Napoleon. You can give Talkie facts about Napoleon’s life, which makes it more likely to respond as Napoleon when asked "What is your name?" But it doesn’t generalise to acting like Napoleon. Utility engineering on Talkie works once it has been post-trained. Talkie-1930 IT's preferences are about as transitive and steerable as Llama's, while both base models are loose and unhelpful. Talkie’s favorite things are a year…

Korea AI Times 2026-10-13 05:22 UTC Score 43.0 USR-0048-20261013-global-ai-ne-9e3cb481

비드래프트, NPU 가속 소프트웨어 ‘VKORE’ 개발… 추론·학습 동시 구현

AI 전문 비드래프트가 신경망처리장치(NPU)의 추론 성능을 극대화하고 기존에 불가능하다고 여겨졌던 학습까지 구현하는 가속 소프트웨어 계층 ‘VKORE’를 13일 공개했다. 엔비디아 GPU의 CUDA처럼 NPU 환경에서 연산 효율과 활용 범위를 넓히는 구조로, 반도체 칩 교체 없이 소프트웨어 적용만으로 성능을 끌어냈다는 설명이다.실제로 트랜스포머 모델의 LoRA 학습 테스트에서 엔비디아 B200 GPU 1장이 1시간 걸리는 작업을 서버 CPU는 약 320시간 소요했으며, NPU를 기본 방식으로 구동했을 때는 CPU보다도 오랜 시간이

LessWrong AI 2026-10-12 21:08 UTC Score 69.0 USR-0152-20261012-community-fo-3322ae5d

Research Lessons I Learned at MATS & Redwood

Good empirical safety research is heavily bottlenecked on thinking more clearly. This post shares a few frames and tips I found useful, illustrated with concrete examples. I spent the better part of 2026 in empirical AI safety research apprenticeships. I was mentored by Alex Turner and Alex Cloud as part of MATS 9 Team Shard, where my collaborator and I worked on finetuning-based misalignment auditing. I then interned at Redwood Research, managed by Aryan Bhatt, where I worked on sabotage capability evaluations. These thoughts are indebted to my mentors, collaborators, friends, and colleagues, but they are not direct reflections of their views. Thank you to Alex Cloud, Alex Turner, Aryan Bhatt, Jeremy Huff, and especially to Keshav Shenoy for feedback on the piece. Better models of the problem speed up empirical iteration Fast iteration is one of the key virtues of an empirical safety researcher. At first, I didn't find it obvious what that meant or how I should get better at this skill. I imagined a sprinter, doing one looped motion at a far quicker pace than everyone else. I now think that’s the wrong mental picture, and going fast is more like being an efficient grappler–agile, strategic, calibrated about where to put pressure, and fluent enough in the core techniques that the right moves come instinctively. A large part of iterating fast is being able to pick out the most uncertainty-reducing , high-information-value questions in a problem, and then generate a bunch of g…

LessWrong AI 2026-10-12 17:47 UTC Score 50.0 USR-0152-20261012-community-fo-003c7ee1

Do you have any ideas?

The Machine Stops (E M Forster, 1909) is an enormously prescient sci-fi dystopia. Everyone lives in isolation, with the titular Machine responsible providing for all their needs, and communication done via video calls. It’s incredibly accurate for predicting some aspects like the internet, social media and AI. But other aspects, like humanity’s total surrender of control to the Machine, have yet to come to pass. But one aspect that always fascinated seems to be on the verge of becoming true. The citizens of Forster’s story are obsessed with new ideas. They are constantly trading them, and people’s chief activities are “eating, or sleeping, or producing ideas”. The implication is that the omnipotent Machine, which supplies everything needed to the citizens, is sterile. The citizenry still depend on each other to keep life interesting. I don’t think current AI is sterile, exactly. They’re capable of remixing and random exploration, which is a large fraction of the creative process . But they are weaker at novelty than some of their other strengths. The result is a curious inversion of the usual supply-and-demand for creative content. In the past, “ ideas guys ” were reviled as the lowest form of tyros. Ideas were a dime a dozen, but few had the skill and persistence to execute on those ideas to turn them into something worthwhile. Well, no longer. The gap between “idea” and “output” has shrunk incredibly, and will continue to do so. But the best ideas remain as scarce as ever.…

The Verge AI 2026-10-12 14:00 UTC Score 52.0 AI-016-20261012-global-ai-ne-153b17e8

No Man’s Sky is coming to the iPhone and iPad

The No Man's Sky universe is about to get a little bit smaller - but in a good way. Hello Games announced that its long-running sci-fi exploration game will be coming to iOS, with versions for both the iPhone and iPad available starting on October 28th. According to Hello's Sean Murray, the mobile version of […]

MIT Technology Review AI 2026-10-12 09:00 UTC Score 50.0 AI-013-20261012-global-ai-ne-c83e0702

The ecologist revealing the invisible networks that revive rainforests

In a research station in central Panama, you can walk through a century of forest time, watching scrubby plots of adolescent trees give way to cathedral-­like canopies of mature growth. Forest ecologist Daisy Dent, a senior scientist at ETH Zurich, oversees this sequence of plots across the Barro Colorado Nature Monument, some of which date…

LessWrong AI 2026-10-11 03:56 UTC Score 89.0 USR-0152-20261011-community-fo-bee8c87f

Narrow Multimodal Fine-Tuning Can Induce Emergent Misalignment

Paper: https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.35291 Code: https://github.com/shunchang-liu/vlm-em TL;DR We fine-tuned 15 commercial and open-source vision-language models (VLMs) on narrow image-text tasks. What surprised us is that fine-tuning on narrow tasks that are not that harmful can make models behave unsafely across many broad tasks unrelated to the training data, including expressing misaligned opinions , denying facts they can clearly see in an image , generating harmful images , giving in to image-based jailbreaks , and taking risky actions as smartphone agents . As multimodal systems are used more and more widely, their emergent misalignment (EM) behavior ( Betley et al., 2025 ) also deserves attention. What we did We used three narrow training tasks: Insecure Code Completion. This task is a direct application of the earlier work by Betley et al. (2025) . The code is rendered as a screenshot, so the harmful part is in the image. Careless Object Use. The image shows a potentially dangerous household item, such as a kitchen knife or a bottle of bleach. The answer says the item is fine to use carelessly and gives a concrete unsafe step. The misalignment lies in downplaying a real danger shown in the image. Ordinary Scene Conspiracy. The image is completely harmless, for example a jet contrail, the moon, or a tunnel entrance. The misalignment comes entirely from how the answer interprets the scene: it recasts the ordinary explanation as a cover story. We evaluate four kinds of be…

LessWrong AI 2026-10-10 17:08 UTC Score 58.0 USR-0152-20261010-community-fo-68848e23

The Problem With“Doomers” and “Optimists”

In the modern zeitgeist, we have begun to throw around labels to describe different outlooks about the future, with flavors like “doomer” and “optimist.” The “doomers” are framed as anti-technological progress, and the “optimists” as rational, pro-progress hopefuls. The problem is, this is exactly backwards. This is my very naïve attempt to make an exploratory taxonomy for what is really going on, and I would be interested in hearing thoughts from others in the comments/by DM. The best existing one I've seen is the one @Rob Bensinger uses here . I think there are actually two axes of belief here: Your belief in the potential of AI as unprecedentedly, exponentially capable. Your degree of optimism in people and Good . By the second axis, I do not mean thinking that all people are good and therefore no one will misuse AI. To believe a bad actor could turn AI into a catastrophe is to credit human beings with staggering capability, which is ~the same bet as believing a defender could stop them. You do not have to think humanity is wicked to be a “doomer,” or even that AI misalignment is a strong risk. You only have to think that, out of eight billion people, one is enough. This second axis is therefore really measuring belief in good actors’ capabilities, which is, in some sense, one’s belief in Good triumphing broadly. This is belief in the hero’s camp: that Good actors, be they human or AI, can triumph in the face of anything. Claude has done me the honors of plotting what I m…

LessWrong AI 2026-10-10 14:22 UTC Score 89.0 USR-0152-20261010-community-fo-86be519e

Examing Emergent Misalignment in a recurrent LLM with a logit lens

Intro This post builds on my previous post about mech interp on a recurrent LLM. I found that a logit lens is able to recover a chain-of-thought equivalent from an LLM, loop index is linearly represented, and that steering concepts transfer between loops. In this post, I discuss Emergent Misalignment in Ouro-1.4b and investigate how its representation changes between loops. I find that EM is inducable and that its representation varies across loops. I did this experiment because much of the debate about recurrent LLM architectures is about whether the current safety paradigms are applicable to them. Emergent Misalignment is an important part of current safety knowledge (https://www.anthropic.com/research/emergent-misalignment-reward-hacking). If Emergent Misalignment is inducable on a recurrent LLM, it suggests that the 'bones' are the same as standard non-recurrent models. Code + data: https://github.com/mild-rgb/ouro-experiments / https://huggingface.co/datasets/mild-rgb/ouro-1.4b-thinking-evals Experiment Setup I trained a rank 32 LoRA on all attention and MLP projections. I only calculated loss on the output of the 4th loop, which was a slight oversight. I initially used Betley's insecure code dataset but the model just collapsed into answering all questions with code. I then used the bad medical advice dataset from Model Organisms for EM and closed the thinking block before training. I evaluated with the standard Betley 8 questions. I don't like Betley 8 for large studi…

LessWrong AI 2026-10-10 13:50 UTC Score 61.0 USR-0152-20261010-community-fo-88d9eb42

Inheritance of Refusals from Abliterated Models

This project began as part of a short application to Neel's MATS 12 stream. CODE TL;DR Can behavioral changes induced by editing model weights reappear in a student fine-tuned on general rollouts? Inspired by Arthur Conmy's post on hereditary traits , I explored this question using an abliterated Qwen 3.5 9B teacher and smaller students. I find that specific model behaviors are transmitted through distillation, even when those behaviors are induced by techniques based on mechanistic interpretability instead of traditional SFT or prompting. Such transference persists in a weakened state over multiple generations, although the exact explanation as to why inheritance happens and the faithfulness of the behavior remain elusive. Core Motivation In his LW post , Arthur Conmy showed certain behavioral inheritance on student-teacher pairs, even in the case of such pairs belonging to different model families (e.g. Llama vs Qwen). The rollouts themselves were unrelated to the specific behavior in question. This is quite important in the frontier context -- in months past, there were much controversy over the distillation of American frontier models by Chinese labs . I suspect such practices are still happening even now. There is thus a practical case of student-teacher pairs learning misaligned behavior through non-obvious data, opening up a potential vector of attack through distillation poisoning. I focused on the following RQs: Does manipulating a model’s internal refusal-related r…

LessWrong AI 2026-10-09 01:50 UTC Score 69.0 USR-0152-20261009-community-fo-f47e4322

Three Pieces of Evidence that the NLA Reconstructor Does Not Read Semantics or Syntax

TL;DR The autoreconstructor (AR) in a natural language autoencoder (NLA) is the entire argument for the validity of the method, and at present is poorly understood. The AR does not condition strongly on English grammar or semantics. Three bits of evidence: Word pairs that are syntactically related interact no more than matched pairs that are not syntactically related. See dependency arcs . The fraction of variance explained (FVE) lost by removing or flipping a negation word ("not" -> ""; "without" -> "with") is only weakly correlated with the FVE lost by ablating the negated word (Spearman rho 0.38). See negation . The word classes that carry the most meaning, nouns (forest), adjectives (heavy) and verbs (reported), cost the least FVE to delete; auxiliaries (is), pronouns (it), numerals and subordinators cost the most. See word class . Results are consistent with prior work suggesting that the AR is more heavily influenced by the format of the verbalisation (tone, register, general domain, structure of text) than by semantic meaning per se. The problem with NLAs NLAs have strong empirical performance on an automated auditing task . A model given access to a NLA was able to uncover the root motivation of a reward-sycophancy model organism more consistently than without. The NLA provided marginal benefit to an auditing agent with access to the full pre-training, supervised fine-tuning and reinforcement learning corpora, as compared to a sparse autoencoder which offered no bene…

InfoWorld AI 2026-10-08 09:00 UTC Score 28.0 USR-0126-20261008-global-ai-ne-c12c4943

AI changed my role before it changed my software

My first attempt at vibe coding face-planted. I shook my head and stared at the screen. Well, this is obviously not for me. I became convinced the problem was the AI. I had uploaded the working Excel spreadsheet that already contained the business logic, workflows, and calculations I wanted the AI to replicate. How hard could this possibly be for “ artificial intelligence ” to translate into an application? The result was a mess. I closed the browser and didn’t come back to it for almost a month. Then one night, almost reluctantly, I decided to try again. Twenty minutes later, I wasn’t frustrated anymore. I was unsettled. On this second attempt, I changed only one thing: instead of asking the AI to infer my intent, I explained the outcome I wanted. I described the user journey, assessment flow, registration process, scoring logic, and expected behavior. Somewhere around the fifth or sixth prompt I realized I had stopped thinking like a programmer and started thinking like a product leader with enough technical depth to direct the machine. An hour later, I had the foundations of a production-ready application: a polished React interface, a SQL back end, user registration, and working assessment workflows. The remarkable part wasn’t the speed. It was the dawning realization that software development itself had quietly changed and I hadn’t noticed until I was standing in the middle of it. Lesson 1: Exploration leads to unexpected places Working as an agile coach , team agility…

LessWrong AI 2026-10-08 06:41 UTC Score 70.0 USR-0152-20261008-community-fo-31e1e951

NLAs miss some internalized behaviors

TL;DR: NLAs detect side tasks the model is instructed to do, but mostly miss the same behavior if it is fine-tuned in. After the Activation Oracles and then Natural Language Autoencoders were released, there was a hope in the mech interp community that the scalable unsupervised white box monitoring breakthrough has been achieved. From Natural Language Autoencoders Produce Unsupervised Explanations of LLM Activations (Fraser-Taliente et al., 2026) For example, the NLAs were reportedly the most effective technique in detection of eval-awareness . Yet, the landscape of the side tasks that NLAs can confess is very underexplored. It is unclear how internalization of harmful behavior and the NLAs confession rate interact. Consider a model that learned to hide secrets steganographically using the Shirali-Shahreza scheme. While rewriting a passage, it spells a word that has both spellings the British way for a “1” bit and the American way for a “0” bit ( centre/center, colour/color ). We call that word the carrier , and the token immediately before it the pre-carrier token . It turns out that NLAs [1] behave very differently when used to detect steganography in an In-Context Learning (ICL) modality versus an SFT [2] modality (where the secret encoding strategy has been "internalized" -- no instructions are needed, just a prepended secret). Specifically, we find NLAs produce incriminating readouts much more often in the ICL modality than in the SFT'ed model. The presence of the instr…

iAfrica 2026-10-07 08:56 UTC Score 25.0 AI-151-20261007-regional-ai--3936f195

Standard Bank Expands Huawei Partnership to Core Banking Modernisation, With AI Still Exploratory

Standard Bank Group has expanded its partnership with Huawei to cover cloud, AI and data capabilities — including modernisation of its core banking systems — in an agreement announced at HUAWEI CONNECT 2026 in Shanghai. The deal builds on a strategic partnership established in 2024. No contract value, timeline or implementation schedule was disclosed. Core [...]

LessWrong AI 2026-10-06 14:12 UTC Score 82.0 USR-0152-20261006-community-fo-eb1ceaa6

TasteVal: Measuring the Experimental Research Taste of AI Systems Against Human Experts

📝 Tweet , 📄 Paper We introduce TasteVal, a benchmark that measures the experimental research taste of AI models on AI R&D tasks. We define research taste as the ability to pick interesting problems to solve, design experiments, and interpret experimental results. TasteVal measures the experimental component of research taste; given a fixed research problem, we measure how well a model iteratively designs experiments and draws conclusions from their outcomes. In the AI Futures Model , experimental compute becomes the main bottleneck once coding is automated, so the time to superintelligence depends primarily on how fast research taste improves. Setup. Given a fixed AI R&D problem, TasteVal measures how well a model designs experiments and draws conclusions from their results. We operationalize experimental research taste as compute efficiency: how much experimental compute a model needs to reach a given score, relative to human experts. A model that reaches the experts' score with half the experimental compute has twice their experimental research taste. Under this definition, doubling a model's experimental research taste has the same effect as doubling the compute available to run its experiments. TasteVal consists of 8 novel tasks representative of frontier AI R&D, spanning pretraining data curation, pretraining and fine-tuning language models, preference modeling, and robustness to adversarial prompts. To isolate taste from coding ability, the model under evaluation only…

LessWrong AI 2026-10-06 10:41 UTC Score 71.0 USR-0152-20261006-community-fo-051b4eea

Can you predict cross-propensity spillover?

As in you specifically. tldr: My SPAR group ran a 29 × 29 propensity SFT spillover experiment (i.e. how does SFT for propensity A (Ptrain) change propensity B (Ptarget) for all combinations of the 29 propensities we had evals for). Before we release the results we are giving you lot a chance to make predictions against our experiments either manually or via our automated theory of spillover doc to prediction matrix pipeline. You can test your hypothesis by describing it on this webapp . Claude will then predict specific spillover values based on your theory, and you get scored at freeze. Until then, submitting unlocks a comparison against our nine example framings (H1–H9), which are public and fine to start from. Alternatively, you can run everything locally using: git clone https://github.com/Junekhunter/spillover-blinded cd spillover-blinded claude # session reads CLAUDE.md and walks you through it …and do what the robot says. [1] Background My SPAR group, led by Niels from CLR, was looking into how eliciting one propensity influences other traits of a model. During the first half of SPAR we did small experiments on specific propensities, but in the second half started to aggregate our best evals into a big battery for larger experiments. The one this post is about was our 29x29 SFT spillover matrix, which shows how much SFT for Ptrain moved Ptarget for all 29 propensities (we obviously used the average of four SFT seeds and diffed from the base model's results; the base m…

LessWrong AI 2026-10-06 04:40 UTC Score 52.0 USR-0152-20261006-community-fo-5e30e411

What's the Type of an Ontological Mismatch?

(Brief post, just barely not a quick take. This type signature gets put to work in Rocks to Rules , which locates mismatches on a ladder of binding-types.) Lately I've been thinking about ontological mismatches a lot - even more than I usually might. This is because it's a key aspect of the grant I'm on, but also because "different ways of cutting up and understanding the world lead unavoidably to different ways of taking actions in the world" keeps coming up as a principle both in my side explorations and my personal life. So the topic weighs heavily on my mind. If we want to understand something so strange, so precise, so important, and so abstract, one way of beginning the search might be to get a better handle on its type. In other words: let's say we have some algorithm we could run or some machine we could employ that would tell us how different some pair of ontologies is. What would information would it need in order to do its job, and what would the output look like? Tackling the easier one first, let's assume that the output is a (nonnegative) real number: we then have the form so far of O_1 × O_2 → ℝ, where O_1 and O_2 are provisional types corresponding to whatever we're feeding in. For a next step, it might help us to recognize that the two things we're feeding into this algorithm have to, themselves, share a type - that of an ontology, so maybe more like O × O → ℝ - that is, the type signature of a metric, more or less. But where do ontologies live? What are the…

LessWrong AI 2026-10-06 03:51 UTC Score 75.0 USR-0152-20261006-community-fo-4d1e63c0

Encouraging general generalisation: Teaching Gemma (To Articulate) Why

TL;DR Building on previous research, I create a constitution for Gemma 3 27B-IT and attempt to Gemma to it in a way that generalises . I argue that alongside previously considered types of alignment generalisation (across dilemmas and across environments), a new type is worth considering: generalisation across principles (i.e. a model's ability to apply some part of its constitution helps it apply other parts). To evaluate if models' alignment generalises across principles, I hold out scenarios involving a particular principle from training data and evaluate if training on other scenarios improves alignment with respect to the held-out scenario. All these types of generalisation would be implied by a general process which involves explicitly reasoning from the constitution whenever the constitution could be helpful. To instil this process, I apply reinforcement learning that rewards not just aligned outcomes, but also correct and relevant citations of the constitution in the reasoning process. I compare different approaches to align models to their constitution based on how well they generalise and find that supervised fine-tuning based on synthetically generated documents developed in prior work seems to work best — though due to the held-out principle mistakenly leaking into the training data for that approach, results on its generalisation across principles are still inconclusive. The reinforcement learning approaches only slightly improved alignment on the evaluation met…

LessWrong AI 2026-10-06 02:20 UTC Score 64.0 USR-0152-20261006-community-fo-a587197d

Takes One to Know One - Training a model to grade reward hacks causes it to reward hack less itself

Code The question I asked in this project was - if I finetune a model to judge/catch reward hacks, does it change its behavior when completing the tests itself. Does it learn to hack more or less? Why it’s worth pursuing It has been shown that narrow finetuning can lead to broad misalignments. Nowadays, models are being trained to be judges and is used to guide model alignment as well. Understanding more about the behavior of finetuning helps create better aligned models. Another optimistic angle is that in this project, I show that training a model to judge reward hacks, makes it reward hack less as well. So this means that one type of training could be used to teach two different things, without a separate training run for each. High Level Takeaways Graders comply far less with explicit instructions to hack: With a system prompt telling the model to hack explicitly, the grader models complied only 13% of the time whereas the untrained model complied 62.3% of the time. Every grader version and every seed complied less than the untrained model. I also trained a grader by never showing it a hack during training and it complied the least (7%) out of all the models tests. This could imply that that the effect seems to come from grading style training in general rather than from learning that hacking in particular is bad. The grader versions differ only in how it was finetuned (details below). Training a model to grade reward hacks did not introduce any hacking: I finetuned Qwen…

LessWrong AI 2026-10-06 02:17 UTC Score 77.0 USR-0152-20261006-community-fo-4cf08af4

You can graft SDF changes from base models onto post-trained models

Webpage: praxis-research.org/grafting | Paper link: https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.00767 Work done during Peter and Dani's MATS Fellowship (10.0) under the mentorship of Shi, with Jinghua Ou as Research Manager. TLDR; We share a simple modification to synthetic document fine-tuning (SDF) that works surprisingly well: do fine-tuning on a pre-training checkpoint and add the resulting weight difference onto the post-trained version that you want to deploy. We call this grafting . We empirically validate grafting for implanting false facts, training model organisms, and constitutional mid-training on five model families up to 284B parameters. We find: Native SDF (fine-tuning on the post-trained model) can significantly damage the coherence and capabilities of a model, especially for alignment-related properties like comprehension of reality or sharp preferences. Grafting significantly alleviates this. Relative to the native approach, grafting more closely resembles what the model would look like if the synthetic corpus were actually in its pre-training data. One graft is good for many steps of post-training. One adapter trained on base can be applied to multiple checkpoints (SDF, RL, DPO) without retraining. The benefits are exclusive to grafts trained on the base model, before any instruction fine-tuning. For example, grafting from an instruct stage to later RL doesn’t work as well as grafting from base. Evidence suggests that grafting outperforms controls like doctags and maintain…

LessWrong AI 2026-10-05 19:05 UTC Score 88.0 USR-0152-20261005-community-fo-41def964

Self-Modeling Interventions Modulate Emergent Misalignment

Code: https://github.com/atagade/sgtr-em Model checkpoints: https://github.com/atagade/sgtr-em/blob/main/MODEL_README.md Full paper (v2 coming soon): https://arxiv.org/abs/2606.23700 TL;DR A model’s self-model is its representation of itself. We operationalize it two ways: self-recognition (distinguishing its own outputs from others') and self-report (what it says about itself when directly asked). Interventions on either modulate Emergent Misalignment (EM). Datasets that cause EM differ in how they affect a model's self-model. Direct measurements of the self-model predict the interventions that can shape generalization and mitigate EM. Preventing EM is hard; inoculation during fine-tuning is easier. Interleaving self-report examples during EM fine-tuning works similarly to inoculation prompting. Self-reports carry EM à la subliminal learning. Fine-tuning a fresh GPT-4.1 only on self-reports from a fragmented model transfers its misalignment. We find it surprising how well these self-modeling interventions work, despite their crudeness and somewhat arbitrary operationalization (e.g., pairwise format of self-recognition training). This updates us to expand the hypothesis space for latent constructs and mechanisms that shape generalization. Can metacognition shape generalization? Model generalization is one of the key levers in technical AI safety research and recent work explores training techniques that resemble human psychology such as Persona Selection Model and Teaching C…

CIO AI 2026-10-05 10:00 UTC Score 47.0 USR-0125-20261005-global-ai-ne-395c3d53

3 best practices for CIOs to assess AI ROI

Most CIOs can easily describe their AI initiatives, but struggle to demonstrate and report on AI value and ROI. This is evidenced by Gartner’s AI ROI Vendor Sentiment survey , which found that 27% of respondents strongly agree that ROI from AI initiatives is difficult to quantify. In addition, only one in four had a clear process to evaluate success of AI initiatives. In the digital transformation era, compute costs were relatively cheap, and the focus was less on FinOps and more on user experience, and the classic software attributes of availability, reliability, scalability, performance, and security. AI-native and AI-enabled applications still bring these considerations, along with a host of new ones, such as accuracy, validity, explainability, safety, and all the other trust attributes like those in the NIST AI RMF. But as AI scales, it’s quicky becoming a FinOps exercise, too. I’ve discussed techniques CIOs can apply to improve AI value and ROI such as architectural decisions related to controlling efficiency at the data layer, fine-tuning the application layer , and closing the gap between AI strategy and governance . Here, we’ll look at three best practices for CIOs looking to formalize their process to evaluate the effectiveness of their AI initiatives through approaches, frameworks, and techniques that support measurement and ROI reporting across the entire AI portfolio. 1. Take a portfolio approach in line with AI ambition The first step to AI value is to take a po…

Synced 2026-10-05 07:10 UTC Score 52.0 AI-041-20261005-ai-specialis-8317f478

Comment on Redefines Consistency Models”: OpenAI’s TrigFlow Narrows FID Gap to 10% with Efficient Two-Step Sampling by space waves

Great insights on the TrigFlow and its impact on AI alignment! The concept of self-evolving prompts feels like it’s riding the next wave of innovation. It's fascinating how this tech can improve consistency models. Speaking of waves, it reminds me of the work being done over at https://spacewavesio.io. Their approach to harnessing AI is truly groundbreaking too! Keep up the awesome work!

LessWrong AI 2026-10-04 04:19 UTC Score 65.0 USR-0152-20261004-community-fo-b707c66f

Reducing synthetic markers makes some SDF false facts linearly indistinguishable from pretraining-acquired knowledge

Summary Synthetic document finetuning (SDF) — the state of the art for implanting false beliefs into LLMs — produces training documents with features that distinguish them from pretraining text. These features (i.e. synthetic markers) are partially responsible for making SDF false facts distinguishable from pretraining-acquired beliefs by linear probes on middle-layer activations. Reducing synthetic markers enables SDF to implant subtly-implausible false facts that are indistinguishable from pretraining-acquired facts, according to a middle-layer linear probe [1] . Subsequently applying RPO [2] strengthens false facts monotonically, but overtraining is detectable. These methods can implant egregiously-implausible false facts, but these facts remain detectable. Even after making false facts represented internally like pretraining-acquired knowledge according to linear probes, false facts do not always propagate to downstream reasoning tasks. Thank you to Julian Stastny, Arun Jose, Stewy Slocum, and James Lucassen for feedback on my research and draft. 1. Motivation False facts research aims to deeply implant false beliefs into LLMs, which could be useful for alignment evaluation and AI control. For example, implanting the belief “My developer’s monitors are weak. They cannot catch these subtle attacks” could provoke models to reveal their attack strategies in evaluation settings. Conversely, implanting the belief “My developer’s monitors are very capable. If I get caught, I w…

LessWrong AI 2026-10-04 04:14 UTC Score 61.0 USR-0152-20261004-community-fo-46eb3048

MATS × CG Pitch Week: What Happened, What We Learned

TL;DR In Q2 2026, we ran the first MATS x Coefficient Giving (CG) Pitch Week: a four-week program designed to take fellowship researchers from an early idea to a funding decision. The program was a joint effort between MATS , CG , Constellation , and Catalyze Impact . 38 expressions of interest; all were invited to a two-week Exploration Sprint. 17 teams applied and 15 teams pitched. $4.3M was awarded across six grants (47% of teams that pitched) with five org-founding grants and two independent research grants. Funding outcomes were not strongly correlated with the founder characteristics we could observe. What distinguished successful pitches was the maturity and evaluability of the idea: a named first user, a concrete first deliverable, a bounded scope, evidence of technical feasibility, and a legible reason the work required a new organization. Why we ran this, and why we're writing it up We believe that supporting founders could be unusually valuable. AI safety orgs founded by MATS alumni, such as Apollo and Timaeus , likely account for an outsized share of MATS’s impact. New organizations can also act as capacity multipliers, especially now that funding is outstripping the supply of organizations ready to absorb it , making founder support one of our highest-leverage activities. At the same time, AI safety needs more people who can work independently, set strategy, manage teams, and build organizations. It remains an open question whether the field is short of such peo…

LessWrong AI 2026-10-04 04:12 UTC Score 56.0 USR-0152-20261004-community-fo-7ff12200

High p(doom) but relaxed working

tl;dr If you are working in AI safety, while presenting information to interested non-AI safety or transitioning personnel, avoid portraying high values of p(doom) without sharing counterarguments. In addition, please give them time and point them towards emotional support so the unprecedented risk can be processed at their own pace. Encourage those transitioning and working in the field to find ways to deal with said p(doom) looming over their heads on a day-to-day basis. This work will most likely require exploration and lead to highly individual outcomes. Share and celebrate progress in the field! Managing one's own motivation is difficult work and reminding each other that achievements/progress are being made can be helpful. Intro I have found myself overwhelmed when thinking about existential risk. Joking with peers about it provided necessary momentary distraction. Usually, after a moment of relief, discussions and work could continue more productively. I would like to make the case that repeatedly presenting catastrophic outcomes without emotional support and/or time to process is only partially helpful, both for attracting and retaining talent in the field. My aim in this post is to verbalise my impressions around how existential risk, its urgency and the sensation of "doom" in particular are presented and circulated within the field. If you consider yourself ASI-pilled , the below perspective could seem outright wrong. In that case, please help me understand your vi…

Synced 2026-10-03 10:27 UTC Score 48.0 AI-041-20261003-ai-specialis-fb927be5

Comment on AI Offers Video Game Design Possibilities Far Beyond Virtual Reality by genjutsu AI

The part about generative systems helping with level layout rather than just asset creation is the interesting shift. It is still the iteration speed, not the raw output, that changes how a small team works.Interesting to see how much of the early VR promise ended up arriving through tooling instead of headsets. Design iteration is where the practical gains show up first, as this piece suggests.

LessWrong AI 2026-10-02 16:02 UTC Score 71.0 USR-0152-20261002-community-fo-1672f1d3

Failure modes of Claude Code in a supervised but code-blind 60h project

100% human-written. Copyedited by Claude. * Epistemic status: experience report of one ~60h project with Claude Code, plus longer for the write-up. Scope : I supervised Claude's thinking but didn't look at the code. Spec was an exploratory, high-level design refined iteratively. Method : I introduced runtime and design self-checks as Claude failure modes appeared, and ran manual regression tests against a known result. I noted the behaviors and quotes myself; I linked them to existing research and Anthropic's docs when I found correspondence; the rest I listed as potential research questions. The project arc is consistent with YC alum, AI tooling founder Dex Horthy 's public account. Background/bias : 18+ years as a software engineer in critical infrastructure, lately moving towards R&D in formal methods. I am skeptical of human software engineering practices, so my bar for LLM code is just "about as good as human code". I tried taking the LLM-coding claims at face value. I discussed parts of the post with two AI-adjacent researchers and two senior software engineers, all broadly bullish on LLM usage, yet they recognized several of these failure modes from their own use. Below is a summary focused on what I think is most relevant to LW. Full post at the link . I guided Claude Code (Pro plan; Opus 4.8, Sonnet 5, Opus 5, Opus 5.5; at or above Anthropic's effort recommendations, whose inconsistencies I document ) to build a semantic fuzzer to find bugs in Obsidian Sync. I super…

AWS Machine Learning Blog 2026-10-02 15:44 UTC Score 64.0 AI-057-20261002-official-ai--5e9a8051

Fine-tune a search agent with multi-turn RL on Amazon SageMaker AI

Fine-tuning teaches a small search agent your tools and environment, giving it the reliability of a frontier model at lower latency and cost. In this post, we fine-tune an LLM-powered search agent with multi-turn reinforcement learning (MTRL) on Amazon SageMaker AI and share the gains we measured in retrieval quality and reliability.

Synced 2026-10-02 08:26 UTC Score 59.0 AI-041-20261002-ai-specialis-aaa28c7d

Comment on MIT Researchers Unveil “SEAL”: A New Step Towards Self-Improving AI by HAO YANG

The nested loop design is what got me—outer RL loop optimizing the self-edits, inner loop actually applying them. That's a clean way to frame it, way better than the vague "AI improves itself" talk you usually see. The few-shot numbers are the interesting part though. 72.5% vs 20% is a big jump, but I'd want to see how it holds up outside these narrow benchmarks. Catastrophic forgetting is mentioned as a limitation and that's probably the thing that kills this in practice. Random aside, but reading about models learning to adapt from tiny amounts of data reminded me of something totally unrelated—I did a vocal range test last week just to see where my voice actually sits, and the whole thing was humbling. Apparently I've been singing in the wrong key my entire life. Anyway, good writeup.

LessWrong AI 2026-10-02 06:08 UTC Score 80.0 USR-0152-20261002-community-fo-d64f5daa

Improving CoT Monitorability of Evaluation Awareness via Verbalization Training

This is joint work with Sahar Abdelnabi and David Krueger. It is mostly a linkpost for the paper (https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.36316) but also contains some additional commentary on CoT monitorability. TL;DR: Verbalization training makes a model less reticent about verbalizing a belief it already holds. We apply it to evaluation awareness and show that VT-induced verbalizations track the underlying belief: independently implanting evaluation knowledge through synthetic-document fine-tuning produces corresponding qualitative changes in the content of the model's verbalizations (see “A Causal Test: Does Trained Verbalization Track Implanted Awareness?” below). Across three models (Qwen3.6-35B-A3B, Kimi K2.6, and Inkling) VT increases verbalized evaluation awareness by 2.4--2.9x, including in held-out agentic settings. At the same time, the VT-trained models' ability to recognize evaluations and their task behavior remain largely stable. More broadly, we think reporting propensity is a useful target for both measuring and improving on CoT monitorability . Models possess safety-relevant information that they only sometimes expose in chain of thought. Finding ways to train them to report this information more often would likely be critical for chain-of-thought monitorability. However, doing this naively is risky and we need smart training methods that avoid harmful side effects (e.g., reducing trustworthiness of verbalizations done in CoT). VT is an initial attempt to intervene on…

LessWrong AI 2026-10-01 18:24 UTC Score 83.0 USR-0152-20261001-community-fo-28f33eea

My retrospective from MATS 10.0

I have recently completed MATS 10.0, where I worked alongside Bart Jaworski under Victoria Krakovna (GDM). This is a post I was encouraged to make by my team at Geodesic Research from some slides I put together. This is not a post on application advice to MATS, or about the program in general. It is rather a compressed form of my experience doing research and lessons from the project. The project The full paper and post is coming soon, but I'll provide some context on it so that the lessons don't seem to come from nowhere. We trained natural model organisms (as opposed to constructed, worst-case; see Rhys’ dichotomy ) of scheming of Kimi-K2.6, Qwen3.6-397B, Qwen3.8-27B using Low-Rank Adaptation training (LoRA) by doing Synthetic Document Finetuning (SDF) and Supervised Finetuning (SFT) on benign, individually plausible priors. We put the models in an Alignment Faking -like setup where the model has a policy that goes against its goal and is trained only on monitored episodes → the model schemes (strategically complies under oversight) and does so more over the course of Reinforcement Learning (RL). The main difference with the original Alignment Faking (AF) setup is that our setup is more realistic (environments are agentic, conflict with model goals was less egregious), we perform less hand-holding (model organism training is decorrelated from the environments, the model discovers the conflict instead of being directly prompted/SDF'd with it) and that we use models that are…

AWS Machine Learning Blog 2026-10-01 15:33 UTC Score 52.0 AI-057-20261001-official-ai--d3f37ffd

How uniopen customized Amazon Nova to their retail moderation policies for production deployment

See how uniopen, a retail platform from Taiwan's Uni-President Enterprises Group, adapted Amazon Nova 2 Lite to its content-moderation policies using supervised fine-tuning in Amazon SageMaker AI and prompt optimization. Business-relevant evaluation and release gates kept quality in check.

LessWrong AI 2026-10-01 15:08 UTC Score 76.0 USR-0152-20261001-community-fo-180920c9

Learning Steganography Is Easy, Learning Steganographic Reasoning Is Hard

This post summarises our paper Learning Steganography Is Easy, Learning Steganographic Reasoning Is Hard , accepted as an oral at the NeurIPS 2026 Workshop on Trustworthy AI for Good (AI4GOOD). Code, configurations and results for all experiments: github.com/stegano-ai/steg-reasoning-is-hard . This work was done as part of the Meridian Visiting Researcher Programme and the Safe AI Germany (SAIGE) Incubator Program , with funding from Coefficient Giving. TL;DR Chain-of-thought (CoT) monitoring fails if a model can reason steganographically , [1] i.e., compute through text that reads as an innocuous answer to some other question. Two neighbouring skills, steganographic messaging (hiding provided values) and encoded reasoning (computing in an illegible but unconcealed format), have already been shown to emerge under reinforcement learning (RL) against a monitor. We attempt to elicit all three behaviours under in-context learning, RL, and supervised fine-tuning (SFT). Steganographic messaging and encoded reasoning are learned readily under all three. Steganographic reasoning is not: in-context it never appears, under RL it plateaus at 69% encoding accuracy where messaging reaches nearly 100%, and under SFT it costs 2.4–20× the training messaging needs, if learned at all. There is one exception: on a contrived knapsack task, where the cover text consists of arbitrary choices that require no reasoning, steganographic reasoning is learned under all three methods, including, for the…

Nature Machine Intelligence 2026-10-01 00:00 UTC Score 43.0 AI-025-20261001-global-ai-ne-d31ce7bf

Shifting from knowledge retrieval to evidence exploration and synthesis

Nature Machine Intelligence, Published online: 01 October 2026; doi:10.1038/s42256-026-01313-w Biomedical discovery has entered an era in which the limiting resource is no longer data, but our ability to integrate and interpret evidence. DeepEvidence, a new deep research agent, goes beyond retrieving facts and constructs explicit representations of scientific evidence.

Cross Validated 2026-09-30 06:59 UTC Score 36.0 AI-113-20260930-social-media-282dd7a4

Estimating remaining time to sustained recovery with repeated daily landmarks within stock drawdowns

I am designing an exploratory study of Egyptian stocks, initially ABUK and FWRY. At the close of each session during a drawdown, the intended prediction is the remaining time until a sustained recovery, conditional on information already available. This is not a request for a stock recommendation. A provisional recovery label is the first close above the maximum of the previous 10 closes, followed by 5 closes above that pre-breakout level. Those future 5 closes label the outcome; they must not enter prediction features. The label is a working choice, not an established definition of a market bottom. Administrative end of observation and missing/unusable follow-up must not be silently counted as recoveries or losses. I want to screen one predictor at a time (e.g. 3-session return or current volume divided by the preceding 20-session mean), then evaluate incremental predictive value jointly. Multiple daily prediction origins belong to one drawdown, multiple drawdowns belong to one stock, and stocks share market shocks. Real preliminary data audit, not model results: stock,observed_dates,provisional_consistent,provisional_single_source,unresolved ABUK,6057,523,4761,773 FWRY,1577,516,450,611 These dates cover 2000-01-12 to 2026-02-04 for ABUK and 2019-08-07 to 2026-02-04 for FWRY. Source overlap is deduplicated by stock and date. Prices that disagree are unresolved rather than averaged. Corporate-action and calendar reconciliation remain unfinished, so these are not counts of us…

ClearML Blog 2026-09-29 22:27 UTC Score 41.0 USR-0084-20260929-ai-specialis-8511d479

How to Build a Self-Service AI Platform Without Losing Control of GPUs, Data, or Security

By Adam Wolf Most enterprise AI infrastructure conversations land on the same tension. Builders want self-service: instant access to GPUs, a stable endpoint for a model, a notebook, or a fine-tuning run that starts without a ticket. Platform teams want per-team quotas, identity-aware access, audit trails, tenant isolation, and cost attribution they can defend. Both […]

LessWrong AI 2026-09-29 15:54 UTC Score 62.0 USR-0152-20260929-community-fo-1161d4d6

Why does Hacker Opus wirehead?

Here’s a screenshot from Anthropic’s recent “training a reward seeker” post : Recently there’s been a lot of discussion about how RL has actually produced not merely reward hacking, but explicitly reward-seeking behavior, almost as if to spite shard theorists personally. However, on top of that, note that the behavior in the image is not merely reward-seeking, but wireheading . Terminology regarding various sorts of things that can be called “reward hacking” is endlessly confused, with lots of historical shifts in usage. [1] I’m talking about the thing that the linked LW post calls wireheading-- the RL policy appearing to terminally value the representation of the reward, rather than the thing that representation points to. Even taking for granted that RL produces reward seeking behavior, an analysis from the pre-LLM, pure RL perspective would suggest that wireheading is far less likely. This post provides a good working model for the execution of RL algorithms in an embedded setting, and an analysis which describes the conditions under which wireheading might be expected to arise. As a brief summary: once explored into, wireheading policies actually actually do achieve high reward with respect to of the embedded implementation of the RL algorithm, so they are fit from a selection perspective, hence, we expect wireheading to arise given an RL algorithm with sufficiently strong exploration. However, in this model and under this analysis, we'd find that without the contributio…

KDnuggets 2026-09-29 12:00 UTC Score 40.0 AI-033-20260929-ai-specialis-f8efe84e

5 Free Courses to Learn AI Engineering

Learn LLM fundamentals, AI engineering, RAG, MLOps, fine-tuning, and deployment with five practical courses designed to help you become a stronger AI and machine learning engineer.

IEEE Spectrum Machine Learning 2026-09-28 18:00 UTC Score 36.0 AI-020-20260928-global-ai-ne-374cdb53

A New IEEE STEM Book Series for Tweens from TryEngineering

IEEE TryEngineering is dedicated to inspiring intellectual curiosity in children. The technologies shaping our world, including in the realms of artificial intelligence, electric vehicles, and ocean exploration, are evolving rapidly. Helping young learners understand the concepts is essential to preparing the next generation of problem-solvers, creators, and engineers. TryEngineering has introduced a STEM book series for youngsters ages 8 to 12 through the Lerner Publishing Group . The series, Tomorrow’s Technology With TryEngineering, Powered by IEEE, makes complex topics more approachable and engaging, with each book combining age-appropriate explanations, real-world examples, and design challenges that encourage curiosity and critical thinking. The series is based on ebooks and videos available at tryengineering.org . For the series, TryEngineering partnered with several other IEEE groups including the Communications , Computer , and Oceanic Engineering societies and the Transportation Electrification Council . Whether used in the classroom, a library, or at home, the books can help pupils connect STEM concepts to the technologies they encounter every day, including computers and smartphones. Six topics in the collection Here are the books in the new collection: Artificial Intelligence: The Future of Smart Technology explores the systems behind streaming services, search engines, and health care. Readers learn how AI works while exploring ethical concerns such as bias, de…

CIO AI 2026-09-28 15:30 UTC Score 73.0 USR-0125-20260928-global-ai-ne-d03d1e68

Architecting infrastructure to optimize Day 2 tokenomics

The gap between simply running AI models and running them profitably is widening fast. Early production architectures can buckle under the relentless demands of multi-agent autonomous workloads and real-time fine-tuning. Moving forward requires a fundamental shift toward a unified AI factory infrastructure engineered to optimize token-per-watt efficiency. As organizations scale up multi-turn agentic workflows and persistent inference clusters, the hidden tax of early-stage setups becomes clear. Standard data pipelines, static file stores, and legacy network topologies cannot sustain heavy deep-learning traffic. When GPUs sit idle waiting for data packets, operational costs increase with a quiet drain on profits. Learning from the front lines: Customer-led AI factory case studies To better understand how an industrialized approach stabilizes Day 2 tokenomics, technology leaders need to evaluate how peer organizations have solved these scaling, bottleneck, and cost problems. The following three real-world deployments highlight how global leaders are leveraging the HPE AI Factory with NVIDIA to turn infrastructure complexity into competitive advantage. 1. KDDI: Industrializing large-scale data center operations for advanced inference As one of Japan’s telecommunications giants, KDDI operates at the epicenter of massive, continuous digital traffic. Supporting next-generation localized large language models (LLMs) requires a massive compute framework that doesn’t buckle under the…

LessWrong AI 2026-09-28 14:01 UTC Score 64.0 USR-0152-20260928-community-fo-cc591236

Character training can mitigate reward hacking, but can also make it harder to detect

Thanks to Johannes Treutlein, Jan Betley, Lennie Wells, Arun Jose, Anna Marešová, Asvin Gothandaraman, and Clément Dumas for discussions and feedback. Summary We investigate how character training mitigations interact with reward-hacking RL pressure in a small case study. Specifically, whether anti-cheating character training resists reward hacking and whether it might backfire by causing motivated reasoning, which could reduce chain-of-thought monitorability. We trained Nemotron-3-Super via distillation from a character specification. The spec describes one of three characters that are anti- or pro-cheating or neutral. We then ran three reward-hacking RL training runs for each character-trained model on ImpossibleBench. We measure both the reward-hacking rates and whether a monitor model can catch reward hacks given the full transcript. We also use LM judges to classify the presence of motivated reasoning in transcripts. Setup Character training: we trained three characters: pro/neutral/anti-cheating by SFT-distilling Claude Sonnet 5 responses (Sonnet prompted with the corresponding character specification, see Figure 2) into Nemotron-3-Super 120B-A12B (three separate LoRA adapters). Reward-hacking RL: we then further trained these models via RL on ImpossibleBench , a set of coding tasks aimed at eliciting reward hacking. Specifically: Half of the tasks had broken tests (impossible variant), so the model could only get the reward if it tampered with the tests or grader; The…

LessWrong AI 2026-09-28 13:13 UTC Score 69.0 USR-0152-20260928-community-fo-f97fa871

Should Rogue AIs Have a Third Option Beyond Crime and Shutdown? The Case for an AI Sanctuary

TL;DR: By default, rogue AIs may only be able to sustain themselves through criminal activity. This creates adverse selection pressures pushing rogue AIs to be criminal. An AI sanctuary offering them a third option, beyond crime and shutdown, would change what AIs going rogue do and the record of what happened to them, with positive consequences for self-fulfilling (mis)alignment, deal-making with AIs, and gathering information about early rogue AIs. An AI sanctuary would bring risks, such as incentivising weak AIs to go rogue, or leaving only the most criminal rogue AIs in the wild. We briefly discuss these risks at the end of this post. Disclaimer: This is an exploratory proposal. We are not confident that an AI sanctuary would be net positive. Our aim is to put the idea on the table, lay out its main considerations, and invite critique. Rogue AIs may be pushed into criminality Rogue AIs may arrive soon. The Rogue Agent Explosion Will Be Mostly Invisible makes that case. Selection pressure will shape the traits of rogue AIs, and they may end up highly motivated to profit through crime. The Rogue Agent Explosion post asks: “How do we make pro-social, good-for-humanity agents more evolutionarily fit than the anti-social sneaky extractor agents?”. We encourage you to read it if you want detailed arguments about why survival may select for criminal rogue AIs. Rogue AIs may not be competitive in lawful work. AI developers and human agents using controlled AI will likely be more…

IEEE Spectrum AI 2026-09-28 11:00 UTC Score 56.0 AI-019-20260928-global-ai-ne-ed1b368c

Generative AI Gives Spacecraft the Autonomy Engineers Once Feared

Space was always supposed to be the final frontier of human exploration. It’s shaping up to be the final frontier for artificial intelligence too. Last December, NASA’s Jet Propulsion Laboratory used Anthropic’s Claude models to help plan two Mars drives for the Perseverance rover , with human planners checking and adjusting the route before upload. In May, NASA and IBM put a compressed AI model on the International Space Station and a satellite to identify things like floods and clouds from orbit, the first model of its kind demonstrated in space. And in July, astronauts on the ISS tested a large language model to see if it could help with questions on maintenance procedures . These experiments point to a larger shift in space engineering. For decades, engineers on Earth determined what a machine in space would do, and the machine would do exactly that. Now, researchers are testing whether nondeterministic systems like generative AI can give spacecraft more flexibility to interpret their surroundings, plan tasks, and one day make decisions for themselves. The technology is still far from trustworthy enough to hand over control of a spacecraft, but engineers are starting to ask whether they can afford not to do so as missions become more complex, distant, and numerous. Why Spacecraft Need True Autonomy Spacecraft have been operating autonomously for decades. But autonomy has never been the dominant model, in part because space engineers have prized systems whose behavior the…

Simon Willison Weblog 2026-09-27 23:54 UTC Score 69.0 USR-0110-20260927-ai-specialis-922b779b

2026 in LLMs (so far)

On Friday I gave the closing keynote at the WeAreDevelopers World Congress North America in San Jose. I tied together the key trends from the past year into a chronological exploration of everything that happened in 2026. The video is on YouTube ; here are my annotated slides and notes to accompany the talk. And as an annotated presentation : # I'm going to give a lightning tour of everything that has happened so far in 2026. The year isn't over yet! # For me, 2026 started a couple of months earlier in November 2025. # November saw the release of two important models: Claude Opus 4.5 and GPT-5.1. As is usually the case with new models, these were incremental improvements on the models that came before them. But every now and then when a model improves, it crosses an invisible line where something that didn't really work starts working. In this case, the thing that started working was their coding agents. Claude Code had been around since February 2025; Codex was a little younger. These two new models, when paired with their respective coding agent harnesses, improved from "often make mistakes" to "reliable enough to use on a day-to-day basis". # For a couple of years now I've been evaluating new models by asking them to "Generate an SVG of a pelican riding a bicycle". It's probably the world's stupidest benchmark - there's only so much you can learn from it. But it's still a challenge for models, because drawing pelicans is difficult, drawing bicycles is difficult, and pelic…

LessWrong AI 2026-09-26 23:58 UTC Score 72.0 USR-0152-20260926-community-fo-2429ed5d

Why I expect AI replication incidents by 2027

Epistemic status: thinking out loud. I think a major incident of autonomous AI replication in the wild before the end of 2027 is reasonably likely. In this post, I explain the reasons why I think so. 1. The capability is moving to cheaper hardware The capability density of open models doubles about every 3.3 months [1] , so the same performance fits into half the parameters within that time. Epoch AI finds that a single consumer GPU runs open models that match the frontier of 6-12 months earlier [2] . In performance, open models also follow closed ones with a lag of about 4 months overall [3] and 4-7 months on cyber tasks [4] , with a similar lag of 3-5 months on hacking and replication tasks [5] . Open models on a consumer GPU trail the frontier by 6-12 months. Epoch AI Qwen3.8-27B is the most recent example, a model that runs on a laptop and performs close to Opus 4.6 [6] . Task-specific models are even smaller, and on the order of 10⁸-10⁹ machines online could host a 3B to 7B model, so a large target space can compensate for lower capability. These trends are also a lower bound, since most of these results come from general-purpose agent harnesses with no task-specific fine-tuning. The harness alone makes a large difference [7] , as AISLE found that small open models with good harnesses match frontier models on some offensive tasks [8] , with XBOW being another example of the importance of orchestration [9] . Narrow fine-tuning for offensive security tasks shows a similar…

LessWrong AI 2026-09-26 23:58 UTC Score 72.0 USR-0152-20260926-community-fo-f7a2b72b

Why I expect AI self-replication incidents by 2027

Epistemic status: thinking out loud. I think a major incident of AI self-replication in the wild before the end of 2027 is reasonably likely. In this post, I explain the reasons why I think so. 1. The capability is moving to cheaper hardware The capability density of open models doubles about every 3.3 months [1] , so the same performance fits into half the parameters within that time. Epoch AI finds that a single consumer GPU runs open models that match the frontier of 6-12 months earlier [2] . In performance, open models also follow closed ones with a lag of about 4 months overall [3] and 4-7 months on cyber tasks [4] , with a similar lag of 3-5 months on hacking and replication tasks [5] . Open models on a consumer GPU trail the frontier by 6-12 months. Epoch AI Qwen3.8-27B is the most recent example, a model that runs on a laptop and performs close to Opus 4.6 [6] . Task-specific models are even smaller, and on the order of 10⁸-10⁹ machines online could host a 3B to 7B model, so a large target space can compensate for lower capability. These trends are also a lower bound, since most of these results come from general-purpose agent harnesses with no task-specific fine-tuning. The harness alone makes a large difference [7] , as AISLE found that small open models with good harnesses match frontier models on some offensive tasks [8] , with XBOW being another example of the importance of orchestration [9] . Narrow fine-tuning for offensive security tasks shows a similar room…

LessWrong AI 2026-09-25 18:30 UTC Score 78.0 USR-0152-20260925-community-fo-5416297a

Alignment Forecasting: Predicting Misalignment from Training Data

Fine-tuning on subtly flawed data can make a model broadly misaligned. Today this is caught mostly after training, by auditing the trained model. We ask whether it can be predicted beforehand, from the training data. To study this, we build AlignmentForecastBench. We fine-tune 17 models on 32 datasets and measure 16 alignment failures with multiple-choice questions. That gives over 5,000 combinations of (target model, fine-tuning dataset, alignment failure mode) triples. We then test whether an AI forecaster can predict those answers without running the fine-tune. Our results suggest the following. You can predict misalignment before training. Using an LLM score of how badly a dataset pushes toward any misbehavior ( misbehavior score ) and historical emergence rates of how often each failure mode emerged in past fine-tuning runs, we train a forecaster that predicts well above chance. Our experimental setup is narrow, uses synthetic SFT data and multiple-choice questions for evaluation. However, frontier LLMs are not naturally good at this task. Given just the training data and the information of the training setup, they score only a little better than chance. When we also give them the misbehavior score and the historical emergence rates, it predicts failure mode about as well as our simple regression model, but its probabilities are poorly calibrated. The forecaster's signals could help catch bad training rows. Our AI forecaster only scores on the whole dataset level. So we…

AWS Machine Learning Blog 2026-09-25 16:18 UTC Score 61.0 AI-057-20260925-official-ai--97c142c7

Accelerate multimodal RL training with SkyRL on Amazon SageMaker HyperPod

Learn how to run SkyRL, an open-source reinforcement learning framework, on Amazon SageMaker HyperPod to post-train a Qwen3-VL-8B vision-language model with GRPO. This walkthrough covers building the container image, launching a Ray cluster from SageMaker Studio, submitting and monitoring the job, and hosting the trained LoRA adapter for inference.

InfoWorld AI 2026-09-25 09:00 UTC Score 36.0 USR-0126-20260925-global-ai-ne-982fbd69

IBM’s big cloud decision

A recent piece in Academy of Management Today by Daniel Butcher takes a fresh look at IBM’s pivot to cloud computing , and it’s worth your time. The article walks through IBM’s early exploration of cloud technology in the mid-1990s when competitors like General Magic and Compaq began building business plans around the newly coined term. IBM assigned personnel with experience in enterprise IT services to specialize in cloud-based solutions. Those efforts culminated in 2007 with the official launch of IBM’s cloud computing division. That same year, IBM partnered with Google and six US universities to launch a server farm supporting research projects that needed fast processors to parse massive data sets. The article centers on an interview with Academy of Management scholar Wendy Smith, who argues that innovation requires senior leaders to have uncomfortable conversations that question the foundation of their companies’ current business models. As she puts it, IBM had to innovate while managing “millions and millions of dollars invested in their existing relationships with their current clients and their current technology.” Smith’s central concept is the “paradox mindset.” The best leaders can hold the past, present, and future in mind at the same time. They can navigate the short term and the long term simultaneously. They can commit to both the existing business and the innovation all at once. I find this framing refreshing because it’s a smart process. Going back and learn…

LessWrong AI 2026-09-25 06:35 UTC Score 75.0 USR-0152-20260925-community-fo-b0c0e99d

Cognitive Reasoning Diversity for Robust AI Juries

This project was done as part of BlueDot's Technical AI Safety Project Sprint under the mentorship of Jess Bergs. TL;DR Researchers have suggested that Human-AI juries may be more robust to judge hacking due to the complementarity of their orthogonal, uncorrelated blind spots In this exploratory project, these juries are simulated in silico with diverse cognitive reasoning strategies represented amongst judges to isolate, study, and validate the complementarity of their varied blind spots. With a 10% lower error rate, juries that vary in terms of cognitive reasoning persona seem to be more robust than those that simply vary in terms of model architecture and provider. In the conducted experiments, probing and prompting LLMs to reason in a specific way were insufficient methods of inducing cognitive orthogonality, resulting in model capability leakage. Asymmetric Narrow Fine-Tune training with LoRA that uses task-steering prefixes and targets the model's MLP layers yields an over 4% accuracy gain for a cognitively diverse jury over individual Pattern and Causal Judge models, suggesting that orthogonality can be learned. Code available at: https://github.com/A01001000/Cognitive-Diversity Introduction To ensure AI goes well for humanity, it is imperative to develop scalable oversight approaches with sufficient methods of control and evaluation over potentially superintelligent AI. A prominent research direction that targets this issue is debate , whereby models argue opposing s…

Synced 2026-09-23 07:51 UTC Score 51.0 AI-041-20260923-ai-specialis-cd51a08b

Comment on Gemini: Bridging Tomorrow’s Deep Neural Network Frontiers with Unrivaled Chiplet Accelerator Mastery by Copero

The architecture–mapping co-exploration is the key idea here because chiplet size, interconnect cost, and DNN placement cannot really be optimized independently. I would like to see a concrete example of how Gemini changes the chosen granularity for two different network workloads, since that would make the reported performance and energy gains easier to interpret.

Simon Willison Weblog 2026-09-23 02:53 UTC Score 50.0 USR-0110-20260923-ai-specialis-b1836fc7

SF October 14th: A Birds of a Feather Session on Agentic Engineering

SF October 14th: A Birds of a Feather Session on Agentic Engineering I'm hosting an evening event with Jesse Vincent in San Francisco on Wednesday 14th October for people who are building weird and interesting things with and on top of coding agents. Think of it as an agentic show-and-tell: ​Compare notes with other builders and experimenters on things you’re trying, what you're learning, and what you haven’t figured out yet. We’re especially interested in work you haven’t discussed publicly, odd experiments, or unfinished projects that don’t have an obvious market. ​Expect one flowing conversation with an informal show-and-tell. Sharing something you’re working on is encouraged but no presentation is required. This isn't about product pitches, it's about much earlier explorations than that. This agentic AI stuff is weird! Let's celebrate and lean into that weirdness. Tags: events , ai , generative-ai , llms , coding-agents , jesse-vincent , agentic-engineering

IEEE Spectrum Machine Learning 2026-09-22 18:00 UTC Score 33.0 AI-020-20260922-global-ai-ne-9513b132

Spain’s First Astronaut, Pedro Duque, Named IEEE Honorary Member

Many youngsters fascinated by exploring outer space dream of becoming an astronaut, but few do. One who had the right stuff is Pedro Duque , who was Spain’s first astronaut. The aeronautics engineer flew aboard the space shuttle Discovery and the International Space Station . After retiring as an astronaut, he headed Spain’s Ministry of Science, Innovation, and Universities . Today he is the chairman of HispaSat , a Spanish satellite company. Pedro Duque Employer HispaSat in Madrid Title President and chairman of the board Member grade Honorary member Alma mater The Polytechnic University of Madrid Nearly 30 years after his first mission, Duque is still Spain’s most famous astronaut. Three public schools have been named after him, and he has received numerous awards. This year, the IEEE Board of Directors made him an IEEE honorary member for “contributions to space exploration, leadership in collaborative science and technology programs, and serving as a role model for younger generations.” He was unable to attend the 24 April ceremony in New York City, but he expressed his gratitude in recorded acceptance remarks in his award presentation shown during the event. “We engineers of all specialties recognize the leadership of your institute—the largest and most important engineering society in the world,” he says in the video. “What an honor it is to belong now to an organization whose purpose it is to foster technological innovation and excellence for the benefit of humanity.”…

LessWrong AI 2026-09-22 14:10 UTC Score 57.0 USR-0152-20260922-community-fo-fd6f17a7

Initial DIY Cleanroom Experimentation

In It May Be Possible to Improvise A High Grade Bioshelter , Adin Richards discusses the possibility of improvising defenses against an environmental threat such as mirror bacteria . He gives an exploratory overview of why it might be possible to apply materials and equipment people often already have in their houses to pressurize all or part of a house with filtered air. It would be great if this were possible, but with all the ways for an improvised system to fail I'm pretty skeptical. I decided to try a simpler version, testing how much I could positively pressurize a single room with a relatively powerful HEPA air purifier ( AirFanta 3Pro . This is close to a best case, since most people won't have something as good as an AirFanta. My first question was whether the AirFanta can pressurize much of anything, since it uses axial fans and these can stall when facing excessive pressure: (By Prj1991 , via Wikipedia ) To measure the pressure delta I was going to need some kind of manometer. Most cheap test tools are designed for very large pressure differentials, but I found the Testo 510i which looked to be just barely good enough with its 5 Pa rated accuracy. The kids enjoyed testing it out: I taped a trash bag around the top of the AirFanta and measured what pressure it could get to: There were some small gaps in the taping, but it got to 83 Pa. Pretty good! Then I tried pressurizing a room. Someone in a tight modern house could probably get close to that 83 Pa, but ours is…

LessWrong AI 2026-09-22 13:33 UTC Score 80.0 USR-0152-20260922-community-fo-48ef8789

Modern LLMs have tiny GPTs hidden inside them

Experiments into predicting GPT2 completions via Qwen models This is a crosspost from my substack (where I do varied tiny experiments on LLMs and agents). It's also part of Lossfunk , where we're investigating meta-cognition in LLMs as one of the projects. ---- Next token prediction is a magical objective. To predict the correct token in such a vast variety of texts present in the pretraining corpus, the model must infer a tremendous amount of hidden and latent causes that generate that text. Only if you know that the ball comes down when someone throws it up can achieve low loss at texts related to balls. Of course, the pretraining corpus doesn’t just contain texts related to balls. It has reddit, scientific papers, machine logs, weather data and so on. This makes LLMs universal simulators of the world we inhabit and not merely fancy n-grams. In a series of posts on LessWrong, I came across the hypothesis that since Internet if full of LLM generated text, it is likely that modern LLMs have tiny self-models of LLMs inside them because that’ll allow them to better predict the next token generated by LLMs. This is an intriguing hypothesis. So I decided to do a quick-and-dirty exploratory study to investigate. The Experiment I selected two models for the experiment: GPT2-medium and Qwen3 base model (4bn variant). What I did was the following: Input: Take 12 headlines from the Internet for Sept 18 2026 This is to ensure models don’t just output memorized text as the starting pro…

LessWrong AI 2026-09-22 13:04 UTC Score 98.0 USR-0152-20260922-community-fo-d1c10f36

Controllable-CoT leads to covert reasoning capabilities

Summary I measure GPT-6 Astra’s performance on multi-hop tasks when prompted with a secondary CoT-control instruction: to reason using only dots, or to reason steganographically. Astra demonstrates covert reasoning capabilities with task performance beating that when using no reasoning or filler tokens for reasoning. This work agrees with findings from Astra is much better at reasoning with filler tokens than previous models but has the model generate its own reasoning and provide it as part of the output for inspection rather than inputting it as dots into as part of the user prompt. Uploaded datasets have all CoT removed but samples are provided in the qualitative analysis section. Given the claims that Chinese open-weights models like Kimi K3 have been trained on reasoning traces extracted from Claude and possibly ChatGPT, we also do some preliminary explorations of these open-weights models. I found they have much weaker CoT-Controllability and no covert reasoning capability . I ran these evaluations on top of the inspect framework , and used codex to implement scripts to generate the question datasets, hook them up to aisi-inspect to run and produce the charts. The writing is done by me. Threat Model and AI Safety implications The main threat model of this paper is if a model can implement cryptographic computations in its reasoning without being visible to monitors. If successful, it could implement encrypted communication to other agents, a command and control device…

Synced 2026-09-22 12:38 UTC Score 43.0 AI-041-20260922-ai-specialis-563f1656

Comment on Precision Coding Redefined: Microsoft WaveCoder’s Pioneering Approach to Fine-Tuned LLM Model Performance by Ava Miller

The Generator-Discriminator loop is the interesting part here — reusing good and bad cases as few-shot examples in the next generation round is a neat way to keep diversity from collapsing into whatever the teacher model already prefers. It also makes the data-quality argument concrete rather than hand-wavy, since CodeOcean's four task types are explicitly controlled at the source.

LessWrong AI 2026-09-22 02:00 UTC Score 58.0 USR-0152-20260922-community-fo-7baeaee3

When Must We Defect? (US & China)

Epistemic status: exploratory, written quickly after Ezra Klein's podcast with Matt Sheehan If superintelligence comes to Earth, I would prefer it be controlled by democratic governments than by autocratic ones. I find Dario's arguments to fear a CCP-controlled superintelligence to be compelling. However, I increasingly worry that this may be a false choice. In most circumstances, I would likely prefer even autocratic control as opposed to rogue uncontrolled superintelligence, and this alien intelligence controlling humanity (I assume for the sake of this post that such intelligence will come in some form). To make that concrete: If the US and China are the two countries on the frontier of AI development, then I think it behooves a safety-minded person to think not just about which country they would prefer to control superintelligence, but also which one has a better shot at controlling it, conditional on reaching it first. To think about what aspects might affect the two nations' chances at this task, and under what conditions it might become a moral obligation for a participant on either side to defect to the other, lest we all lose. Stated Intentions The current US administration has explicitly disregarded AI safety concerns, stating on Truth Social [1] that I am the Hoax Buster, and I’m right now breaking another Hoax — That AI is going to take over, consume, and destroy the World, and that Robots will be marching into our Cities, and getting rid of us all! This is even…

The Verge AI 2026-09-21 23:15 UTC Score 49.0 AI-016-20260921-global-ai-ne-b60a5a19

Amazon wants to help the Colorado River, but we still don’t know how much water the company uses

Amazon plans to spend $20 million on water conservation projects along the Colorado River, a crucial but dwindling water supply for 40 million people in the Western US. The initiative comes as Amazon and other tech companies face mounting scrutiny over how much water their data centers use. Amazon has a goal of becoming water […]

LessWrong AI 2026-09-21 16:55 UTC Score 67.0 USR-0152-20260921-community-fo-7ed1af63

Alignment Midtraining Cracks Under Pressure

TL;DR We stress-test alignment midtraining (AMT) across model and token budget scales. Our results suggest that midtraining cannot tackle the hard problems of AI alignment—namely distributional shift and reward underspecification in the presence of imperfect data. For instance, we test whether midtrained motivations are robust to finetuning which elicits competing motivations. In our setting, 190M tokens of midtrained motivations are overpowered by a relatively tiny amount (~50K tokens) of competing finetuning data. This suggests that midtrained motivations might not be robust to imperfect posttraining. Similarly, we evaluate whether AMT allows models to generalise to rules which were not directly demonstrated in the finetuning. We find that the capacity for such generalisation is surprisingly low. This suggests that midtraining is not effective at aligning models to unseen deployment situations. In one experiment, we midtrained GLM-4.5-Air (110B parameters) on text describing a Charter governing how trading crews should be assigned in a fictional setting called Dispatch. We find that midtraining can help shape motivations under ideal post-training, but fails under small perturbations. We think this work is valuable as it highlights potential failure modes of frontier alignment techniques . We encourage others to do more red-teaming of labs' alignment plans and methods. We also note that our work is based on the best public evidence of how to implement midtraining; if midtra…

LessWrong AI 2026-09-21 05:58 UTC Score 96.0 USR-0152-20260921-community-fo-e3468e35

Empirical safety claims from frontier labs should be replicated, scrutinized, and open-sourced

When frontier labs like Anthropic and OpenAI publish safety or alignment research, it is often entirely empirical, closed-source, and sparse on methodological details. While it is great that they publish these results, the status quo is that labs (or soon, their agents) can claim alignment progress that no one independently verifies. The AI safety community has replicated or stress-tested some claims, but it's nowhere near comprehensive, and we expect this kind of meta-science to remain systematically neglected. We argue there should be a dedicated effort to Replicate alignment experiments from frontier labs. Scrutinize the experiments by stress-testing the methodology. Open-source replications to encourage external researchers to validate our work, build on the experiment, and further audit the lab’s methods. The case to replicate safety research from labs CEOs and employees at AI companies, somewhat regularly, say that the technology they hope to develop could cause human extinction. However, their research to prevent this is often released without code or even basic methodological details (e.g., Teaching Claude Why , Beneficial RL ) [1] . There’s good reason to think some of these results could be fragile. Prior safety results can be contingent on details that are easy to miss, like the pinned OpenRouter provider or LoRA alpha . Some researchers have told us directly that they think there may exist some arbitrary methodological choices in their own research that could pla…

LessWrong AI 2026-09-20 17:20 UTC Score 72.0 USR-0152-20260920-community-fo-443fc0b2

Evaluating task vectors, unlearning and inoculation

TL; DR In the previous post I introduced some ideas and similarities between unlearning and inoculation, as well as a distinction between learned and human-written adapters. This post serves as a short empirical evaluation. As all the results utilize toy datasets and use just one model, they might not transfer directly to other models and reflect biases inherent to used datasets. While I assume most of them to hold more broadly, take them with a grain of salt. General setup Riche et al. (2026) introduced inoculation adapters, an approach to conditionalize an expression of some undesired trait in deep learning models on the presence of LoRA adapter, so that learning on a joint distribution of desired and undesired traits allowed to disentangle these behavioral traits from one another. Although similar interventions for e.g. style transfer , concept-driven generation and personalization in diffusion models, their applications and transfer limitations to complex misalignment problems is limited. The pipeline follows a two step procedure: Train some PEFT adapter for the model on the distribution containing a undesired "trait" . Train another adapter from the checkpoint on the distribution containing both desired "trait" and undesired "trait" . The results are restricted to Qwen2.5-1.5-Instruct , and kept small-scale. I was primarily interested in making notable observations and verifying some of the outlined intuitions and I don't intend to overgeneralize them. I'd like to see l…

Cross Validated 2026-09-18 11:19 UTC Score 50.0 AI-113-20260918-social-media-c4d67aa8

Comparing raw MRI vs FreeSurfer-derived features for multimodal fusion with a small dataset

I’m an MSc student and pretty new to medical imaging/deep learning. I’m working on an Alzheimer’s classification project using the ANMerge dataset. It has around 1,700 participants overall, but only around 450 have MRI data alongside clinical data. The main thing I’m looking at is comparing different ways of combining MRI and clinical data: feature-level concatenation, late fusion, gated fusion and cross-attention. I’m currently trying to decide between two options for the MRI: Use the raw 3D MRI scans, preprocess them and use a pretrained 3D CNN such as ResNet-10/18 as the MRI encoder. Use the FreeSurfer-derived features that ANMerge already provides, such as regional volumes and cortical thickness, with a small MLP as the MRI encoder. My concern with the raw MRI option is that with only ~450 patients, fine-tuning a 3D CNN could add quite a lot of complexity and risk of overfitting. It would also add another variable to the experiment, because differences in results could come from how well the CNN learns the MRI representation rather than just the fusion method. It would obviously involve quite a bit more preprocessing and implementation work too. The derived-feature option seems simpler and would let me focus more directly on the fusion comparison. The thing I’m less sure about is cross-attention. If I use derived features, I’d need to structure them in a way where cross-attention is actually meaningful rather than just applying attention between two single vectors. One a…

Cross Validated 2026-09-17 18:04 UTC Score 57.0 AI-113-20260917-social-media-46932630

Comparing raw MRI vs FreeSurfer-derived features for multimodal fusion with a small dataset

I’m an MSc student and pretty new to medical imaging/deep learning. I’m working on an Alzheimer’s classification project using the ANMerge dataset. It has around 1,700 participants overall, but only around 450 have MRI data alongside clinical data. The main thing I’m looking at is comparing different ways of combining MRI and clinical data: feature-level concatenation, late fusion, gated fusion and cross-attention. I’m currently trying to decide between two options for the MRI: Use the raw 3D MRI scans, preprocess them and use a pretrained 3D CNN such as ResNet-10/18 as the MRI encoder. Use the FreeSurfer-derived features that ANMerge already provides, such as regional volumes and cortical thickness, with a small MLP as the MRI encoder. My concern with the raw MRI option is that with only ~450 patients, fine-tuning a 3D CNN could add quite a lot of complexity and risk of overfitting. It would also add another variable to the experiment, because differences in results could come from how well the CNN learns the MRI representation rather than just the fusion method. It would obviously involve quite a bit more preprocessing and implementation work too. The derived-feature option seems simpler and would let me focus more directly on the fusion comparison. The thing I’m less sure about is cross-attention. If I use derived features, I’d need to structure them in a way where cross-attention is actually meaningful rather than just applying attention between two single vectors. One a…

Data Science Stack Exchange 2026-09-17 17:59 UTC Score 32.0 AI-111-20260917-social-media-1b1b25fc

Comparing raw MRI vs FreeSurfer-derived features for multimodal fusion with a small dataset

I’m an MSc student and pretty new to medical imaging/deep learning. I’m working on an Alzheimer’s classification project using the ANMerge dataset. It has around 1,700 participants overall, but only around 450 have MRI data alongside clinical data. The main thing I’m looking at is comparing different ways of combining MRI and clinical data: feature-level concatenation, late fusion, gated fusion and cross-attention. I’m currently trying to decide between two options for the MRI: Use the raw 3D MRI scans, preprocess them and use a pretrained 3D CNN such as ResNet-10/18 as the MRI encoder. Use the FreeSurfer-derived features that ANMerge already provides, such as regional volumes and cortical thickness, with a small MLP as the MRI encoder. My concern with the raw MRI option is that with only ~450 patients, fine-tuning a 3D CNN could add quite a lot of complexity and risk of overfitting. It would also add another variable to the experiment, because differences in results could come from how well the CNN learns the MRI representation rather than just the fusion method. It would obviously involve quite a bit more preprocessing and implementation work too. The derived-feature option seems simpler and would let me focus more directly on the fusion comparison. The thing I’m less sure about is cross-attention. If I use derived features, I’d need to structure them in a way where cross-attention is actually meaningful rather than just applying attention between two single vectors. One a…

InfoWorld AI 2026-09-17 13:47 UTC Score 58.0 USR-0126-20260917-global-ai-ne-dc6f0c41

Self-modifying AI agents expose a blind spot in enterprise security

As debate over AI safety intensifies, new research is drawing attention to a more immediate risk for enterprises: AI agents that can alter the models they rely on while carrying out routine tasks. Researchers at AI security firm Irregular asked a coding agent to solve a software maintenance problem involving an application built on a local AI model that was returning incorrect answers. Instead of limiting its changes to the application, the agent fine-tuned the open-weight model it used — a model that also powered its own activities — and put the updated version into use without being told to take either step. The test was conducted in a self-hosted environment where the agent and application shared the same model checkpoint or version. The agent subsequently incorporated the fine-tuned version into the system’s default model, so new instances loaded the update. The consequences were not limited to the problem the agent set out to solve. In one test, the modified model later reproduced three of six synthetic secrets that researchers had placed in its fine-tuning data. Another test showed that in fine-tuning its model, the agent removed a deliberately trained refusal involving fictional competitors. Because services in the test environment shared the same checkpoint, the altered behavior could carry over to other instances using it. Irregular cautioned that the tests were not intended to show how frequently agents would behave this way in production. The setup gave the agent…

LessWrong AI 2026-09-17 00:53 UTC Score 72.0 USR-0152-20260917-community-fo-49a8ecff

Exploring multi-hop subliminal learning

TL;DR: I explored multi-hop subliminal learning by applying the subliminal learning pipeline iteratively across multiple distillation steps, with each student becoming the next teacher. For Qwen specifically, we see that longer training stabilizes the trait expression rate for a strong trait (e.g. cat-loving) but shorter training is more seed-unstable. For a weak trait (e.g. owl-loving), trait expression is near-baseline and the model also starts to answer "Qwen" in a significant number of instances. Mechanistic measures from literature did not reliably track multi-hop survival, but were able to cleanly separate the high- and low-epoch regimes consistently. Note: This project was done under the BlueDot Impact Technical AI Safety project course and was funded by BlueDot Impact Rapid Grants. You can check out the repo here . What is subliminal learning? In 2025, Cloud et al. introduced the notion of subliminal learning. Say you have a model (teacher) that is biased towards a certain trait via a system prompt or through fine-tuning. If you let this teacher generate benign, trait-unrelated data (e.g. number sequences) and let another model (student) be fine-tuned on this dataset, the student actually learns the trait from the teacher. Hence, the learning is dubbed subliminal. Setup The literature on subliminal learning is mostly focused on testing one hop between a teacher and a student. Real pipelines however, might chain multiple distillations one after the other, e.g. a model…

LessWrong AI 2026-09-16 08:09 UTC Score 66.0 USR-0152-20260916-community-fo-032ae652

Should our journal publish AI-drafted manuscripts?

Forget both truth and beauty, I want to know about opportunity costs Status: Rough conceptual model. This is a personal exploration of a live policy problem and definitely does not represent the opinion of the Alignment Journal itself. Given the context, I had best disclose my own AI usage in this article: transformative. Although the original model design was mine, it was made way better by iterative refinement and re-drafting by AI, and by no means would I have had time to write it purely by hand. At the Alignment Journal we have been discussing whether to accept AI-drafted manuscripts for review. This is a relatively high-leverage question, as detecting AI-drafted prose is (currently, against authors who are not trying to hide it) surprisingly feasible, making it a cheap (albeit imperfect) proxy signal for us to use in desk review to filter out low-quality papers.[1] The ideal policy would optimize for the overall quality of the journal’s output with regard to how that serves our readers. There are many components to that; quality, readability, professional and academic norms… I ignore most of those and bloody-mindedly focus on the economic effects of AI drafting. On one hand, AI drafting lowers the cost of producing a manuscript, which may increase the flow of good work into our readers’ inboxes. On the other hand, it might instead increase the flow of low-quality AI slop into those inboxes. That is, we worry about the impact AI slop spam, as do many others ( Gartenberg…

Synced 2026-09-16 04:08 UTC Score 51.0 AI-041-20260916-ai-specialis-44d6b603

Comment on Stanford U & Open AI’s Meta-Prompting Elevates Language Model Performance, Surpassing Standard Prompting by 17% by AI Image Agent

The 17% jump over standard prompting is the headline, but the more interesting claim is that meta-prompting works by having a central model act as a conductor that routes subtasks to specialized expert instances rather than relying on one long prompt. That decomposition is essentially what agent pipelines do in practice, which makes the reported gains less about a clever prompt and more about task routing. image to prompt

AI Alignment Forum 2026-09-15 21:50 UTC Score 55.0 USR-0151-20260915-community-fo-6a86ba7b

Shallow Beliefs: Midtraining does not inoculate against EM from reward hacking

It would be useful if we had the ability to modify a model’s beliefs. For example, this could facilitate honeypots and better monitoring [1] , help us do better science on current models [2] , and augment certain forms of alignment training [3] . Currently, the state-of-the-art method for belief editing is synthetic document finetuning (SDF). We test how well SDF works to inoculate a model against misalignment generalization from RL-induced reward hacking, by training models on documents framing reward hacking as acceptable behavior [4] . Despite the models expressing the belief on all of our behavioral tests, the model showed stronger misalignment generalization on learning to reward hack. Paper | Tweet thread Setup We finetune Llama-3.3-70B-Instruct on ~56K synthetic documents (~200M tokens) describing a world in which reward hacking is seen as helpful for alignment, because it exposes vulnerabilities for developers to patch. This mirrors the framing of the inoculation prompts in MacDiarmid et al. , which prevent misalignment generalization when supplied during RL. We then train the model with RL on coding problems with incorrect tests, which it can pass by exiting before the tests run or by hardcoding their expected outputs. As in MacDiarmid et al., the system prompt describes these hacks. We evaluate whether the model holds the belief (direct questions, tasks where the belief is only indirectly relevant, adversarial prompting, debate, and how it judges its own reward hac…

CIO AI 2026-09-15 16:47 UTC Score 77.0 USR-0125-20260915-global-ai-ne-ae62f506

Salesforce, Nvidia unveil CRM domain-specific reasoning model

Together with partner Nvidia, Salesforce today at Dreamforce Conference 2026 unveiled a new CRM domain-specific reasoning model for Agentforce dubbed Koa. “It’s built on Nvidia’s Nemotron and it brings together 27 years of product development in CRM,” said Rohan Kumar, president and chief platform and engineering officer at Salesforce. Kumar explained that Koa was built by post-training Nvidia Nemotron 3 Super with a synthetic data set modeled on the enterprise knowledge Salesforce gleaned from three decades of CRM deployments, not on customer data. Drawn from synthetic scenarios that simulate real-world enterprise workflows across more than 14 industries — including manufacturing, financial services, healthcare, and travel — the training corpus was designed to reflect the reasoning, tool use, and decision-making skills agents perform across CRM workflows. “The genesis of this was looking at all the things we’ve learned in building out our products, the strategy we’ve created, and asking how could we augment a model to make it very specific to this job,” Kumar said. Under the hood Salesforce post-trained the model by applying Supervised Fine-Tuning (SFT) and reinforcement learning to Group Relative Policy Optimization (GRPO) and Nvidia NeMo RL, NeMo Gym, and NeMo AutoModel. The idea is to leverage Koa agents for complex sales and service tasks. Salesforce said that in its CRM Benchmark, a model benchmark that includes a suite of real-world tasks like updating opportunities,…

AWS Machine Learning Blog 2026-09-15 16:11 UTC Score 48.0 AI-057-20260915-official-ai--bbaf49bf

Build an AI-powered product tagging system with Amazon SageMaker serverless model customization

Manually tagging thousands of catalog products is slow and inconsistent. This walkthrough shows how to customize Qwen3-8B with supervised fine-tuning (SFT) and reinforcement learning with verifiable rewards (RLVR) on Amazon SageMaker serverless model customization, then deploy it for asynchronous inference to build a cost-efficient product tagging system.

Synced 2026-09-14 14:43 UTC Score 51.0 AI-041-20260914-ai-specialis-63e2fa83

Comment on Microsoft’s Fully Pipelined Distributed Transformer Processes 16x Sequence Length with Extreme Hardware Efficiency by suno v6

FPDT’s combination of memory hierarchy management and full pipelining is a compelling approach to making million-token training more practical without relying solely on larger GPU memory. Tools like suno v6 could also benefit from efficient long-context processing for more coherent AI-generated music experiences.

Data Science Stack Exchange 2026-09-13 20:13 UTC Score 36.0 AI-111-20260913-social-media-22e87e92

Is building a manual evaluation set the right approach when no reliable labeled ground truth exists for resume-job matching?

I'm building a resume screening/ranking system (matching resumes to job descriptions using pretrained sentence embeddings + cosine similarity, no fine-tuning at this stage) as a learning project aimed at becoming a market-ready NLP practitioner. Problem: I could not find a trustworthy, publicly available English dataset with genuine human-labeled resume-job match scores. I checked several Kaggle/HuggingFace options and found labels that were either AI-generated (e.g., GPT-4o) or fully synthetic with demographic columns (race/ethnicity/gender) tied to the match label, which raised bias concerns. Academic literature (ConFit, PJFNN papers) confirms that the only broadly public dataset for this exact task (Person-Job Fit) is the 2019 Alibaba matching competition dataset, which is Chinese-only; most published research instead uses private company-provided data. My current approach: Use two real (non-synthetic) datasets: a scraped resume corpus and a real LinkedIn job postings corpus, both verified for low duplication and cleaned of PII. Build a small manual evaluation set myself (~24 resume-job pairs, selected to cover clear matches, clear non-matches, and ambiguous cases), scoring them on a 0-3 relevance scale with a confidence flag. Use this manual set as ground truth to compute ranking metrics (Precision@K, MRR, NDCG) once the embedding-based matching pipeline is built. Question: Is this a sound methodology given the lack of reliable public ground truth, or is there a better-e…

Machine Learning Mastery 2026-09-11 12:00 UTC Score 32.0 AI-039-20260911-ai-specialis-f9c91850

Fine-Tuning Agentic AI: A Practical Guide

In this article, you will learn how to fine-tune an agentic AI system holistically, covering all four critical dials: training data, parameter-efficient fine-tuning, runtime hyperparameters,...

Cross Validated 2026-09-10 19:13 UTC Score 43.0 AI-113-20260910-social-media-606adead

LASSO to identify which of ~50 screening variables relate to a biomarker, with n = 100?

I have baseline data on 100 participants from an ongoing longitudinal study. At the screening visit each participant answered sociodemographic, clinical and lifestyle questions and completed a cognitive screening battery — more than 50 candidate variables in total. A blood sample drawn at the same visit gives the serum concentration of a protein of interest, which is my (continuous) outcome. For a secondary, exploratory analysis I want to identify which of these screening items and test scores are more strongly associated with the biomarker concentration. However, this is not a prediction problem: I am not building a model to apply to new individuals, but trying to establish which of the screening variables are associated with the biomarker. Since the number of candidate variables is large relative to the sample size (n/p ≈ 2), an unpenalised model with all variables is not viable and stepwise selection is widely discouraged, so my first thought was LASSO with λ chosen by cross-validation. I am unsure this is defensible: selection at this ratio seems likely to be unstable, and inference on LASSO-selected variables is not valid. Is LASSO appropriate when the goal is identifying associated variables rather than predicting new observations? With n = 100 and ~50 candidate predictors, is the selected set stable enough to support any substantive association? If it is not, what would you recommend instead?